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KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
 
For ease of reading and reference the key terms listed on the ‘summary page’ and 
some additional important concepts are briefly explained below.  These terms and 
concepts are more thoroughly treated in the main body of the text. 
1. Syro-Palestine 
The secular term for the territory coinciding with Israel, Lebanon, southern Syria, 
Jordan, the northern reaches of the Arabian Peninsula, and the Levant.  In short, the 
territory over which the United Kingdoms of Saul, David and Solomon exercised 
political influence.  Such lesser political entities had begun to emerge in the wake of 
the tumultuous large scale migrations that occurred at the end of the Late Bronze Age.  
The weakening of the traditional great powers allowed for the emergence of smaller 
regional powers and princedoms for the first time in this strategic land bridge region 
of the ancient Near East (Miller & Hayes, 1986:28).       
2. Iron Age II a 
A technical archaeological temporal reference, denoting the years (ca. 1045 – 931 / 30 
B.C.E).  This time frame has relevance as applied to the spatial unit ‘Syro-Palestine’ 
(Bimson, Kane, Paterson, & Wiseman, 1992:20).    
3. Polemology 
The branch of political science that treats the scientific study and classification of 
warfare.  It derives its name from one of the ancient magistrates of the Greek city 
states made responsible for military affairs (i.e.) the polemarch (The Consolidated-
Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary … 1962, s.v. ‘polemarch’).e  
4. Military Statecraft 
Statecraft is defined as “The art of conducting state affairs” (The Consolidated-
Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary … 1962, s.v. ‘statecraft’).  Military statecraft is thus 
that form of political dialect between political actors (usually nation-states in modern 
international politics), using or threatening the use of coercion in order to achieve a 
political goal. 
5. Foundations of Military Force 
A broad polemological concept designed to objectively measure a political entity’s 
capacity for military statecraft, both defensively and offensively.  The scope of the 
study entails the war potential, the military potential, the technological sophistry, and 
all aspects of logistics of the entity (STUSTO-S Only study guide, 1996:69). 
6. War Potential 
A political entity’s capacity to engage in warfare.  It is an all-inclusive assessment of 
tangible and intangible factors, ranging from psychology, the national economy, 
political alliances, geographical location, manpower, levels of training and education, 
cultural heritage, demographic profile, ethnic cleavages in the given entity, strength of 
national cohesion, food and water security, political regime, and many other factors 
(STUSTO-S Only study guide, 1996: 70).   
7. Military Potential 
The capacity to engage only in restricted military action, such as the allocated armed 
forces to a given theatre of military operations or a military expedition or mission, 
whatever its nature (STUSTO-S Only study guide, 1996:70). 
8. Technology 
“That branch of knowledge which deals with the various industrial arts” (The 
Consolidated-Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary… 1962, s.v. ‘technology’).  In the 
context of the pre-industrial time period of this dissertation, the word technology is a 
general reference to the scale and sophistry of a political entity’s productive 
occupation.   
9. Logistics 
The science of movement and supply, including communications (STUSTO-S Only 
study guide, 1996:70) 
10. Strategy 
A complex term with at least three subdivisions according to scale of engagement, 
command and control.  All generally levels of strategy embrace the ideal of creating 
circumstances for overcoming the enemy by force.  The three subdivisions of strategy 
are total strategy (sometimes ‘national strategy’), involving the highest authorities of 
a political entity in the selection of objectives and the allocation of resources for the 
attainment of a political objective (STUSTO-S Only study guide, 1996:19).  General 
strategy deals with the overall conduct of military operations in a given theatre and 
usually involving the most senior commanders or the companions and personal 
retainers of the king.  It especially deals with the broad selection of the method of 
engaging another power until a conclusion has been reached (STUSTO-S Only study 
guide, 1996:20-21).  Lastly, operational strategy is where conception and execution 
meet.  Operational strategies are used to execute general strategies (STUSTO-S Only 
study guide, 1996:23).  A simple, abstract definition for strategy is given by Fourie as: 
“the method of using means of coercion to create an untenable situation for an 
opponent” (STUSTO-S Only study guide, 1996:15). 
11. Tactics 
The disposing of fighting forces once they have engaged the enemy.  While strategy 
need not necessarily involve actual fighting, tactics always does (STUSTO-S Only 
study guide, 1996:13). 
12. Weapons 
Any instrument of offence or defence in the combating of enemies.  These are 
catalogued according to their chief characteristics (i.e.) melee or ballistic, edged or 
concussive etc. (The Consolidated-Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1962 … s.v. 
‘weapons’). 
13. Defensive Armour 
Any covering of the body or vehicle for the purpose of increasing personal security in 
a dangerous setting.  Against the backdrop of combat tactics: to increase a soldier’s 
chances for survival on the battlefield. 
14. Military Architecture 
Temporary or permanent fortifications are the hallmarks of a defensive general 
strategy (Montgomery, 1972:152).  The prevalence of such architecture, designed to 
optimise the defensive value of strategically important sites, is a useful gauge in itself 
in fathoming the degree of political stability of a given period of history.  In 
conjunction with topographical factors, weather patterns,  seasons, engineering and 
capacity, military architecture is also a useful mirror of both the war and military 
potentials of the political powers in that period and in that region. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is essentially a study of a selected ancient political dynamic that 
affected the world of the common man in the biblical land of Canaan during the 
archaeological period known as Iron Age IIa (henceforth IA IIa).  It is not a review of 
general political history in a given time and place, supplemented by a study of the in 
situ cultural remains of that place.  Rather, the content of this work aims to 
specifically examine the expression of the political dynamic as it pertains to military 
statecraft.  The underlying question throughout this dissertation is to what degree has 
military statecraft served as the principal means to political ends during Canaan’s IA 
IIa period.  
 
Essential here is the Clausewitzian proposition that military statecraft in its basest 
form, i.e. warfare, is simply a continuation of political discourse by means of another 
form of language or communication.  This idea is born out by the record of pandemic 
warfare among human beings in all ages and in all places.  Even where the textual 
records fail us, the evidence of the social scourge of warfare can be found by an 
appeal to the cultural remains in most instances.  This dissertation has as its goal to 
affirm the proposition that an accurate study of the warfare in a given time and place 
can serve as an accurate index to the lifeworld of such people, especially the nature of 
their polity.  A study of the character of a polity may yield some insights as to the 
values of such a society.  The outcome will yield much helpful data necessary for the 
reconstruction of the cultural components of such a lifeworld.   
 
Polemology (from the Greek word polemos that means ‘war’, and logos, meaning ‘the 
study of’) will largely provide the conceptual framework for this study.  Polemology 
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is known more commonly as strategic studies.  It is a relatively new field of scientific 
enquiry, notwithstanding the plethora of pseudo-scientific writings that have been 
produced over the centuries, including within living memory.  Its beginning as an 
academic discipline goes back only a very short way, to the early Cold War days 
following the Second World War.   Ironically, ‘polemology’ may be new as a 
scientific discipline but the social phenomenon of war dates back to mankind’s 
earliest efforts at civilisation (Fourie, 1996:3–4).  This relatively new field of 
scientific enquiry, when studied in conjunction with archaeology produces the sub-
discipline of military archaeology.  This dissertation attempts to make a contribution 
to this synthetic sub-discipline, as it pertains to the common man during IA IIa in the 
land of Canaan.   
 
Competence in any subject calls for a clear understanding of the constituent concepts 
that will be encountered in that particular course of study.  Studies in the humanities 
and social sciences are notorious for the freewheeling, undisciplined use of words and 
terms, a practice that tends to foster confusion and inaccuracies. Clarity of thought 
will obtain to the degree that there is clarity of concepts, which in turn requires clarity 
about terms (Fourie, 1996:46).  The foundation of military force is the central concept 
throughout this dissertation.  It is a multiplex concept that embraces several 
significant aspects of military statecraft.  It measures particularly the military 
potential and the war potential of a political entity, be they an ancient tribe or 
confederation of tribes, the ancient equivalent of the nation state, or any other form of 
political collective.  The foundation of military force is a scientific measurement 
concept that aims to assess a political entity’s potential and existing military capacity 
to wage and sustain war at any given time.  In as much as the concepts war potential 
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and military potential are concepts that are used frequently throughout this 
dissertation, it is necessary to explain briefly their meaning before going further.  War 
potential is the sum total of a political entities resource base, including tangible and 
intangible factors within that society that contribute to its resource base.  Military 
potential on the other hand refers to forces specifically available at a given time in a 
given place for a given purpose.  In physics terms, war potential is to potential energy 
as military potential is to kinetic energy.  Such potentials also entail the scope and 
standards of technological sophistry and all aspects of logistics.  A more complete 
discussion on war and military potentials follows in chapter four.   
 
The third chapter argues the merits of a retroactive analogous approach for a review 
of the foundations of military force in Syro-Palestine during this time.  The 
constituent elements of such military force are outlined in detail in the third chapter 
with care being taken not to give mere lip service to the issue of logistics.  Technical 
aspects of the foundations of military force, to the extent it existed within the various 
political entities, were made manifest by the tactics employed and in the doctrines 
governing operational strategies.  As is typically still the case in the modern world, 
technology was readily adapted to military means with doctrines carefully devised to 
suit, for gaining the advantage in the pursuit of political ends.  
 
An analogous approach is the principal research attitude of this dissertation.  Care has 
been taken to avoid careless ethnocentric and anachronistic errors.  Misuse of even 
sophisticated tools in the workshop still results in a poor quality product.  There are 
certain constants in polemology that do not vary from one period to another and lend 
credibility to such an approach.  These include, inter alia, geographic distances, 
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nutritional requirements for sustaining human and other animal life, and the 
employment of war as a political instrument of means in all ages.  Some factors have 
undergone only moderate change since IA IIa so can be allowed for with an 
acceptable degree of tolerance, such as weather patterns and the kinds of foodstuffs 
that can be produced in the region.  There are however some components of the 
lifeworld of man that have altered radically and knowledge of these are vitally 
important to the integrity of the conclusions of this dissertation.  In anthropological 
terms, these radically changing components included historical awareness, religion, 
politics, social norms and relationships, economic and commercial activities, forms of 
education and even recreation (Vermaak, 1996 b: p.5). 
 
The effective mustering and employment of military potential, and ultimately even a 
political entity’s war potential, generally constitutes the business of strategy.  Strategy 
is the next persisting theme of this paper.  A detailed discussion of this ‘umbrella’ 
concept is given in chapter four.  The premise at work throughout this dissertation is 
that a careful analysis of the foundations of military force will yield many fruitful 
insights to supplement our conceptions of this period.  The temporal and spatial 
context will be primarily Syro-Palestine during IA IIa, but this must be studied within 
the cultural context of the Ancient Near East at large.  A brief historical survey of the 
region during IA IIa serves as the point of departure.  Particular attention is given to 
Israel, which at the time of IA IIa was making the socio-political transition from 
confederated tribes to a unique brand of theocratic monarchy.  This invites the 
reminder that technology and logistics are only two dimensions of the overall scope of 
strategy.  The social dimension of strategy in warfare is a measurement of societal 
cohesiveness, unity of purpose, or in layman’s terms, the capacity of the people to 
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endure common stress and hardship to attain the political objective.  This is a vitally 
important dimension of strategy, which if ignored or misunderstood, will bring 
political disaster in its train. To illustrate, notwithstanding their technological and 
logistical superiority in the Vietnam War, France and then the United States of 
America was decisively defeated in turn by their communist Vietnamese opponents.  
The latter were inferior to them logistically and technically, but vastly superior in its 
social cohesiveness, i.e. the social dimension of strategy. 
   
Ancient case studies that bear out concepts from modern studies of polemology can 
be found provided researchers eyes are trained to be adequately sensitive to all the 
dimensions of strategy.  Regarding the social dimension, the Maccabaean Wars 
against the Seleucids of Hellenistic Syria and even the Israelite invasion of Canaan 
under Joshua’s leadership are relevant case studies for the social dimension of 
strategy.  Some scholars have also labelled aspects of this dimension of strategy as 
‘psychological warfare’.  The mass deportation of conquered enemies by the 
Assyrians, and by the Neo-Babylonians after them, sought to achieve political 
objectives by means of the social dimension of strategy, i.e., the break-up of social 
cohesiveness and unity of enemy political entities.  The eventual total loss of the ten 
northern tribes of Israel, as a constituted political entity, points to the success of this 
strategy employed by the Assyrians.  Their ruthless treatment of rebellious subjugated 
peoples or intransigent enemies was another aspect of the social dimension of strategy 
employed by the Assyrians.  Ancient Israel’s treatment of conquered Canaanite city-
states during Iron Age Ia and b identifies her as a practitioner of the social dimension 
of strategy (Joshua 6: 21; 8: 22 – 29; 11: 21 – 23).  Again later, during Iron Age IIa, 
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Saul’s treatment of the Amalekites (1 Samuel 15: 3) gives further evidence of the 
social dimension of strategy at work in Israel’s colourful political history. 
 
The nature of military force, as outlined in chapter four, includes a review of weapons 
systems and the operational doctrine for their effective tactical employment during IA 
IIa.  Even today some strategic studies place a heavy emphasis on the technical 
arsenals of the political actors, too weighty in several instances, when reviewing the 
nature of force in a political dispensation.  Though relevant, such poorly conceived 
‘balances of power’ are not stand-alone factors of political power in a given time and 
place.  Nevertheless, technology is an integral component of political power and must 
be properly accounted for.  Technological innovation is certainly one of the 
outstanding cultural components when distinguishing between the ancient and modern 
worlds.  Technology was and remains the principle agent for the evolution of warfare.  
And notwithstanding the material differences of past and present, technology remains 
a principal component of all military potentials and of all war potentials, whatever the 
political entities under consideration.  Thus technology and its impact must be 
factored in, but it must be done so judiciously when studied retroactively. 
 
Chapter five reviews the various wars and military operations that occurred in Syro-
Palestine during IA IIa.  The operation of all dimensions of strategy is best studied in 
the light of the military record, with due attention to the tactical factors present at each 
engagement.  The influence of technology is closely tied to the tactical options a 
commander has to draw upon in the field.  Greater technological capacities usually 
translate into a potentially more powerful and articulate fighting force.  History does 
not bear this out in every instance though; thus the need for a multiplex approach that 
 7
will weigh all dimensions of strategy appropriately.  IA IIa provides scope for such a 
study and such a study in turn adds light to our spectrum of understanding of the 
world at this temporal juncture in Syro-Palestine.              
 
The material cultural remains, in addition to pictographic and literary evidence, of 
greatest interest to this study, are the weapon systems and military implements of IA 
IIa.  Military statecraft was a political option only to the extent that weapons and the 
tactical doctrine for their effective employment were to be found among a people or a 
state.  Chapter six will review the various categories of arms and defensive equipment 
present in Syro-Palestine during IA IIa.  Military architecture is an important part of 
this chapter, tracing the evolution of the static defences of cities and towns.   
 
When considered holistically the chapters of this dissertation will establish an 
informed visage of the political dynamics that shaped the lifeworld of the common 
person in the period catalogued by archaeologists as Iron Age IIa.  Much of the 
cultural lifeworld of the Ancient Near East was shaped by political events.  These 
ancient political events were also largely the substance from which the foundations of 
the Western World’s history were laid.  Frequently, the tool that carved out these 
foundations was military statecraft.  The onset of Polemology in the last half-century 
has supplied social science scholars the tools long needed for a more refined study of 
the role of military statecraft in the affairs of the Ancient Near East in general and 
ancient Israel, IA IIa, in particular. 
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CHAPTER 2.  HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SYRO–PALSTINE DURING                  
  IRON AGE IIa. 
State, nation, people, band and tribes are value-laden concepts in social science. 
‘People’ is not easily defined in anthropological studies.  Lexicologists trace its 
development from the Greek root ethnos to the related word demos that has come to 
signify ‘nation’ in modern English usage.  The latter carries with it political weight 
and serve to distinguish a particular group or collection of persons.  These persons are 
in most instances linked by a geographical proximity or by their shared common will 
to form a social unit, which, within a geographical territory, introduces the concept of 
a nation-state.  Generally, a ‘people’ is characterised by common descent, a 
community of history, tradition, culture, custom, and language and they usually 
occupy a definable territory (Wiseman, 1973: Preface).  Such factors of commonality 
when undergirded by social structure contribute to the strength of social cohesion.  
The social cohesion of a people or a nation state is an important and contributing 
factor to a political entity’s war and military potential.   
 
A ‘band’ is the oldest form of political organisation, typical examples being groups of 
hunter – gatherers.  Bands are normally small in number ranging from 20 – 500 
people.  Bands are normally nomadic communities and commonly employ operational 
strategies in the form of raids.  They have a less formal political regime and 
consequently have recourse to fewer general strategies.  Their war potential is 
generally smaller though they may combine to increase to larger confederacies, 
sometimes with very large military potentials.  The stark contrast between a bands 
war potential and its military potential explains why such raiders throughout history 
have been destructive and fearsome but unsustainable in the long term.  Tribes are 
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larger than bands and may include a number of local groups and bands within their 
composition.  Tribes often have an economy based on agrarian farming and animal 
husbandry and therefore produce a greater population density and more resources in a 
typically agrarian world (Vermaak, 1996c: 8-9).  Over time this can become the basis 
for a greater war potential.  
 
In the arena of international politics these various groupings evolved to become the 
principle political actors.  Throughout the history and even prehistory of the Near East 
these political actors, regardless of their respective regimes, have determined the 
conditions of the lifeworld of the common man.  From the polemology standpoint, the 
social cohesion of such political associations informs the social dimension of strategy 
and bears significantly upon the war potential of all these political actors.  War 
potential is a general expression of political power.  The greatest political power has 
most often been found in the hands of the larger political actors, possessed of large 
populations with strong centralised economies such as Egypt and the various larger 
Mesopotamian states and empires.  These traditional great powers neighbouring Syro-
Palestine have ever-viewed the latter as a political and economic prize.  In total and 
general strategic terms, Syro-Palestine is the key to the Near East.  Every Eastern 
Mediterranean and West Asian power that arose in the Ancient Near East sought to 
penetrate and occupy this region in the pursuit of their own political interests.   
 
In the second millennium B.C.E. imperial Egypt held political sway and left a huge 
cultural footprint in Syro-Palestine.  Only toward the end of this period did the 
Hittite’s effectively challenge Egypt for a greater share of the region’s spoils.  
Egyptian influence lingered on though for centuries beyond its effective political 
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control of Syro-Palestine.  During the first millennium B.C.E. the political centre of 
gravity in the Ancient Near East swung eastwards and away from Egypt and 
culminated in the successive empires of Assyria, Babylonia, and finally Persia.  This 
dissertation positions itself in the time period of the Ancient Near East described by 
scholars as a general political nadir for the traditional great powers.  From the 
vantage-point of hindsight, the period IA IIa, (ca. 1045 – 931 / 30 B.C.E.) transpired 
when Egypt’s formidable New Kingdom was in steady decline and before the rise of 
the militaristic Later Assyrian Empire.  This political vacuum created the necessary 
regional political environment in which the confederated tribes of Israel could 
politically transform themselves into the United Kingdom of Israel.  These political 
developments impacted broadly on political entities throughout the region. 
 
What then does the material and other evidence tell us of the political discourse 
between the peoples and political entities of Syro-Palestine during IA IIa ?  The 
discussion under this heading will outline the context, content, and the actors who 
engaged in such political dialogue and the means they had at their disposal for such 
political discourse.  Further thereto, what can be discerned about the levels of social 
cohesion in these various political groupings and how the social dimension of strategy 
affected the war potential of these political entities? 
  
2.1. Israel 
 In terms of Israel’s superbly long and inimitable history, the state is the basic unit in 
any study of international politics.  The period 1045 – 931 / 30 B.C.E. was a 
watershed period in which the state of Israel was established.  The Israelites 
hammered out a unique conception of political kingship.  Israelite history had its 
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beginnings long before the creation of Greek polis-type city states.  Their history 
continued long after their state’s political downfall.  To what factors may one attribute 
Israel’s historical and ethnic longevity?  Vogel and Van Oosten noted that the reason 
for this lies in Israel’s view of history and substantiated their assertion by quoting 
Moscati thus: “Israel has its God; this God made a pact with Israel; the working out of 
this pact constitutes history” (Unisa 1983: 90).  The criterion for Israelite 
historiography is unique.  The covenant was between the people and their God.  It was 
timeless and was not bound to any territory.  Territory was a reward for covenant 
faithfulness, not a precondition for their relationship with their deity, as was the case 
in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and most other places the Mediterranean world and the 
Ancient Near East.  All of these states flourished or waned into obscurity according 
external secular criteria rather than according to religious or sacral fidelity.  Israel’s 
corporate nationalism, even their national identity, derived from the Abrahamic 
Covenant and not from the evolution of a political state or any concomitant 
constitution.  Significantly, even gentiles (those not party to their covenant with 
Yahweh), could be included within the scope of this corporate nationalism by 
embracing the Israelite religion and entering into the covenant with Yahweh by means 
of its associated ordinances like circumcision etc.  As an aside, this goes a long way to 
explaining the position of Urriah the ‘Hittite’; a valiant convert to Yahwism and one 
of the listed 37 ‘mighty men’ serving in the Israelite army of duplicitous King David 
(2 Samuel 23: 39. cf. 2 Samuel 11: 11).  The nationalism that issued from the 
Abrahamic Covenant also explains the essential difference between Greco-Roman 
historiography and Israelite historiography.  The former is simply described as the 
study of cause and effect.  Israelite historiography on the other hand, most notably in 
the Old Testament before the massive diffusion of Greek cultural influence under 
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Alexander and the diodochi (Alexander’s political successors) who inherited the 
broken up Macedonian Empire, entailed the recording of God’s long association with 
the Israelites and the details of that interaction within the confines of the Ancient Near 
East.  These recorders were writing as witnesses to God’s deeds.  Israelite 
‘historiography’ was sacral in nature and contrasted the secular nature of Greco-
Roman historiography.   
 
Ironically, in the face of extant textual records for this period, the Bible is the only 
written source that deals with the United Monarchy.  What is the source or literary 
criticisms for the biblical texts dealing with this period?  Allowance must be made for 
the original authorship, language, ethical and theological concepts, textual patterns 
and formulae, and the historical standpoint of the writers.  Such sensitivities will do 
much for the analytical domain of this study and its academic credibility.  Noteworthy 
in this regard is the Deuteronomistic History source (henceforth D = Deuteronomist 
source).  This is seen by biblical socio-literary scholars as the redactive work of 
(initially Israelite and continued later by Jewish) traditionists.  Their recording of 
Israel’s history was programmatic, striving to impress upon their readers the 
uniqueness of Israel’s covenant with Yahweh and that obedience to its terms produced 
security and prosperity while all political ills were directly traceable to collective 
unfaithfulness to their covenant relationship with Yahweh.  The D is traceable from 
Deuteronomy to the end of the Books of Kings, thus covering in its timeframe the end 
of Moses’ ministry to the death of King Josiah in 609 B.C.E (Gottwald, 1987:138-9).  
In archaeological terms, D edits Israel’s history from Late Bronze Age to mid-Iron 
Age.  While the D draws liberally from both primary and useful secondary sources 
such as administrative documents from the united monarchy, independent cycles of 
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traditions about the prophet Samuel and the kings of the united monarchy, excerpts 
from the royal archives of the divided kingdoms and from the temple archives, it is 
important to appreciate that D, as a traditionist source, is selective, biased in its 
interpretation of certain king’s reigns, and even openly hostile in its later redaction of 
Israel’s history.  For instance, David is treated very generously, Solomon’s flaws and 
errors are glossed over ‘for David’s sake’, and Saul is vilified (compare 2 Kings 18: 
3-7 and 2 Chronicles 30: 23-27).      
 
The Israelite change in regime to a monarchy was gradual, even pedantic.  It was 
challenged internally by the devout religious elements and from without by Israel’s 
political foes.  From a conservative Israelite religious standpoint these political 
innovations were at best a hankering after worldly regimes and trappings, evidence of 
false values, and at worst a blatant abrogation of the all-important covenant with 
Yahweh. From the outset, Yahweh had vested His prophets with authority to speak 
and act on His behalf, to direct the affairs of His hierocracy on earth and for this 
purpose a loose confederation of tribes was deemed politically adequate.  This 
defining covenant relationship traced its beginnings to the era of the patriarchs.  
Yahweh had prescribed the original terms and had renewed the basic tenets of the 
Abrahamic Covenant, as outlined in Genesis 17 and Genesis 22: 15 – 18 with each 
succeeding generation.  It was Abraham’s grandson Jacob who in due course of time 
became the eponymous patriarch and recognised progenitor of the twelve tribes of 
Israel.  By faithful compliance with the terms of the Abrahamic Covenant, the 
promised blessings were to be realised, not least among them being membership in 
the ‘household of God’ and the boon of inheriting a promised land in both mortality 
and post-mortality.  When the voice of the people called for a new political 
 14
dispensation (1 Samuel 8: 4-5), it was seen by the devout as an admission of the 
peoples wanting faith.  
 
 Perhaps the people’s confidence was shaken by the inability of their spiritual leaders 
to engender proper spiritual values in their own sons.  The priest Eli’s sons, Hophni 
and Phineas (1 Samuel 4: 11-14), and thereafter the prophet Samuel’s sons, Joel and 
Abiah (1Samuel 8: 1-3), were failures in terms of their own moral and spiritual 
rectitude. Each sought after his own narrow interests and failed to keep God’s 
commandments and the requirements of the established priesthood.  Aside from their 
own personal failings, the consequences of this at the national level were dire; without 
divine approbation any attempt to check foreign intrusions were doomed to disaster.  
 
The external challenge was simply the continuation of political hostilities from a 
preceding era, remembered to us as the period of the Judges (ca. 1200 – 1000 B.C.E.).  
To the majority of Israelite rank and file, whose faith and spiritual vigour ebbed and 
flowed, Israel’s war potential had been abundantly exposed for its vulnerability by 
relying as it did on the ethereal factor of divine intervention for security.  Hemmed in 
by powerful and centralised empires, kingdoms, princedoms, and long established 
city- states, and located on a land bridge between three large continents, serious 
question marks were placed alongside the merits of the system of the judges.  To 
those who placed more stock in reason than in their covenantal relationship with 
Yahweh, their peculiar monotheistic deity, the military balance was wholly lopsided 
in favour of their political antagonists. It left the confederated tribes of Israel 
singularly dependant on Yahweh, His charismatic prophet, and a military novice to 
provide martial leadership in the role of a ‘judge’ for the sporadically mustered tribal 
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yeomanry. Only miraculous divine intervention in nearly every instance could provide 
security for Israel in their new though highly contested sedentary, agrarian lifestyle.  
Thus the Israelite of at least average faith keenly felt the need for a stronger political 
hand to deal with inter alia resilient Canaanite enclaves, to secure the territorial spoils 
already won, and to level the political playing fields between them and their well 
established neighbouring political entities.  The sharpest spur though, was the political 
power of the Philistines which during this time period, when the long-standing powers 
of the Ancient Near East were in a temporary nadir, was still significant and a 
persistent threat to Israel’s security.   
 
At political centre-stage during this period of Israelite history, referred to by 
archaeologists as IA IIa, were the three monarchs, namely Saul (c. 150 – 1011/10 
B.C.E.), David (c.1011/10 – 1071/70 B.C.E.), and Solomon (c. 971/70 – 931/30 
B.C.E.).  It is noteworthy that Albright alternatively proposed the dates 961 – 922 
B.C.E. for Solomon (Blaiklock and Harrison, 1983 … s.v. ‘Solomon’).  My option is 
for the former sets of dates provided by Bimson et al (1992:117) owing to the 
cumulative and dynamic nature of scientific enquiry which recommends later rather 
than earlier sources.  According to Blaiklock and Harrison, the greater majority of 
scholarly opinion in this field of science rests with the earlier set of dates (id.).     
King Saul was of the tribe of Benjamin, a tribe renowned for its martial prowess.  The 
patriarchal blessing given to Benjamin, the eponymous progenitor of this Israelite 
tribe by Jacob, affirmed this hereditary characteristic; “Benjamin shall ravin (sic) as a 
wolf: in the morning he shall devour the prey, and at night he shall divide the spoil.” 
(Genesis 49: 27).  The Benjamites as a tribe enjoyed a high reputation for bravery and 
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skill in war, and was particularly noted for its deadly accurate slingers with their 
traditional left-handed action (Judges 3:15 and 20: 16).  
 
 Notwithstanding the biblical accounts of the various successes of the Judges, which 
proceeded Israel’s period of the United Monarchy, the Israelites were under 
unremitting pressure of Philistine suzerainty, as mentioned above.  The biblical record 
attests to several factors that qualified Saul to be the political deliver of Israel from 
the Philistine oppressors.  He was of above-average manly stature.  As a warrior-king 
his natural strengths were obvious, as were his leadership skills.  Even these worthy 
traits were further supplemented by the pedigree of a family of mighty men and the 
advantages of personal charisma and good looks (1 Samuel 9: 1 – 2).  From the 
vantage point of hindsight Benjamin, though recognised for their military abilities, 
was a minor tribe and divine favour would still need to play its part to ensure Israel’s 
political success at the onset of the first millennium B.C.E.   Moreover the tribal land 
of Benjamin, from whence Saul came, lay right in the path of Philistine expansion.  
The struggling Israelites of this period had good reason to look to Saul - a well-chosen 
weapon in Yahweh’s hands, with confidence for political successes against their arch-
rivals the Philistines.  The military superiority of the Philistines was in large part due 
to their superior technological skills in metallurgy.  However, the most effective 
weapon to wield against armoured targets is not a sharp-edged weapon (especially in 
this pre-steel period of IA II a), but rather a concussive weapon such as is the case 
with heavy sling-shot, the traditional and outstanding weapon of the Benjamites.  The 
broken terrain of the central hill country in which the tribal land of Benjamin lay 
easily offset the principal disadvantage of the sling, its short range as a ballistic 
weapon.  (See the ‘Weapon Lethality Tables’ for the sling in chapter 6). 
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But ultimately Saul failed.  He disqualified himself politically by assuming spiritual 
leadership prerogatives on three separate occasions that fell outside his political 
mandate.  For this Yahweh rejected him.  First, Saul arrogated to himself the priestly 
functions for priesthood ordinances for which he had no priesthood authority to 
perform.  Such behaviour was reminiscent of contemporary pagan kings of the 
Ancient Near East who were either incarnate gods themselves such as Pharaoh or 
acknowledged as the high priests of their respective deities as in the cases of the 
Hittites and the Mesopotamian kingdoms.  This was no trivial oversight by a novice 
king but rather the presumptuous intrusions of political leadership into matters of 
sacral authority, born of arrogance and conceit (1 Samuel 13: 8 – 14).  Second, Saul 
was blatantly disobedient to the divine injunction to annihilate the troublesome 
Amalekites who had set themselves against Israel at Rephidim in the wilderness of 
Sinai during the days of the Exodus (Exodus 17: 8 – 16) and had become the 
foresworn enemies of Yahweh as a result thereof.  Again Saul had taken religious 
liberties in which he had no authority and then tried to deceive Samuel the prophet 
with half-truths and rationalisations.  Third, Saul’s dabbling in witchcraft as a medium 
for discerning the future course of events points to the extent of his own personal 
spiritual corruption and his unfitness to serve as a public and representative figure 
among the covenanted Israelites.  Such dealings in spiritualism were expressly 
forbidden on punishment of death by the Law of Moses (Leviticus 20:27).  That 
Yahweh had rejected Saul and called another to serve as the political leader of Israel 
became common knowledge throughout the land (The New Bible Dictionary ...1974, 
s.v. ‘Saul’). 
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David, youngest of Jesse’s eight sons had no overt characteristics or credential’s that 
set him apart as Israel’s heir-apparent.  His training during childhood and adolescence 
was typical of a rural upbringing and held out no promise for the sophistry of oriental 
kingship. He was a shepherd-boy and at best, this apprenticeship inculcated in him the 
qualities of a shepherd – courage (1 Samuel 17: 34 – 35) and a caring disposition.  
David was ordained at Bethlehem (1 Samuel 16: 1 – 13) to be Israel’s new king and 
political leader after Yahweh had rejected Saul for his improprieties.  Providence 
provided for David to become familiar with the regimen and protocol associated with 
the royal court.  He served as a minstrel in Saul’s court.  David had originally come to 
Saul’s attention as one who could possibly assuage his manic depressions: “...that is 
cunning in playing (the harp), and a mighty valiant man, and a man of war, and 
prudent in matters, and a comely person, and the Lord is with him” (1 Samuel 16: 
18).  He found favour with Saul and soon thereafter David was appointed Saul’s 
armour bearer and was repeatedly exposed to the martial role of Israel’s king.  
 
 David’s courage and competency with a sling against the heavily armed and 
armoured Philistine champion, Goliath of Gath, broadcast irrefutable evidence to 
Israel that here was one that matched Saul’s credentials as a political deliverer.  It 
appears that the sling was to Iron Age IIa Israel as was the bow to the ancient 
Egyptian and Mesopotamian kings.  The bow was regarded as a weapon of power, 
possessing the ability to strike down enemies from a distance, a trait easily associated 
with the power of the gods or with their earthly appointees or representatives.  The 
bow held an important place in the iconography of many ancient cultures, especially 
in Egypt where it was a symbol of monarchical power, and one which seems to have 
been used extensively in the vocabulary of dominance gestures, and, as shown below, 
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in gestures of submission.  The largely illiterate world of the first millennium B.C.E. 
would have readily recognised the message of the ‘turned-bow’ omen in this political 
exchange between the two champions.  The redacted text of D (1 Samuel 17: 43-47) 
gives a ‘direct quotation’ of the verbal exchange between the two combatants, 
notwithstanding both are well out of earshot of the two clamouring armies positioned 
on the facing hills of the valley (1 Samuel 17: 1-3) in which Goliath and David met 
(Wilkinson 1994: 200).     
 
 
 
 
 
 
PICTURE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Picture from ANE 201 Reader for 201-E, Communications in the Ancient Near East. 
1996. p.74).  
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The picture on page 19 shows Seti I defeating Libyans.  The large Libyan archer, the 
iconography depicting the Libyan general, demonstrates capitulation by placing 
himself under the bowstring of his own bow.  In the case of Israel with no significant 
military tradition of archery, the sling served as the principal ballistic weapon for Iron 
Age IIa Israel.  In the context of the warrior-king narrative, it is not far-fetched that 
the chosen warrior be endowed with the opportunity and necessary skill to 
demonstrate divine approbation for military leadership as had previously been the 
case for ‘Saul the Benjamite’ in his emphatic victory over the Ammonites (1 Samuel 
11).  The personal contest between the champions of the Philistine and the Israelite 
armies has several precedents in Asian warfare.  David’s victory (1 Samuel 17: 38 – 
54) made him an obvious choice to all as a suitable replacement for King Saul.  
David’s military achievements were widely and publicly heralded, and became the 
source of Saul’s jealousy from that time onward (1 Samuel 18: 7-9). 
 
The relationship between Saul and David deteriorated to the point where the latter had 
to flee for his life.  In time David established the ‘Adullam band’, a group of political 
dissidents and fugitives whom he trained and armed as a war-band (Adullam is an 
historical site pre-dating the Israelite conquest period.  Located some 25 km’s south-
west of Jerusalem, Adullum was typically a former Canaanite royal city of the 
Shephelah).  Under David’s leadership, the Adullam war-band harried foreign 
invaders, protected outlying Israelite interests and won the support of many of the 
Israelite commoners.  The hostility of Saul eventually drove David and his war-band 
out of Israel altogether.  The Philistine king of Gath granted the frontier town of 
Ziklag to David in exchange for the occasional use of his war-band.  Following the 
Philistine victory over the Israelites at Gilboa and the death of Saul at this battle, the 
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Philistines briefly re-established their suzerainty over Israel.  David returned to Judah 
as a Philistine vassal.  His claim to the throne, initially set up at Hebron, was 
contested by the old courtiers of Saul, but upon the death of Captain Abner and Saul’s 
son Eshbaal, organised resistance died out and David reigned over all the twelve 
tribes of Israel.  To further cement his long anticipated kingship over a united Israel, 
David expelled the Jebusites from Mount Ophel and transferred his capital to 
Jerusalem, a neutral site between the northern and the southern tribes of Israel.  
David’s “new status as king of Israel amounted to a declaration of independence for 
the whole kingdom.  It immediately precipitated a war with the Philistines” which he 
defeated decisively in the Valley of Rephaim (Bimson et al 1992:41). From his new 
capital David embarked upon several highly successful military campaigns and 
subjugated Israel’s hostile neighbouring enemies.  These enemies included the 
Philistines whose technological advantages had by this date become negligible, many 
of the remaining Canaanite strongholds and enclaves, Edomites, Moabites and 
Ammonites across the Jordan, Amalekites near his earlier Philistine refuge Ziklag, 
and Aramaeans to the north in the region of modern Syria.  All this was accomplished 
as already stated, during the contemporary political nadir that existed in Mesopotamia 
and in Egypt.  Nevertheless, it is to the political triumphs of David that Jewish 
theologians have ever looked to, as a type of messiah / deliverer- even down to the 
present time (The New Bible Dictionary ...1974. s.v. ‘David’). 
 
  It fell to David’s successor, Solomon, to consolidate these political gains.  His 
accession to the throne was not without intrigue and the shedding of rival claimant’s 
blood.  He is unique in that he was Israel’s first dynastic ruler - the first of several 
successors in the Davidic dynasty that was to rule from Jerusalem for over four 
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centuries. During Solomon’s forty-year reign he made several political changes for 
the more effective administration of the United Kingdom of Israel.  Solomon’s reign 
was also the meridian of Israel’s monarchic history; the king was the great patron of 
Israel’s wisdom literature, international diplomacy and political accords, fabulous 
wealth, peace and general prosperity (The New Bible Dictionary...1974, s.v. 
‘Solomon’). 
 
Solomon’s first order of business was to accomplish the building of the temple in 
Jerusalem, a focal point of Israelite ‘nation building’.  This seven-year project was 
followed up by the building of a palace suited to the station of a king who ruled over a 
significant kingdom in the Near East.  The kingdom was drastically reorganised along 
what appears to be the Egyptian model; twelve administrative ‘tax districts’, with 
little regard for tribal boundaries which in retrospect had the effect of underscoring 
differences and accentuated the interests of individual tribes rather than the common 
national interests of the fledgling nation-state.  Indeed, only a centralised government 
would be capable of maintaining Israel’s empire.  Egypt’s cultural influence and eons-
long imperial dominance over Syro-Palestine offered a ready model for emulation.  
Even the titles of his administrative officers follow translations of Egyptian proto-
types.  In the realm of international politics diplomatic capacity is enhanced or 
restricted, even in times of peace, by a political entities military potential.  Israel’s 
war potential grew to an unprecedented level at this time, yielding a military potential 
that could secure the territorial gains bequeathed him by David and the able generals 
whom had served his father well.  Evidence of this is to be found in Solomon’s 
establishment of ‘chariot cities’, including Jerusalem, Hazor in Galilee, Gezer towards 
Philistia, and Megiddo, a common battlefield site of Near Eastern armies.  Some 
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scholars estimate that some 4 000 horse stalls were kept for the chariot arm of the 
military establishment.  The 40 000 horse stalls given in 1 Kings 4:26 is regarded a 
scribal error (The New Bible Dictionary …1972, s.v. ‘Solomon).  This expanded 
military potential held in check Israel’s several subject-allies, and elevated Israel’s 
monarch to comparable parity with politically depressed Egypt during this period (id).  
 
 The degree of Israel’s political prominence was such that a diplomatic marriage 
could take place involving King Solomon and Pharaoh’s daughter –  it was a rare 
instance when a pharaoh’s daughter was given in marriage to an alien (1 Kings 3: 1; 
7: 8).  1 Kings 11: 1 tells of an array of political marriages during Solomon’s reign 
among whom were Moabites, Ammonites, Edomites, Sidonians, and Hittites.  Later 
period Hellenistic sources also suggest that a diplomatic marriage existed between 
Solomon and Hiram of Tyre’s daughter (The New International Dictionary of Biblical 
Archaeology ...1983, s.v. ‘Solomon’).  The strength of the economy, a critical factor 
in any political entity’s war potential, and the expansion of Israel’s war potential 
allowed Solomon to make fundamental changes in Israel’s military organisation, the 
details of which will be more closely investigated in Chapter 5.    
 
2.2. Canaan and Neighbours East of the Jordan. 
Canaanite territory is variously described, depending upon which records are being 
consulted, and upon the temporal setting of those records.  Egyptian records from the 
New Kingdom period, immediately prior to the onset of the Iron Age of the Ancient 
Near East, are imprecise, as are Ugaritic, Assyrian, and Hittite tablets and 
inscriptions.  This is an enigma for a typical modern, occidental mindset, born of a 
political heritage comprising finely demarcated international boundaries and strict 
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controls that regulate contacts between peoples of the modern political units labelled 
the nation-state.  With due regard for the challenges of ethnocentricity, some clarity is 
necessary for the accommodation of proper scientific investigation.  In due process of 
time, Iron Age Canaan generally covered the territory of western Palestine from 
Ugarit in the north to the Negev desert and the port Ezion-geber in the south.  The 
Mediterranean’s eastern littoral formed its western boundary and Hamath in the north 
to the Jordan River in the south formed its eastern boundary.  It would be a mistake to 
equate these boundaries in the same way a modern political state has carefully 
demarcated geographical boundaries.    
 
The discussion of the so-called neighbours east of the Jordan includes the minor 
kingdoms named Ammon, Moab, and Edom.  The latter two kingdoms featured 
during David’s reign in particular, once the greater political threat of the Philistines 
had been dealt with.  When Ammon allied itself with the Aramaean kingdoms of 
Zobah and Damascus, it too was defeated along with its allies at Helam in 
Transjordan and its capital captured (Bimson et al. 1992: 41).   
 
2.2.1. Canaan. 
 The Ugarit texts from nearby modern Ras Shamra have gone some way to correcting 
the dearth of dedicated Canaanite records.  From this site on the north Syrian coast 
and from nearby Minet el-Beida, C.F. Schaeffer’s twenty-two season’s long 
excavations (1929 – 1960) have produced much material evidence that illuminates 
several aspects of Canaanite culture.  Among the many important finds since 
excavated are royal palaces, temples (including one dedicated to Baal), and 
administrative buildings.  Fine objects uncovered include ivories, weapons, statues, 
 25
and stelae.  Of particular value are the many inscriptions in cuneiform and 
hieroglyphs, reflecting the variety of ancient languages and dialects that were 
practised at Ugarit.  No less than 350 Ugaritic texts prepared in the unique Ugaritic 
alphabet have been recovered.  There is a semblance between this northwest Semitic 
dialect and ‘Canaanite’ and Hebrew.  This holds out prospects for dedicated 
Canaanite textual sources that are yet to be uncovered in Syro-Palestine.  The Ugaritic 
texts also contain several epics that fill in important social details of a religious 
nature.  The religious rites of Canaanite worship graphically describe their particular 
world–view.  Their tough and enduring religious beliefs centred on the storm-god 
Baal, who by the 14th century had already displaced ‘El’, an obscure and remote god 
who had in earlier centuries been more prominent as the ‘father of the gods’.  Baal’s 
consort was Anat whose rescue of Baal from the god of death, Mot, aeteologically 
explained the rotation of the seasons. Autumn was explained in terms of Baal’s death 
and springtime in terms of Baal’s rescue from Mot and his resurrection or renewal of 
life.  Baal’s epithets underscore his primal position as god of storms and controller of 
rain and fertility in the agrarian world of the Canaanites, viz. ‘Lord of heaven and 
earth’ and ‘the rider on the clouds’ (Isaiah 19: 1).  Anat for her part was similar to the 
Phoenician goddess Ashtart, the goddess of war, love and fertility.  The biblical texts 
allude to these aspects of Canaanite culture in a pejorative sense, expounding upon 
“the degrading results of the worship of these deities, with their emphasis on war and 
sensuous love, sacred prostitution, and the consequent social degradation” (The New 
Bible Dictionary...1974, s.v. ‘Archaeology’). 
 
Notwithstanding the Canaanite religious emphasis on “war and sensuous love” etc. 
the Canaanites were spent as a political force by the onset of the Late Bronze Age.  
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Their political regimes were feudal in nature.  They organised themselves into city-
states.  This period of Canaanite history coincided with the vigorous imperialism of 
the New Kingdom of Egypt and Canaan was largely reduced to vassalage, forming 
part of Egypt’s Asiatic Empire.  As Egyptian vassals they had only a very limited 
military potential, retaining some infantry and chariots.   These petty princedoms and 
city-states of Canaan continued their downward political spiral, spurred on to political 
ruin by the corruption of the contemporary Egyptian bureaucracy.  In view of this 
political scenario, many of them were irreparably shattered by the political upheavals 
of the Thirteenth Century B.C.E. that ushered in the new archaeological era of the 
Iron Age.  Information on the Canaanites after the Bronze Age is accordingly sparse 
and information such as exists for the Iron Age era still needs to be synthesised.  The 
formerly great Bronze Age Canaanite city-states such as Hazor were now well passed 
their heyday.  Resistance to invasion from the east by the Israelites and from the west 
by the Philistines could not be consolidated and only the strongest Canaanite cities 
held out during Iron Age I (1200-1000 B.C.E.).  The result was that the Canaanites, 
by the time of Iron Age IIa, now ruled only in Phoenicia proper with its ports and in 
isolated principalities elsewhere (The New Bible Dictionary...1974.  S.v. ‘Canaan’).  
Phoenicia is referred to in the Amarna Letters as the “land of Canaan” and will be 
discussed briefly below as a separate political entity. 
 
2.2.2. Neighbours East of the Jordan. 
Like the native inhabitants of Canaan, Israel’s political discord with its Transjordan 
neighbours had its beginning from the earlier period remembered to us as the Judges.  
The book of Judges the various ‘oppressions’ by King Eglon of Moab with Ammonite 
warbands in tow (Judges 3: 12-13), and attacks on Israelites east of the Jordan in 
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Gilead (Judges 10: 8-9) by the Ammonites.  From the vary outset, Israel’s occupation 
of Canaan augured stormy political relations for the region.  Indeed, after thirty 
centuries of internecine war in the region, one can hardly argue against war as the 
societal norm for the common man in this part of the world and for the key role that 
military archaeology must play in recreating the lifeworld thereof.    
 
2.2.2.1. Ammon.  The Kingdom of Ammon was located on the central Transjordanian 
plateau from at least the Late Bronze Age until the end of the Iron Age.  Situated 
between the Jabbok and the Arnon rivers, their capital city was Rabbah-ammon.  We 
know the Ammonites mainly through the Old Testament, which records their several 
clashes and skirmishes with Israel, from the era of the Judges until the end of the Iron 
Age.  Vermaak observes that the Ammonites, for much of their Iron Age existence, 
were integrated into the political and economic systems of the kingdoms of Israel and 
Judah (1996a: 28).  Their socio–economic structures were transformed as the Iron 
Age periods progressed.  Their earlier pastoral mode changed to one of intensive 
agriculture. 
 
Their political history is interesting; during the Early and Middle Iron Age periods 
until about 650 B.C.E. they followed a political pattern of forming coalition alliances.  
This was done in acknowledgement of their political weakness that they compensated 
for by entering into political alliances rather than by fighting on their own.  This 
pattern is evident even in Israel’s settlement period (Judges 3: 12-14).  Their political 
policy of dependence or semi-dependence toward dominant powers helped to assure 
their political survival into Hellenistic times (Vermaak 1996a: 29).  
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There is little material at our disposal owing to a general lack of scholastic interest in 
ancient Ammon and extensive excavations are still to be undertaken.  Archaeological 
data to hand at this time shows the Ammonite kings, like other Near Eastern 
potentates, established a series of border fortresses to demarcate and protect their 
territories.   Immediately preceding Saul’s accession to the newly established political 
throne, the Ammonite king Nahash besieged Jabesh Gilead.  This political challenge 
was a continuation of earlier discord and Saul’s first test as political king of Israel.  
Saul rallied the Israelite tribes and drove the Ammonites out (1 Samuel 11: 1-11).  
During Saul’s decline, David as an Israelite renegade was befriended by King Nahash 
(1 Samuel 10: 1-2).  The spurious treatment of King David’s messengers and 
ambassadors by King Nahash’s son Hanun and his enlistment of Syrian mercenaries 
against Israel precipitated a war between Israel and Ammon.  David’s generals Joab 
and Abishai defeated the Ammonites.  Chapters 11 and 12 of 2 Samuel and chapter 20 
of 1Chronicals provide some details of the war between Israel and Ammon.  Joab, 
David’s military commander invested the capital city Rabbah-ammon, which still 
occupies the same ‘footprint’ even today, with some success.  Following the initial 
breakthrough, David brought up reinforcements and the entire city was carried.  The 
Ammonites were dealt with by King David in a typical Near Eastern fashion: they 
were ‘cut and harrowed’ and “made to pass through a brick kiln” (2 Samuel 12: 31).  
The Israelite’s suzerainty over the Ammonites ended when the latter gained their 
independence sometime after Solomon’s death and retained their independence until 
attacked and overwhelmed by the powerful Neo-Babylonian army in c.580 B.C.E. 
(The New International Dictionary of Biblical Archaeology ...1983, s.v. ‘Rabbah’). 
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2.2.2.2. Moab.  The core of Moab, land of the biblical Moabites, lay between the  
wadis Arnon and Zered on the plateau east of the Dead Sea.  Around 1300 B.C.E. 
Moab and a number of Transjordan Iron Age kingdoms appeared simultaneously.  
Like the others, Moab was a highly organised and centralised kingdom with good 
agricultural and pastoral pursuits, splendid buildings, distinctive pottery, and the 
typical arrangement of border fortresses as discussed under the Ammonites above.  
The mainstay of this modest kingdom’s economy was sheep farming and its related 
activities, and trade opportunities that were to be had as a result of the King’s 
Highway that passed through this territory. 
 
The Moabites were ethnically and politically akin to the Ammonites and regarded the 
united and divided kingdoms of Israel and Judah as their common foe(s).  During the 
period of the Judges Eglon the king of Moab oppressed Israel for 18 years until 
assassinated by Ehud the Benjamite (Judges 3: 12-30).  Hostilities continued into the 
Iron Age IIa period.  1 Samuel 14: 47 records war between Saul and the Moabites.  
David lodged his parents there while he was a fugitive, and as in the case of the 
Ammonites, David warred against them and reduced them to vassalage (2 Samuel 8: 2 
and 12) which continued until the end of Solomon’s reign.  The political upheavals 
during Rehoboam’s reign weakened Israel and afforded Moab the opportunity to 
regain her independence, which she held until the Omride dynasty temporarily 
reconquered Moab again (The New Bible Dictionary...1974, s.v. ‘Moab, Moabites’). 
 
2.2.2.3.  Edom.  Notwithstanding earlier periods of Israelite toleration, during IA IIa 
King Saul led the Israelite army against Edom (1 Samuel 14: 47).  King David 
followed in turn, finally conquering it and establishing Israelite garrisons in Edomite 
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territory.  The Edomites suffered great destruction and carnage at the hands of Israel 
during David’s reign.  David’s military chief, Joab, campaigned for six months in 
Edom with the aim of destroying Edom’s military potential i.e. ‘until he had cut off 
every male in Edom’ (1 Kings 11: 14 – 22).  The long-term political goal became 
more apparent when Solomon built a port at Ezion-geber.  Israel’s war potential 
benefited from the exploitation of the copper-mines in the region and the construction 
of a port for his merchant fleet there.  Edom remained in subjection to Israel for the 
period IA IIa. 
    
2.3. Phoenicia 
According to Old Testament parlance, Phoenicia was part of the greater Canaanite 
picture.  The distinctive appellation ‘Phoenician’ found purchase first in the Roman 
archaeological period (37 BCE – 324 CE).  The 194 km’s of Eastern Mediterranean 
coastline, between the rivers Litani and Arvad, existed in a loosely constructed 
political confederation of city-states, not unlike the Canaanite city-states in the south-
eastern hinterland of Syro-Palestine.  Rather than the belated name of Phoenicia, the 
inhabitants of each city state referred to themselves by the name of their own city-
state.  In the centuries preceding IA IIa the Eastern Mediterranean lay within the 
Egyptian New Kingdom’s sphere of political influence.  Disaffection with the 
political status quo was evident and by c.1400 B.C.E. Sumuru, Berut, and Sidon each 
pursued political goals independent of Egypt which had slumped into its so-called 
Late Period (1070 – 332 B.C.E).   The Sea Peoples invasions of c.1200 B.C.E. marked 
the onset of IA IIa in the Eastern Mediterranean with great disruptions and the violent 
destruction of Byblos, Arvad, and Ugarit.  The displaced Sidonians fled to Tyre, 
which now became the principal Phoenician port.  The greatest period of political 
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cohesion, and war potential, coincided with IA IIa during the reign of Hiram I.  The 
latter’s treaties with David and Solomon produced a golden age for the Phoenicians, 
which continued until the rise of the New Assyrian Kingdom (The New Bible 
Dictionary ...1974, s.v. ‘Phoenicia’). 
 
2.4. Syria (Aram) 
The ancient and largely undefined country of Aram roughly equates with modern 
Syria.  Like the Canaanites to the south, the Aramaeans were a collection of city-
states that experienced varying levels of political confederation over the centuries.  
Damascus, Bit-Adini, Beth Rehob, Maacah, and Zobah were the more prominent 
Aramaean city-states.  The name ‘Syria’ is an anachronism of Greek origin; 
purportedly derived from ‘Assyria’ in the latter half of the First Millennium B.C.E. 
Throughout IA IIa to c.700 B.C.E. these people more often than not were Israel’s 
enemies to the north.  They were the initial buffer between the Old Assyrian Empire 
and the Israelites and Canaanites further to the south.  Each one of United Israel’s 
kings fought against the Aramaean city states (see 1 Samuel 14: 47; 2 Samuel 3: 3, 5 
and 1 Kings 11: 23-25).  The cooperation of Israel and the Aramaeans against the 
powerful New Assyrian Empire such as occurred at the Battle of Qarqar (853 B.C.E.) 
came later, during the Omride Dynasty (The New International Dictionary of Biblical 
Archaeology …1983, s.v. ‘Aram, Aramaeans’). 
 
2.5. Philistines and other Sea Peoples. 
The Sea Peoples exerted a huge cultural and political influence on the affairs of the 
peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean by the end of the Bronze Age.  The Philistines, 
or ‘Pulusati’ as they were referred to anciently, were the dominant group in a wave of 
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Sea Peoples that settled the coastlands of southern Canaan.  In terms of their war 
potential the Philistines were technically very advanced over local contemporaries 
such as the Israelites.  The Philistines had acquired their advanced metallurgical skills 
from the Hittites who held the monopoly on such before them.  Trading in metal 
implements and weapons together with their distinctive pottery allowed them to build 
up a robust economy by the onset of IA IIa, another key aspect of their substantial war 
potential.   
 
Prior to the creation of the Israelite monarchy, the Philistines overran Canaan.  They 
also defeated the Israelites at Shiloh.  Archaeological evidence confirms the 
technological superiority of Philistine arms at the onset of IA IIa.  The more fertile 
plains of the Philistines were worked with the aid of iron implements while the less 
fertile mountainous areas, controlled by the Israelites, were worked with bronze 
implements.  The Philistines superior military potential suffered severe reverses at the 
hands of David from which they never fully recovered.  By the time of Solomon the 
Philistine threat was largely removed and their culture appears to have been absorbed 
by the Phoenicians (The New International Dictionary of Biblical Archaeology 
…1983. s.v. ‘Philistines’). 
 
2.6.  Egypt: Beginning of the Late-Dynastic Period (Dynasty 21)  
‘Strange political circumstances’ is an apt description of the situation that obtained in 
Egypt during IA IIa.  The imperial New Kingdom effectively ended in c.1180 B.C.E. 
with the death of Rameses III.  This traditional great power of the ancient Near East 
now degenerated into long-term weakness under a series of inept kings. Egyptian 
history of this era is referred to as Late-Period Egypt and it extends beyond the 
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artificial archaeological boundaries of IA IIa.  The once great state was by the onset of 
IA IIa greatly weakened by increasing poverty and divided political leadership.  
Pharaoh Rameses XI of Dynasty XX was still the nominal monarch of all Egypt but 
real executive power and authority, such as existed in Egypt at this time, was divided 
between Prince Nesubanebded I, regal prince of Lower Egypt and Herihor for Upper 
Egypt.  Herihor had served as a general when pharonic rule was rapidly weakening 
and the priesthood of Amun at Thebes was growing correspondingly more 
independent of the Egyptian king.  In the ensuing maladministration, corruptions, and 
chronic inflation an army coup d’ etat secured for Herihor the high priesthood at 
Thebes and established him as the ruler of Upper Egypt.  This political division was 
ratified by mutual agreement, both halves of Egypt being too weak and politically 
fragile to impose the alternative of a united, centrally governed Egypt on the other.   
 
When Rameses XI died in c.1085 B.C.E. Prince Nesubanebded I, better remembered 
as Smendes, became the pharaoh at Tanis, but only by the consent of Herihor.  By 
further mutual agreement, both Herihor and Smendes confirmed for each other the 
principle of hereditary succession in their respective portions of Egypt.   Thus began 
Dynasty XXI.  During this period Egypt’s war potential was severely curtailed by this 
de facto division of the state into the traditional Upper and Lower portions of Egypt.  
This explains why Egypt’s foreign policy in Syro-Palestine was so benign compared 
to the New Kingdom.  Egypt pursued a policy of selective neutrality, cooperation and 
occasionally fostered friendships with the political entities of southern Syro-Palestine.  
During David’s southern campaign against the Edomites, Egypt granted Hadad the 
infant Edomite heir political refuge.  Hadad’s Egyptian royal education and 
subsequent royal marriage, along with Solomon’s royal marriage to Egyptian 
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princesses reflects Late-Period Egypt’s reliance on non-military means in the pursuit 
of political objectives.  The now powerful state of Israel was seen as a buffer on 
Egypt’s Asiatic frontier.  The death of the last Tanite pharaoh in 945 B.C.E. coincides 
with the end of IA IIa.  The ensuing Libyan Dynasties (Dynasty XXII) belong to 
another era (The New Bible Dictionary …1974, s.v. ‘Egypt’). 
 
2.7. Nomadic Raiders from the Desert. 
After Israel’s settlement in Canaan, the nomadic threat stemmed mainly from the 
Arabian Peninsula to the south and southeast.  The raiding strategies of these peoples 
allowed them to prey upon the vulnerable settlements, driving off livestock and 
plundering the resources of the locals pursuing a sedentary lifestyle.  Saul and David 
both campaigned vigorously against such peoples and Solomon’s commercial 
expansion in the 10th century brought Israel into greater contact with Arabia. 
         
2.7.1. Amalekites  
Ethnically the Amalekites traced their ancestral roots to the same progenitor as the 
Edomites (Genesis 46: 12, 16).  The Amalekites were nomads of the Negeb and Sinai.  
From the outset the Amalekites and the Israelites became inveterate enemies.  The 
war potential of these nomads would have been limited and set piece battles between 
these two foes would have been rare.  The first violent encounter recorded took place 
at Rephedim under Moses leadership (Exodus 17: 8-13).  Prior to IA IIa the 
Amalekites often allied themselves to other nomadic enemies of Israel, pursuing a 
typically nomadic raiding strategy.  Their limited war potential did not provide them 
with the means necessary for a persisting strategy against Israel (Judges 6: 3-5, 33).  
.During both Saul and David’s reigns Israel and the Amalekites clashed violently (1 
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Samuel 15 and 1 Samuel 27: 6 respectively).  The Amalekites were almost entirely 
destroyed by the start of Solomon’s rule (The New Bible Dictionary. …1974, s.v. 
‘Amalekites’).   
 
2.7.2. Midianites  
The desert lands to the east of the Gulf of Aqabah were the traditional homelands of 
the Midianites who, during the reign of the Judges, had posed a significant threat to 
Israel.  Some interesting ethnic connections are observed.  The Kenites were a 
Midianite tribe who were spared by Saul in his war against the Amalekites (1 Samuel 
15: 6) and by David (1 Samuel 30: 29) who in turn pursued a peaceful cooperative 
policy with them (The New Bible Dictionary …1974, s.v. ‘Kenites’).  Aside from the 
minor tribe of Kenites, the Midianites in general had been nomadic predators against 
the Canaanite settlements during the Bronze Age and Israelites as they began to 
displace the former during the Iron Age period.  From the days of the ‘judges’ the 
Midianites had cooperated with other nomadic raiders, including some of Israel’s 
bitterest enemies such as the Amalekites.  The Midianites constituted a constant threat 
to Israel’s southern borders (Judges 6: 3 - 6).  Their mobility stemmed from their 
longstanding employment of camelry as mounts, increasing their capability for a 
raiding strategy and providing the means for greater lines of communications.  Judges 
chapter’s six and seven recounts their menacing raids far to the north from the Gulf of 
Aqabah into the Jezreel Valley and their expulsion under Gideon’s military leadership 
(Bimson et al.1992: 37). 
 
 
 
 36
CHAPTER 3.  THE SCOPE FOR A RHETROACTIVE STUDY OF   
  STRATEGY IN ANTIQUITY. 
The period IA IIa is well treated in a large collection of literary sources, including 
biblical and extra-biblical documents.  Of particular significance are the Books of 1 
Samuel and 2 Samuel that give details of the reigns of kings Saul, David, and 
Solomon, the three kings of the United Monarchy.  Mazar reminds us however, that 
the Bible as a principal textual source, is centred mainly upon Israel and only 
incidentally upon her neighbours and the Ancient Near East at large.  The role of 
archaeology in the study of the life world of Syro–Palestine continues to fulfil its 
traditional function, namely, the reconstruction of material culture and material 
changes.  For the purposes of this period’s strategic studies it also plays the secondary 
role of verifying, illuminating and supplementing the written sources.  This secondary 
role is helpful to our knowledge of the non–Israelite political entities that are not 
accorded equal consideration in the biblical sources.  This function of archaeology 
also allows for the evaluation of Israelite material culture against the larger spatial and 
temporal background of this region and period (Mazar, 1990: 370).  The material 
remains of culture tend to resist ethnic and national categorisation, producing endless 
riddles and enigmas for modern scholars of antiquity.  Optimal success in this 
challenging aspect of archaeology requires a holistic approach in every instance.  This 
is also true in the sub-discipline military archaeology.   
 
The analytic domain of science requires that the scope of the concept culture not be 
assumed nor glossed over for fear of speaking past each other or trying to arrive at 
accurate conclusions using flawed language or unsound propositions in the process 
(Faure, 1988: 32 - 39).  At the present time, anthropologists, sociologists and 
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philosophers are not unanimous as to what the concept culture actually means.   
Broadly speaking, culture includes everything that can be made, changed, or 
developed by humans.  Thus culture is the product of man’s creativity.  It includes 
within its scope everything found in the lifestyle of a person or a given group of 
people, ranging from their beliefs and attitudes to that which pertains to their survival 
and their social intercourse.  Semantically, the meaning assigned to this term is very 
broad and entails several aspects, inter alia geographical awareness, historical 
awareness, religion, politics, kinship, social aspects, the economy, education, and 
even recreation.   
 
All of these factors interact with each other to create a worldview, or fundamental 
assumptions held by that person, family, clan, or ethnic group, people or nation.  By 
means of such a world view, individuals and societies conceive the world around 
them.  In a computer science analogy, a person’s worldview is comparable to the 
software that receives and reacts to signals from the environment.    To the extent that 
a worldview is held in common by a political entity, and to the degree that every 
aspect of that worldview is shared, the social dimension of strategy – that index of 
social cohesion within a polity, is informed.  In sum we may say that culture as a 
concept is taken to mean an “expression of daily activities of living of the individual 
or group within a society” (Vermaak, 1996 b: 4 – 5).  In terms of war potential, social 
cohesiveness is an important determinant, too often ignored by military historians and 
scholars of political science.  The schematic on the next page conceives the idea 
graphically of how various components and aspects of daily life interact on a micro 
and macro level to produce a dynamic world view.  The several arrows point to inputs 
and outputs and some aspects of socialisation that are the determinants of a person’s 
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or a society’s perceptions of how things ‘really are’ in the world around them.  If the 
buy-in or acceptance is to a great degree (i.e. large scale and intense), powerful social 
cohesiveness will result.  To the degree that the buy-in is small, social cohesiveness is 
weak and consequently the achievement of strenuous economic, social, and political 
goals are impossible.    
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(Picture from Vermaak, ANE 100-A, 104/96: p.18) 
 
 
The entire cultural milieu, as demonstrated in the worldview diagram above, 
constitutes the components typical of the lifeworld of any peoples regardless of time 
and place. The history of Syro-Palestine during IA IIa rests on an amalgam of all 
these factors.  All facets of the cultural model dynamically interact with each other.  
The lifeworld of any people is never static.  Analogously speaking, rather than a 
photograph, the recreation of a lifeworld is the recreation of a slow-motion motion 
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picture and data from a particular stratum of a given archaeological site should be 
understood as a frame from a movie.   
 
Up to the present time and as it pertains to archaeological work in Syro-Palestine in 
general, the military aspect has been largely a fringe subject to the greater body of 
scholars involved.  I assert that this lack of in-depth attention to the polemological 
perspective threatens to distort scientific efforts to accurately recreate the lifeworld of 
antiquity.  Speaking of Alexander the Great’s political achievements in the Fourth 
Century B.C.E., Ulrich Wilken was quoted by Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, in the 
preface of the latter’s book: “The whole subsequent course of history, the political 
and cultural life of after times cannot be understood apart from the career of 
Alexander” (1991:5).  The accuracy of our conception of the ancient world is at risk 
when scholars reconstruct antiquity with insufficient attention to the polemological 
lens needed to bring it into crisp focus. 
 
A general dearth of specialised scholarly studies in the military aspect of 
anthropology may be explained in terms of two cardinal reasons.  Firstly, the 
unsubstantiated generalised notion that war is an aberration of human social conduct 
and does not therefore merit the attention of social scientist attempting to reconstruct 
the normal lifeworld of the common man in any given society.  Secondly, the 
scientific study of war as a social phenomenon is a relatively latecomer to the 
academic conspectus of typical modern university curricula. Only since the 
conclusion of World War Two and the advent of nuclear power has the study of 
strategy really come of age in institutions of higher learning (Fourie1996: 7).  In 
conjunction with this, the revised approach to archaeology, the so-called New 
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Archaeology since the 1950’s, has adjusted the focus of archaeology from a historical 
orientation to an anthropological orientation; the lot of the common man rather than 
the great man (i.e. the ruler) now being the principal focus of attention.  Artefacts and 
other evidence becomes ‘data’ only when these “are properly excavated in context, 
interpreted in relation to a pertinent question, and published in full” (Craffert 1998:5).  
The study of phenomena in context requires that a more consistent and systemised 
effort be paid to the military aspects of ancient society.  The scientific scope and 
academic basis for the reach of archaeology has thus been broadened remarkably over 
the last half-century.  The undergirding proposition of this dissertation is that Military 
archaeology, as specialised sub-discipline and a legitimate part of New Archaeology’s 
holistic approach to recreating an accurate image of the common man in his ancient 
lifeworld, be moved from the periphery of scientific endeavour to a more central 
position.   
 
Regarding the second cardinal reason for the dearth of scholarly work in the military 
perspective of anthropology, it is regrettably the case that far from being an aberration 
of normal human intercourse, the norm [meaning the “rule; a pattern; a model; an 
authoritative standard” (Consolidated Webster...1962, s.v. ‘norm’)] in fact argues that 
organised violence on a large scale, involving for this gross purpose the resources and 
values at the disposal of the band, tribe, or nation-state has in fact been and continues 
to be the norm in the lifeworld of the common man throughout all dispensations of 
time.  Will and Ariel Durant calculated in 1968 that there had only been a paltry 268 
years free of war in the previous 3 421 years of world history (Kagen 1995: 4).  The 
principal variable in this assertion of war being the de facto norm is only the nature, 
scale and duration by which the political issue is resolved.  The greater the sophistry 
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and the war potential of the political entities involved, the greater the corresponding 
scales of misery and wanton destruction.  Empirical studies confirm this pattern from 
antiquity onwards until the evolving belligerents reached that awful stage of 
‘overkill’, which in modern political parlance goes by the acronym ‘MAD’ (mutually 
assured destruction).  At this point the whole calculus, as far as the norm goes, is 
turned on its head.  Violent political discourse, or war, between such modern powerful 
entities becomes much more circumspect and careful owing to the unprecedented 
military potentials among the leading political entities of the modern era.  Less 
powerful modern contemporaries continue to liberally apply the age-old norm of war 
as the final arbitrator for resolving political disputes. 
 
The cultural emphasis of this dissertation has a markedly political bias.  More 
accurately, this dissertation deals with the logical extension of political discourse in 
Syro-Palestine’s Iron Age IIa, namely, the warfare that obtained during this period.   
Warfare was and still is seen as a principal means to political ends.  To paraphrase 
Clausewitz; “When whole communities go to war – whole peoples, and especially 
civilised peoples – the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion 
is always due to some political object” (Howard and Paret 1976: 75). Since the onset 
of what A. Bernard Knapp has termed the ‘era of internationalism’ in the Ancient 
Near East (i.e. the Second Millennium BCE.) commercial, political, and social 
contacts between political entities in the international arena had increased (Knapp 
1988).  Equally rather than coincidentally, there had also been a corresponding 
increase in war between nations.  When limited local and regional resources were 
competed for and the various political entities disagreed as to their respective military 
strengths – their war and military potentials, war irrupted.   
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3.1 The Motivation for War: Present and Past. 
Essentially, the reasons for political entities going to war against each other have not 
changed since antiquity.  This is not surprising to those social scientists that assert that 
human nature is basically the same wherever you go or in whatever time period you 
study man in context.  A study of the factors leading to the irruption of war between 
modern nation-states and peoples today will give a fairly accurate insight then as to 
the causes of war anciently.  Several stereotype half-truths are commonly bandied 
about as to what are the typical causes of war.  A closer look exposes the sandy 
foundation on which many of these enduring misnomers rest.  Recognising the 
military aspect as a dominant cultural component in the political shaping of the world, 
it is important to gain some insight as to what are the factors that generally precipitate 
the outbreak of war.     
 
Blainey asserts that a state of war only exists between political actors when it is 
agreed upon by these actors (1976:269). The defender’s chosen form of statecraft also 
often reflects the war potential of that political entity.  For instance, a diplomatic 
response coupled with economics (payment of tribute) may be a de facto recognition 
of an inferior military potential.  If however the respective military strengths are in  
dispute between the political actors, then it is resolved by warfare until the lessor is 
vanquished and the true military potentials of the belligerents are established.  The 
surest test of military potentials is warfare.  In reaching the decision for peace or 
war, the issue is strongly influenced by several factors, some operating concurrently. 
Aggressive political attitudes and dispositions of leaders are often nurtured by 
ideologies that see war as a solution to political disputes.  Such decision-makers 
believe that more can be gained through fighting than through diplomacy.  Attitudes 
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useful for the promotion of peace will return when others, who see the reverse as true, 
replace such leaders, or when aggressive leaders are forced to review their beliefs in 
the face of failed military ventures (Blainey, 1976:270).  
 
An effort by political leaders to impose their will on other political actors is often a 
valid cause for the outbreak of war.  Notwithstanding the several forms of statecraft 
that exist by which means political goals may be pursued, political leaders are often 
swayed to opt for a military solution.  The following factors are noteworthy and 
common considerations when choosing between military and other forms of statecraft 
in the pursuit of political ends: 
• All available military strength and the ability to effectively apply that strength in 
the given political circumstances (i.e. military potential).  This embraces many 
aspects of a political actor’s circumstance and the power available to them.  To 
illustrate, assume the correctness of the Israelite invasion of Canaan, as detailed in 
the Book of Joshua.  This factor presupposes manpower (the logistic aspect), 
technical skill (the weaponry, tactical and operational competency), and the ethos 
to engage an enemy in a war of annihilation based on religious or ideological 
ideas (a worldview) about the political actors destiny.       
• What will outside political actors do if a political entity opts to pursue its political 
goals by means of military statecraft in that given time and place?  Early Iron Age 
Canaan was a complex political arrangement of several lessor regional powers, 
including the Transjordan kingdoms, the Israelites, Philistines, other Sea Peoples, 
and the several Canaanite princedoms - all competing for larger stakes in this key 
crossroad region of the Ancient Near East.  Alliances changed swiftly and success 
against one could bring positive acknowledgement and recognition from one 
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political actor and hostility and attack from another quarter.  David’s successful 
wresting of Jerusalem from the Jebusites brought political support from King 
Hiram of Tyre while simultaneously it provoked two powerful attacks from the 
Philistines (2 Samuel 5: 6 – 25).  
• Perceptions of whether there is internal unity or discord within their own land 
and in the land of the enemy.  This consideration for military statecraft is reflected 
in Egypt’s motives to enslave the Hebrew remnants from the former Hyksos 
dynasties that had ruled Egypt to the end of the Middle Bronze Age II (c. 1553 
BCE).  The aggressive political spirit of the New Kingdom of Egypt was a 
reaction to the internal discord and its resulting weakness that shamed Egyptians 
for centuries afterward.  
• Knowledge or forgetfulness of the realities and sufferings of war.  Several 
millennia of political history with only a few outbreaks of peace along that broad 
timeline suggest that forgetfulness of the misery of warfare is a norm between 
each succeeding generation and in some instances even during the time-span of a 
single generation, not withstanding war-weariness and impoverishment.  Even 
decisive military outcomes are no assurance of enduring peace.      
• Nationalism and ideology.  The New Kingdom of Egypt, Assyria the military state 
with its war ideology associated with the god Assur, and Israel’s martial God 
Yahweh all stand as examples of nationalism and ideology that precipitated war 
between the political actors of the ancient Near East.   
• The state of the economy and also the ability of the economy to sustain the war.  
Strategies are differentiated at various levels of political governance and further 
differentiated according to the type of warfare engaged in.  The choice of warfare 
type is dictated according to war potential, particularly economic circumstance.  
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David’s Addulam band employed a raiding strategy against King Saul and while 
in Philistine employ against the nomadic Amalekites of the Negev.  Then once 
David had secured Israel’s throne that same Adullam Band became the nucleus of 
King David’s standing army and were employed in a persisting strategy against 
Israel’s several enemies.   
• The personality and experience of those who shared in the decision to pursue 
political goals by means of military statecraft.  
  
Blainey concludes his book with a generalisation that endorses the merits of a 
retroactive study of ancient warfare with the aid of modern polemological concepts.  
Notwithstanding the extensive cultural changes that characterise the differences 
between modern and ancient society, especially the technological revolution that has 
since occurred, there is still a wealth of evidence among political actors on the 
modern international scene that points to the relevance and continuity between ‘the 
era of cavalry and the era of intercontinental missiles’ (1976: 273).  Van Crefeld 
supports this position, and even takes it one step further by noting the advantages to 
perspective that accrue with the passing of time.  He points out the errors of 
Clausewitz’s analysis of Napoleon’s system of warfare by noting that Clausewitz was 
‘too close’ to the events of the day and this was the reason for the great war 
philosopher’s clouded judgement on Napoleonic logistical systems (1977:70 – 71).  
There is thus a case to be made for a retroactive study of polemology, notwithstanding 
the technological revolution that separates the ancient and modern eras.  
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3.2 Si Vis Pacem Para Bellum 
This oft-mistranslated maxim, originally given by Vegetius, when translated correctly 
states ‘if you wish for peace, understand war’ (and not ‘.... prepare for war’).  When 
attempting to better understand the social phenomenon of war, regardless of temporal 
or spatial frameworks, close attention must be paid to the universe in which war 
exists.  Social context is one of the keys.  Just as social circumstances vary, so too do 
the types of warfare.  It is helpful to know something of the variations if one is to 
understand this crucial arbiter between political actors.  Warfare does not exist in 
isolation from other cultural aspects of the life-world of mankind and has to be 
studied in a multiplex approach if conclusions reached are to be reliable.  There are 
social relationships between the concepts that pertain to this subject. Our 
understanding of war will progress according to how well one understands the 
dynamic relationships between all the components of a given culture. It is critically 
important that one begins with the understanding that war is a social phenomenon.  
From that starting point, one can appreciate that warfare is a function of politics that 
strategy is a function of warfare, and that tactics is a function of strategy (Fourie, 
1996: 47).  This generalised assertion belies the complexity of the subject at hand.   
 
Wars, like strategy, may be generically categorised according to scale and type.  This 
unbundling will prove helpful to improving our understanding of warfare.  The scale 
of war may be limited or unlimited according to the political resources, political 
design, or circumstances at that given time and place of the actors concerned.  
Regarding the type of warfare a simple criterion such as internal or external will also 
go a long way to clarifying warfare (Fourie, 1996:41).  IA IIa Israel provides both 
interesting and relevant case studies for the discussion of these concepts.    The 
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existence of these concepts of warfare predated their formal use in military vernacular 
by several millennia, some of which found purchase only after 1945. 
 
3.2.1. Limited War and Unlimited War 
King Saul’s mandate to transform confederate-tribal Israel into a political unitary state 
required several campaigns against neighbouring political entities of various war 
potentials.  Israel’s gradual progress towards this political goal illustrates two aspects 
of limited war.  Firstly, Saul was limited by both what prerogatives and initiatives he 
could take independently and what resources he had placed at his disposal for 
realising this goal.  In the former aspect, King Saul’s political prerogatives were 
severely curtailed by religious custom and a tradition that was carefully guarded over 
by the prophets such as Samuel.  Yahweh’s ratification, always through the prophet, 
was essential.  Without divine approbation Saul’s tenure as king lost its legitimacy.  
Saul and the IA IIa kings after him, ruled only by the sufferance of Yahweh and all 
political undertakings were subject to ecclesiastical scrutiny and sanction.  
 
The second aspect of limited war had to do with the management of a political actor’s 
finite war potential. The limited military resources forced upon Saul were not just as a 
result of religious conservatism, but also for more mundane and practical reasons, i.e. 
by Israel’s comparative poverty in the Early Iron Age Canaan.  This was especially 
acute in the face of so many hostile neighbouring political actors.  It was prudent for 
the Israelite kings to appreciate Israel’s inherent limitations during IA IIa and to not 
pursue political goals by means of military statecraft that exceeded the new state’s 
war potential.  The several remaining Canaanite enclaves had to be tolerated until 
Israel’s war and military potentials had developed sufficiently to cope with them.  
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During the reigns of Saul and David, political goals and resources had to be very 
finely weighed and balanced.   To achieve this Israel’s IA IIa kings designed a general 
strategy that dealt with her enemies in a piecemeal and successive fashion.  Thus 
limited war, as a category of warfare, was discernible in Israel’s general strategy 
against her several political opponents.   
 
Unlimited war as ‘unlimited means to political ends’ was never really an option in 
Israel’s history, not even during the celebrated reign of King Solomon.  When 
compared to the traditional great powers of the ancient Near East, Israel was never 
more than a regional power and her political meridian coincided with the general 
nadir of the great powers and only for as long as those circumstances persisted.  Even 
Israel’s strategy against the nomadic Amalekites did not amount to unlimited war in 
that not all Israel’s resources were committed to that annihilation of this bitter foe.       
   
3.2.2. Internal War or External War 
Internal war is distinguished from other kinds of war in that the belligerents often both 
originate from the same polity and are fighting for control of the same.  There are 
several variations to this criterion and IA IIa once again provides credible case studies 
for this category of warfare.  Civil war is a term sometimes used to describe this kind 
of warfare, though the distinguishing criteria are often blurred.  King Saul’s jealousy 
of David’s military prowess, a quality that earmarked him as a potential threat to any 
future Saulide dynasty, soon precipitated political crises in the fledgling monarchy.  
Saul’s relentless pursuit of David and his Adullam band of fellow political dissidents 
qualify as an example of internal war.  David eventually sought respite from Saul’s 
unrelenting hostility by hiring out the Adullam band’s military services to the 
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Philistine king, Achish of Gath.  David’s status to Achish was that of political vassal. 
After Saul’s death at Mt. Gilboa, much of Saul’s political gains against the Philistines 
were undone, leaving Israel vulnerable to Philistine aggression.  David’s coronation 
by his Judaean tribesmen at Hebron also marked the renewal of the civil war between 
David and the house of Saul.  The latter’s supporters had established Saul’s son 
Eshbaal as Israel’s king in Mahanaim.  Two years of civil war ensued before the 
deaths of Abner and Eshbaal ended the strife.  
 
Also noteworthy is how such civil wars are prone to dragging other political actors 
into the fray, including enemy states who take advantage of the civil strife to pursue 
their own political goals.  Blainey maintains that a link exists between civil unrest and 
international wars, the former often precipitating the latter (1976: 82).  David sought 
respite from Saul’s unrelenting hostility by hiring out the Adullam band’s military 
services to the Philistine king, Achish of Gath.  Thus David’s status to Achish was 
that of political vassal.   When David later claimed the throne, following Saul’s death 
at Mt. Gilboa, his actions were viewed as hostile to Philistine interests in that his 
status changed from vassal to king of an enemy nation.  War quickly broke out again 
and Israel’s great victories under David regained her full independence from 
Philistine oppression. 
 
Israel had no custom or established principle of royal succession.  This created a 
political crisis with the passing of each king during IA IIa.  Civil war irrupted again 
when Absalom attempted to wrest the kingdom from his ageing father David.  In this 
instance there was no outside political interference and the crises passed when 
Absalom was defeated and killed.   
 50
 
Such political setbacks were to dog Israel’s history for several centuries, constantly 
wearing away her power base.  The end of the United Monarchy in c.931 BCE was in 
itself a crippling development to her future war potential, leaving her divided and 
vulnerable to the resurgent great powers of the Near East during the First Millennium 
BCE.  The consequences of internal war had a severely negative impact on Israel’s 
future political security.   
 
3.2.3. Non-military Forms of Conflict 
Such forms of political dialogue do include coercion, but the application of coercion 
differs from military statecraft.  Israel pursued her goals during this period not only by 
military statecraft but frequently by recourse to non-military forms of statecraft.  One 
such non-military method is diplomacy.  Diplomatic marriages, such as Solomon’s 
celebrated marriage to a pharaoh’s daughter were very important statecraft devices in 
the pursuit of political objectives.  The significance of this should not be glossed over.  
Greater eastern states than Israel were never accorded this honour which underscores 
the international prestige of Israel towards the end of the period IA IIa and also 
underscores the downward trend in Egyptian international power at this time.   
 
Another important non-military form of conflict is in the area of economic support or 
sanction.  Such forms of political dialogue are in evidence in IA IIa too.  King Hiram 
of Tyre pursued a policy of political friendship primarily through economic 
cooperation with the rising power of Israel.  Israel was a strong military regional 
power during IA IIa, and Hiram’s motives for cementing such a longstanding alliance 
may have been coloured by events still in living memory for the Phoenician city states 
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along the Eastern Mediterranean littoral.  Generally, the purpose of such an alliance 
serves to coerce a power not party to the alliance, or who is a common enemy to the 
alliance members.  The coercion is implicit, conveying a warning to enemies of its 
capacity to call on military potentials beyond its own to engage and destroy enemy 
aggression (Fourie, 1996: 45).  The aggressors in this instance were the ubiquitous 
Philistines.  Around 1200 BCE Sidon, the mother city of Tyre, had been plundered by 
the Philistines and many of its inhabitants had fled to Tyre.  The Sea People menace 
was a persistent common enemy to both the monarchs of Israel and Phoenicia during 
IA IIa.  This colours the historical picture as to why Hiram sought the alliance with 
Israel and why Israel in turn welcomed it.  The accord between Tyre and Jerusalem 
was fostered by Hiram sending skilled artisans and valuable building materials to aid 
the building of David’s palace (2 Samuel 5:11 and 1 Chronicles 14:1).  When 
Solomon acceded to the throne the policy of friendship and cooperation was renewed 
in the same way.  The temple was built in Jerusalem with the help of valuable wood 
and skilled Phoenician artisans.  Solomon reciprocated with annual payments of 
wheat and fine oil to Hiram and barley and wine to the Phoenician workers for the 
duration of the temple construction, some twenty years in all (The New Bible 
Dictionary … 1974, s.v. ‘Hiram’ and ‘Tyre’).        
 
3.3 Establishing True Military Potentials from Ancient Texts  
Reading ancient texts uncritically invites several problems, including inflated military 
potentials.  Military historians such as Hans Delbruck and Otto Hinze highlighted the 
flaws of several ancient historians such as Herodotus, Thucydides, Vegetius, Tacitus, 
and others.  Tendencies to bias, born of pride in national achievement, personal 
dislike and even hatred, ethnocentricism and uncritical transmission of eyewitness and 
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secondary reports and earlier texts all combined to produce romantic history rather 
than historiography proper (Fourie, 1996: 27).   
 
Aside from objective and rational enquiry in general, conflicting numbers in parallel 
biblical accounts points to the problems of faithful reproduction of the original texts 
over the several intervening centuries.  I Chronicles 21: 5 records that David’s  
census counted a total of 1 570 000 men of military age.  In 2 Samuel 24: 9 the total 
given is only 1 300 000 men (Church Educational System, Old Testament Student 
Manual, Rel.302, 1981:193).  To determine accurate military and war potentials for 
Israel during IA IIa, these obvious errors must be reconciled.  Ancient texts such as 
the books comprising the Bible have been subjected to repeated laborious manual 
copying for hundreds and even thousands of years.  The margin for error from such an 
ongoing enterprise is huge, significantly increased by time and the number of scribes 
involved; each with their own varying levels of scholastic competence, commitment, 
personal motives and controversies at work.  Unless the context was accurate, the 
scribe had little to be guided by in making correct decisions in the process of 
translation and the faithful reproduction of earlier texts.  Subjective and personal 
viewpoints and even religious dogma all played a role in what was transmitted and 
adjusted.  Occasionally misguided piety led scribes to uncritically accept fantastic 
numbers simply because these distorted reports were part of holy script and that 
placed them beyond the rational enquiry of mankind.    
 
3.3.1 The Corruption of Numbers 
Numbers are particularly susceptible to errors when translating from ancient texts, 
especially if the numbers were given in figures rather than in letters.  Figure-written 
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numbers are easily altered, dropped, or added to inadvertently or deliberately.  The 
addition of extra noughts is evident from the parallel passages of 2 Samuel 10: 18 
(700 chariots) and 1 Chronicles 19: 18 (7000 chariots).  Likewise, 2 Kings 24: 8 gives 
the age of King Jehoiachin as 18 on accession whereas 2 Chronicles 36: 9 gives it as 
8.  A digit has been dropped in the latter passage. Even when fully written out, certain 
numbers were and are easily confused in Hebrew, just as some are in English.  The 
numerical value ‘eight’ can be radically altered by several hundred percent by the 
addition or dropping of the letter ‘y’.  Likewise in Hebrew the addition of a single 
letter would make three into thirty (Church Educational System, Old Testament, Rel. 
301. 1981:193).        
 
3.3.2 The Confusion of Words 
The ancient Hebrew texts were devoid of vowels which made it easy for two words 
using a similar arrangement of consonants to be confused and the meaning of the 
phrase and text to be corrupted.  A key example in the matter of military potentials 
serves to illustrate this problem: ‘eleph’ and ‘alluph’.  When written in the manner of 
ancient Hebrew without any vowels, these words look identical (i.e.) ‘lp’.  In ordinary 
usage ‘eleph’ is the word for ‘thousand’, but is also used in other senses, namely for 
‘family’ (see Judges 6: 15), or ‘clan’ (see Zechariah 9: 7; 12: 5 – 6), and even for 
military unit.  The word ‘alluph’ on the other hand connotes ‘chiefdoms’ such as the 
chiefdoms of Edom (Genesis 36: 15 – 43).  When used in context, ‘alluph’ probably 
denotes a commander of a regular military unit.  Among the irregular and regular 
forces of antiquity, the military roles of civic leaders were not generally rationalised 
until the mid-first millennium B.C.E., and then only by a gradual socio-political 
evolutionary process.  Nevertheless, a strong probability exists that the usage of this 
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word in a military sense refers to a senior military rank, the rank of a professional 
fully armed soldier (Church Educational System. Old Testament Student Manual, Rel. 
302, 1981:193).   
 
Confused words of this sort have challenged translators and scribes, let alone the fact 
that languages are simply not equal.  Words, phrases, and terms can at best only 
approximate each other.  Crude treatment of military concepts such as distinguishing 
between regular soldiers of a standing army and ‘territorial cadres’, also sometimes 
referred to as ‘irregulars’, can lead to skewed conceptions of the facts.  The word for a 
regular soldier is the same as the word for the number ‘thousand’.  Where crude 
translation skills have been employed military potentials may get severely distorted, 
i.e. what should read as 500 ‘regular’ infantry can erroneously become half a million 
soldiers per se. 
 
3.3.3 David’s Census During IA IIa 
Historians are not unanimous in the matter of Israel’s population size.  The 
conventional number of about five million by the time of IA IIa has some acceptance 
amongst scholars based on passages such as 2 Samuel 24: 9 and 1 Chronicles 21: 5.  
Roland de Vaux challenges this proposition which rests on the generalisation that if 
800 000 (Chronicles 21:5 passage) men were liable for military service, that number 
could be extrapolated to indicate an overall population of at least five million.  De 
Vaux’s contention is that such a population within the limited confines of the territory 
of Palestine would mean nearly twice as many people to the square mile as the most 
thickly populated countries of Europe.  The restricted agricultural yield, a product of 
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geographical phenomenon and technological limitations, would simply not support 
such a population in IA IIa.   
 
By allowing for copyist errors when dealing with ‘lp’ which in some instances means 
the number 1000 and in other instances is simply referring to an armed man, the 
revised census of David points to a total of 120 000 men of military age, together with 
about 100 professional soldiers.  From this military potential it can be induced that 
Israel’s total population, by generalised extension, would have been in the vicinity of 
half a million people.  This accords a lot better when placed in context with all the 
other cultural components of the day and other indicators in the biblical text.  This 
figure of half a million also helps establish the important human resource component 
of Israel’s overall war potential (Church Educational System.  Old Testament Student 
Manual, Rel.302, 1981:194).   
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CHAPTER 4.  THE NATURE OF MILITARY FORCE IN SYRO-PALSTINE 
  DURING IRON AGE IIa 
Each scientific discipline employs its own customised jargon and terminology.  Thus 
polemology must inform military archaeology if the latter is to have any scientific 
credibility.  Military force is an esoteric term and its values should be broadly 
outlined before proceeding.  Likewise, the ‘nature’ of something is its fundamental or 
essential qualities (Collins English Dictionary…2001, s.v. ‘nature’).  Military force 
embraces the sum of a political entities war potential, its military potential, its 
technological capacity and all the logistical factors that have bearing on that political 
entities ability to pursue its political objectives by military statecraft.  These core 
polemological concepts amount to the essence of strategy.  To recap, strategy is an 
instrument of politics - it is a means to a political goal.  In abstract language, strategy 
seeks to create an untenable situation for an opponent.  Clausewitz’s outstanding 
contribution to military philosophy was to clarify that war is a political instrument.  
This then, is the first principle of military statecraft; to produce a political decision 
that diplomacy, or other more benign forms of statecraft, failed to deliver (Beaufre, 
1965:149).  Beaufre defines strategy as “the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills 
using force to resolve their dispute”.  Dialect here refers to the initiatory actions and 
the counters to them taken by the contestants until a decision is reached and the will 
of one is forced upon the other (Fourie, 1996: 50).  By extrapolation war tells us much 
of the political universe and the values of the common man in whatever age and place 
it occurs. 
 
Further fine-tuning of the term strategy helps one to understand its practical operation. 
Strategy operates or works at three levels.  Modern studies have gone a long way in 
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clarifying former vague and inaccurate applications of terms associated with strategy.  
These sharper social science tools now allow for a more sophisticated analysis of 
warfare.  Warfare in the world of the ancients can now be pursued with greater 
scientific objectivity and sophistication than ever before. 
 
4.1. War Potential and Total Strategy. 
This is a comprehensive combination of ways and the sum of various means that 
contribute to a political entities coercive power, even when not directly engaged in 
conflict.  The employment of all available resource aims to ‘create the untenable 
situation for its opponents and oblige them to accede to the position of the victor.  
This may be achieved with or without warfare taking place.  Besides earlier 
principalities and kingdoms, the rise of empires from the time of Sargon of Akkad 
(2334 – 2279 B.C.E.) onwards allows for the appropriate use of this concept.  As 
political entities grew in size and capacity for political action so did the level of 
political sophistry increase.  Total strategy entails the complete subordination of all a 
political entities resources, including civil resources, to the realisation of the desired 
political goal.  In modern nation states, such a strategy is conceived and directed at 
the executive level (cabinet) of political leadership. 
 
4.2.  Military Potential and General Strategy. 
There are various means of coercion for a government to choose from, such as 
economic, diplomatic, psychological, and military.  Each of these types of coercion 
includes general methods of application suited to the government’s total strategy.  
General strategy in this instance refers to both the character of the means and to the 
broad method of coercion chosen to create and exploit situations at the expense of an 
 58
opponent.  For example, lacking the means necessary to permanently remove the 
Philistine military threat once he had ascended the throne of the re-united Israelite 
monarchy, David initially opted for a general strategy that was military in character, 
and the method employed may be described as ‘containment’.  Israel’s still 
ambivalent loyalties to the institution of monarchy in general, to the House of David 
in particular, and their still largely technical inferiority produced Israel’s successor 
king to develop a general strategy for the long term that allowed for such political  
inhibitions to be compensated for.  In modern military settings general strategies are 
associated with campaign theatres and tend to span longer time frames.  Often several 
battles are fought to produce a given campaign’s outcome.  It is theoretically possible 
for general strategies to achieve an outcome without overt warfare taking place.  The 
demand for ‘earth and water’ (symbols of submission) from the Greek city states by 
Xerxes’ envoys is a case in point.  The Greek city states of Boeotia and Thessaly, 
including powerful Thebes, acceded to Persian political pressure in 480 BCE.     
  
4.3. Technological Aspects of Military Force at the Level of Operational Strategy. 
Technological aspects of the foundations of military force are of great significance to 
studies in military archaeology for any age.  Herein lay the clues for the superiority of 
one political entity’s war potential and military potential over another’s.  The adage 
“history turns on small hinges” has direct relevance here in that often the hinges of 
history can often be traced to technological aspects.  
 
Technological aspects of the foundations of military force are multifaceted in nature.  
It entails on the one hand the evolution of devices, appliances, implements, weaponry, 
armour, and contraptions with application value in the field of warfare.  On the other 
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hand technological capacity also involves materially intangible factors such as the 
deft, sophisticated or technically skilled employment of weapon systems in 
circumstances of terrain and several other tactical factors with great adroitness.  
Attempts at technical competency are essentially the methodology labelled warfare 
which is manifest primarily at the operational and tactical levels. 
 
Each level of strategy has a complimentary level of methodology.  At the level of 
operational strategy the aim of methodology is to optimise three key tactical concepts 
for successful combat between opposing deployed forces: security, mobility, and 
offensive capacity. When collectively referring to such technical devices and their 
efficient employment in combinations the term ‘weapon systems’ has significance, 
even in antiquity.  Military experience in the many era of history has repeatedly 
pointed to the superiority of a tactical synthesis of combined arms when effectively 
employed in concert. 
 
Sometimes the most effective way to teach a principle or to clarify a concept is to give 
examples of the concept from real life.  For an example of devices and contraptions, 
the development of true cavalry came about as a result of sophisticated horse breeding 
among the Hurrians which produced animals capable of not only pulling loads 
(chariots) but of bearing armed riders into combat.  Subsequently the innovation of 
stirrups, bits and other equestrian devices rendered cavalry even more efficient.  True 
cavalry added significantly to the military potential of the political entities that 
possessed them.  Similarly, the Assyrians showed great propensity for field 
engineering and siegecraft in the campaigns of the first millennium BCE, raising in 
their wake the benchmark of the application of technology to military purposes and 
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the scope of operational strategy.  The technological innovations of the Germans 
following the bloody stalemates of World War One trench warfare produced the 
concept of ‘blitzkrieg’ which was a watershed development in operational strategy – 
the interwar developments in engineering science made such concepts of warfare 
feasible.  As a general strategy blitzkrieg was a novel combined air-land strategy used 
to great effect by the German army and air force in its invasions of Poland, the Low 
Countries, France and Russia (Fourie, 1996:21). 
 
Operational strategy is the lowest of the three levels at which the concept of strategy 
operates.  Operational strategy is where conception and execution meet.  At this level 
commanders co-ordinate the collective units of weapons systems placed at their 
disposal.  Ideally this takes place in concert with all other units of weapon systems to 
force an untenable situation upon their opponent or opponents.  The bulk of biblical 
and non-biblical accounts, literary and non-literary, that describe or otherwise shed 
light on military action reflect strategy mainly at the operational level.  Strategic 
insights at other levels have to be induced in most instances. 
 
A tentative description of operational strategy, or ‘grand tactics’ as certain scholars 
loosely refer to it (i.e. Archer Jones), states it is the way in which a military force, 
specifically allocated to a particular military operation, is employed to create a 
military situation that is untenable for the enemy and most advantageous for the force 
using the operational strategy.  Operational strategy comprises the operations and 
manoeuvres by means of which opposing forces are brought within striking range of 
each other in the most favourable way for creating conditions necessary either to 
overcome resistance or to achieve victory in battle (Fourie, 1996:13-25).   
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Operational strategy can be further explained by classifying such strategy according 
to certain characteristics that are present.  The use of raids was a common operational 
strategy in the ancient world.  Raids were temporary intrusions into enemy territory. 
The aims of raids varied from purely economical to political.  Invasions into hostile 
territory, or the threat of such invasions sometimes sought political concessions such 
as the Philistine raids into Israelite territory soon after David assumed the title of King 
of Israel.  By this action David publicly set aside any Philistine vassal status he may 
have acquired while his Adullam Band served as a mercenary war band for King 
Achish of Gath.  The Bedouin of the Arabian Peninsula, the Midianites, the 
Amalekites, and such nomadic peoples are prime examples of groups and peoples 
who employed raids to garner economic benefit.  Standing armies of the day also 
employed raiding operational strategies in the pursuit of political objectives; the 
Assyrians employed raids on a huge scale, denuding whole territories of human and 
material resources in the form of war booty.  These large scale raids also aimed at 
reducing the enemy’s war potential; inter alia the dislocation of the enemy’s 
economy, break up of its social cohesiveness, creation of subjugated, favourable 
regimes etc.    Nebuchadnezzar the Neo-Babylonian king of the seventh century 
B.C.E. enforced his political objectives by a series of raids against Jerusalem between 
606 and 587 B.C.E.  Israel’s subjugation was thus enforced by such large scale raids.  
The hallmark feature of raiding strategies was their transitory nature.   
 
Another observable form of operational strategy evident in the ancient Near East was 
invasion with the intent of occupying and assuming permanent control of a territory 
and its values and resources.  The Israelite occupation of Canaanite territory was not 
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transitory in its aims.  Archer Jones labels this as a persisting strategy (1987:57-59).  
Unlike the Egyptians, Philistines, Assyrians, Neo-Babylonians, and nomadic 
tribesmen who sought to remove the values of a foreign territory as war booty for 
their own use in their own territory, a persisting operational strategy was informed by 
a different set of warfare dynamics.  The outcome was occupation with political goals 
aimed at permanently changing the political landscape.  Thus Jones’ concept of ‘a 
persisting strategy’ identifies the nature of such an operational strategy.  The ratio of 
force (military potential) to space (invaded territory) changes in a persisting strategy.  
Unless the ratio of force to space favours the invader, the invader may win battles 
along the way, but will ultimately succumb when his war potential is exhausted 
(Jones, 1987: 54 – 55).  Twentieth century examples include the Japanese campaign 
in Manchuria, beginning 1931and the German invasion of the Soviet Union, 
beginning ten years later.  The invasions of the Sea Peoples at the end of the Late 
Bronze Age also fall into the category of a persisting strategy. 
 
4.4.  Technological Aspects of Military Force at the Level of Tactics. 
‘The concept of fighting” is tactics (Fourie, 1996:13).  Too often the novice or the 
careless writer makes little distinction between the concepts of strategy at the various  
levels and tactics.  The general distinction between the strategy and tactics is that 
tactics is entirely about fighting, whereas strategy – even at the level of operations,  
need not necessarily entail fighting.  Indeed, the ideal strategy is to force an  
unfavourable situation upon an enemy, usually by manoeuvre, that he yields  
without offering battle (e.g. Napoleon at Ulm, 1805 against the Austrians).  The word  
tactics derives its current meaning from its Greek root taktika.  Tactics describes the  
arrangement of troops on the battlefield and their function in relation to one another.   
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The overall effectiveness of these combined formations is reflected in the outcome of  
the battle.  Tactics also must take into account enemy troops, their weapon systems 
and their formations (i.e. the enemy’s battlefield ‘arrangement’).  The material  
remains and the texts that provide data for ancient warfare in Syro-Palestine also  
supply valuable details and commentary on ancient battlefield tactics.    
 
4.4.1. Tactical Factors in Antiquity. 
Tactical factors in the ancient setting may be organised under two broad headings; the 
melee tactical factors (see p.65) and ballistic tactical factors (see p.72).  Such lists of 
factors are not to be confused with the concept of luck - the so-called random factor.  
The latter is indeed a bona fide issue in the concept of fighting but it is supplemental 
to tactical factors at the level of tactics.  Experienced practitioners of warfare will 
seldom discount the concept of luck.  The random factor is sufficient to impact 
decisively on the final outcome of the engagement or battle.  But luck is elusive, and 
generally inconsistent.  It is ethereal and not controllable but capable tacticians may 
take steps to ameliorate its worst effects on the outcome of the fight.  Luck does not 
lend itself to scientific enquiry and will thus not receive more attention in this 
discussion on tactical factors.  By contrast, tactical factors lend themselves very well 
to empirical studies.  With the assistance of scientifically researched combat 
behavioural models, carefully based on historical prototypes, simulated wargames (or 
‘kriegspel’ as the German General Staff named such modular simulated warfare) may 
afford us useful insights on the interplay between melee and ballistic tactical factors, 
the effects of disorder on fighting formations and how tactical situations may cause 
disorder on the fighting arrangements of units in combat.  From such understanding, it 
will become apparent that fighting and shooting capacity can indeed be diminished or 
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enhanced by skilful exploitation of the battlefield.  Phenomenon such as the weather, 
time of day, season, and the interaction of such at the time and place of the 
engagement of the belligerents all combine to colour the resultant outcome.  The 
wargames model of warfare to be used in this exercise is ‘War Games Rules, 3000 BC 
to 1485 AD [sic] (6th Edition), published by Phil Barker (ed.) of the Wargames 
Research Group.       
 
The term ‘art of war’ is amply demonstrated at the tactical level.  The art aspect lies 
in the creation of a set of combat circumstances wherein the ‘arrangement’ of own 
forces, in conjunction with the tactical characteristics of their weapon systems strives 
for a combat outcome such as the neutralisation or even destruction of the enemy. 
Destruction of the enemy may be either the physical destruction or the psychological 
destruction of the enemy’s will to fight on or even to fight at all.  Whatever the case, 
the tactical situation must become untenable for the enemy in order to gain the tactical 
victory. This outcome is sought while minimising such effects on ones own forces.  
Failure to minimise psychological or physical attrition may produce only marginal net 
gains in the campaign as history recalls of King Pyrrhus of Epirus.  His military 
adventure campaign of 280 – 276 B.C.E. against the armies of Republican Rome 
precipitated the military idiom ‘Pyrrhic Victory’ – a concept denoting expensive 
tactical victories too often result in overall political or strategic failure.      
 
Having recapped the aim of warfare in general, and at the tactical level in particular, 
careful consideration must be given to the tactical factors that influence this.  The 
following is offered as a sampling of tactical factors.  These factors are relevant to the 
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Iron Age and even to subsequent ancient archaeological periods such as Hellenistic, 
Roman, and Byzantine.  Each factor’s dynamic is lightly expounded upon. 
 
4.4.1.1. Melee Tactical Factors.  Listed under this sub-heading are some of the more 
common melee tactical factors relevant to warfare at the tactical level in antiquity:   
• Charging into enemy units rather than standing to receive such attacks.   
Many of the weapons employed in antiquity relied on impetus for their effectiveness.  
The hard swing or thrust of a bronze or iron sword, battleaxe, spear-point or mace 
against an opponent’s protective armour or shield increased the weapons destructive 
efficiency.  Moreover, charging usually won the initiative for the attacker, placing the 
defender at the disadvantage in the fight.  The momentum of the charge tended to 
disorganise the defensive line when the said charges crashed into it, compromising the 
effectiveness of the defenders fighting formation.  This encouraged charging units to 
engage the enemy en mass and with speed, even impetuously.  In time charging 
formations (‘arrangements’) were devised, such as the ‘wedge’ that would exploit this 
tactical factor to its fullest.     
• Mounted troops in good order attacking disordered foot. 
Mounted troops were primarily in the form of charioteers in the early stages of IA IIa. 
Midianite and Amalekite camel-riding raiders had also been encountered by Israel in 
the south and again in a major raid into the Jezreel Valley in the period of the Judges 
(see Judges 6: 1-6, and 6: 33 respectively).  As such, camel-born troops may also be 
categorised as mounted troops even though the camel was inferior to the horse as a 
war animal.  By King David’s reign cavalry, on sufficiently strong war-horses, were 
starting to appear more and more on the battlefields of Syro-Palestine.  Infantry were 
especially vulnerable to cavalry attack when they were disordered and in such 
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instances could only offer a disorganised defensive formation or no defensive 
formation at all.  The trend was for cavalry to increase in fighting strength over the 
ensuing centuries until the introduction of efficient handguns in large numbers finally 
dislodged them from their millennia long place of primacy on the battlefield.  In open 
terrain well-developed and trained cavalry could function optimally and posed a 
deadly threat to the more slowly moving infantry.  The best chance infantry had 
against cavalry was to arrange themselves in close formation behind a wall of shields 
etc, or to take shelter in rough terrain where cavalry speed over steep, rocky or broken 
ground would inflict leg or hoof damage to the mounts.  Generally, it was dangerous 
for infantry to be caught by cavalry in the open and doubly so if the foot soldiers were 
not ‘arranged’ in formation or ‘good order’.  In fourth-century Greece, a popular 
proverb among the classical Greeks stated that to challenge Socrates to argument was 
akin ‘to infantry challenging cavalry on the open plain’ (Spence, 1993: 48).  It was 
considered extremely rash and usually ended in defeat – for Socrates’ opponent and 
likewise, for the infantry.   
 
Chariotry was the principal mounted weapon system during IA IIa.  It was no 
coincidence that when Israel met the Philistines with their well developed chariot arm, 
in terrain suitable for the effective use of such chariots, the unarmoured Israelite foot 
soldiers were roundly defeated.  An example that stands out is King Saul’s final battle 
in c.1010 B.C.E. at Mt. Gilboa (the Jezreel Valley area is gentle, rolling terrain).  
Indeed, throughout antiquity and on into the Middle Ages, the superior destructive 
ability of mounted weapon systems in the charge earmarked them as premium shock 
troops. 
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• Pursuit 
The casualty reports from recorded ancient battles often give the impression that the 
victors were nearly invincible and vanquished were of little consequence in terms of 
their fighting prowess.  Such ideas miss the mark by large margins.  The greatest 
numbers of casualties were inflicted when one side broke and routed.  In the process 
of disengaging the enemy and routing the defeated side offered no further arranged 
defence and in their attempts to break away exposed themselves to the attacks of their 
pursuers.  The number of casualties inflicted at this point in the fight on the routers 
increased exponentially. 
• Advancing or retreating in the fight 
Effective employment of several hand-to-hand weapons in the ancient melee 
depended upon maintaining fighting formations.  The hoplites of the Philistine city 
states for example, arranged as they were in serried ranks of spearmen, had a tendency 
to incline leftwards to further protect their defensive ‘shield side’ while wielding their 
weapons in their right hands.  Controlling these rigid spear-armed infantry formations 
was easier on the advance than in reverse.  This generally held true for all melee 
formations whatever their particular weaponry.  Chariotry were especially incapable 
of retiring from the melee and cavalry were likewise vulnerable to becoming 
disordered when attempting to do so.    
• Type and quality of weapons 
The profiles of melee weapons that were common to IA IIa will be dealt with in detail 
in chapter six of this dissertation.  The design of a weapon and its intended battlefield 
function imbued it with certain characteristics and qualities that afforded the soldiers  
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who employed it specific advantages or disadvantages in the fight.  For instance, the 
first strike ability of long spears and pikes were well suited for defence against 
charging cavalry, but the same long spears and pikes were inferior against the first  
strike ability of infantry-born weighted javelins such as the legionnaire’s pilum.  A 
two-handed weighty battle-axe or heavy sword on the other hand had greater 
destructive capacity in general but rendered its user more vulnerable in defence 
because both hands were employed in wielding the weapon and thus discounted the 
use of shields.  Lightly armoured infantry with light javelins or ballistic weapons 
could exploit broken terrain without compromising their loose or open fighting 
formation.  In such situations they gained the tactical advantage over the heavier less 
flexible heavy infantry.   Thus in certain situations particular weapons and weapons 
systems afforded advantages while in other circumstances these self-same weapons 
and weapon systems imposed tactical disadvantages.  The Israelites were at a 
disadvantage to the Philistines because they lacked the technological skill to work 
iron and had to contend against the Philistines with inferior quality weaponry.  
Similarly, Celtic swords were notorious for their lack of tempering and the blades 
would reportedly bend, buckle and quickly lose their keenness (sharpness of the 
blade) in the fight.   
• Height advantage 
This is a consistent factor from antiquity to modernity, not withstanding the march of 
technology.  Commenting on the effects of geography upon military operations in 
general, Clausewitz observed that the nature of the ground impacted tactics in three 
principle ways: as an obstacle to the approach, as an impediment to visibility, and as 
cover from fire (Clausewitz, 1976:348).  Dealing specifically with height advantage, 
Clausewitz noted “physical force is always harder to exert in an upward direction than 
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in a downward direction, and this must hold true of an engagement”.  Clausewitz goes 
on to cite three obvious reasons why height advantage is such a leading tactical factor 
in the engagement.  Firstly, the high ground inhibits the enemies approach, secondly 
(and this belongs more properly to shooting tactical factors but inasmuch as these 
factors often occur interactively and simultaneously, I will give it here), shooting 
downward, considering all the geometrical relations involved, is perceptibly more 
accurate than shooting upward.  And thirdly, heights command a wider view 
(Clausewitz, 1976:354). 
 
It has thus always been of great importance for defenders to arrange their defence on 
high ground.  Throughout antiquity Jerusalem has demonstrated the value of defence 
from high ground.  The concept of a citadel entailed fortification of the highest point 
in the city.  Launching attacks from higher ground against enemy troops below 
afforded the troops fighting downhill greater tactical advantages for reasons already 
given.  It is easier to move down a slope than up a slope, particularly if one is 
encumbered about with armour and fighting equipment.  Additionally, the overall 
impression of troops occupying higher ground is greater to the mind than the 
circumstances that actually accrue to height advantage warrant.  Simply stated, 
another important advantage of occupying the high ground in an engagement is 
psychological.   Troops deployed on the high ground can thus withstand significantly 
larger or even better quality or better equipped enemy forces than themselves, or a 
combination of all three.   Consider the extreme example of the Jewish defenders at 
Masada in C.E 73 against which no less than 7000 legionaries and auxiliaries were 
deployed.  Masada tied up more than a standard Roman legion for a period exceeding 
six months. 
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• Shields and defensive armour 
The development of personal armour and other such protective equipment has 
constantly shadowed the evolution of more effective and sophisticated weapon 
systems.  This pattern of tactical countering has continued uninterrupted throughout 
the ages and still characterises the weapons industry today (i.e.) the ICBM and the 
proposed ‘Star Wars’ anti-ballistic missile defence system.  More relevant to this 
dissertation’s time period, the technological skills for iron working in IA IIa were 
being diffused throughout the region, steadily eroding the tactical advantages of the 
peoples like the Philistines who had once monopolised them.  More details of the 
technical aspects of this protective equipment will be discussed in chapter six.   
 
The ancient melee was typically carried out at close quarters.  In such desperate 
fighting the use of shields and body armour conferred upon the combatants’ greater 
staying power in the fight.  Consequently the morale of well armoured troops tended 
to be more robust.  Psychologically speaking, armoured troops generally had greater 
confidence of surviving the fight.  With fewer troops falling to the enemy’s deadly 
blows and thrusts the better-armoured troops had the advantage of maintaining not 
only their impetus in the fight, but importantly, such also better maintained the 
fighting formation in which they were arranged. Armour and shields helped produce a 
positive ratio of wounds inflicted than received in the fight. To illustrate, even the 
wild fanaticism of the naked fighting Celts was successfully countered by the 
steadiness of Rome’s well-armoured legions.  The latter held sway on the battlefields 
of the ancient Mediterranean world in no small measure due to the excellent balance 
between good defensive equipment and good offensive shock weaponry.  When these  
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qualities were blended together in excellent tactical formations, such factors 
combined to make them the most steadfast and articulate foot soldiers of antiquity, 
their millennium-long primacy in battle bearing witness to the fact.   
• Heavy casualties from ballistic weaponry prior to or in conjunction with 
the melee. 
When used in concert with melee tactical factors, missile weapons - with their own 
unique ballistic tactical factors, produce a synergistic result that realises the optimum 
destruction of enemy forces or erodes their will to fight on.  In military parlance, 
‘softening up the enemy’ with missile fire immediately before engaging them with 
shock-troops can make a significant impact on the targeted formation’s fighting 
capacity.  This may be viewed in terms of a crude formula: the higher the casualties 
from missile troops immediately prior to hand-to-hand combat, the lower the effective 
fighting power of the targeted unit in the ensuing melee.  Psychology or troop morale 
is likewise affected and may be decisive in the ensuing engagement.  Generally, it is a 
combat characteristic of larger units that they can ‘soak up’ more damage than smaller 
units before their actual fighting power is diminished or impaired.  This also holds 
true for veteran troops or elite troops, but the psychology aspect will be discussed 
more fully in 4.4.3. The Effects of Psychology on Tactics. 
• The order of the fighting unit’s combat arrangement or formation 
Simply stated in a question format, is this unit’s fighting formation properly ordained 
or is it in a state of disorder when engaged by the enemy?  Such disorder reduces the 
fighting power of a unit, its cohesiveness, and its morale.  A fighting unit is negatively 
affected when this concept is compromised.  The concept will be discussed further in 
section 4.4.2.  The Effects of Disorder on Melee and Shooting.  
 
 72
• Fighting to cross defended obstacles 
Artificial obstacles include man-made structures or modifications to the terrain in 
which the engagement takes place.  Defences such as Jerusalem’s walls, defendable 
gate complexes, palisades of felled trees, pits dug in front of the fighting unit’s 
position, caltrops (anti cavalry spiked devices that followed in later archaeological 
periods), sharpened stakes embedded into the ground at angles to intercept enemy 
assaulting units like spears projecting out the ground and so on.  All these and several 
others are examples of man-made obstacles that would undermine the fighting power 
of a unit of troops trying to engage enemy troops deployed behind such obstacles. 
 
Natural obstacles can achieve the same results in warfare.  Wiley commanders seek 
out such circumstances and exploit their influence in battle.  Streams, boggy or deep 
mud, steep rocky hillsides, hedges, or cultivated fields such as olive or vine 
plantations are examples of natural obstacles.  Such obstacles similarly increase the 
defensibility of positions and increase the difficulty factor of engaging enemy 
deployed in defence of them. 
• Troop and unit confidence. 
This matter will be dealt with more substantially in 4.4.3. The Effects of Psychology 
on Tactics.  Let us pause here though to observe that when a fighting unit that has lost 
its nerve, its confidence or more correctly its morale, it is fragile and weak in terms of 
its will power and resolve to engage the enemy in combat.  Because of this 
psychological debilitation such an afflicted unit has diminished fighting power and is 
vulnerable in combat until its morale is restored.  It fights poorly and is prone to being 
beaten.  In the brutal experience of the melee a shaken unit was grist for the grim 
reapers mill. 
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4.4.1.2. Ballistic Tactical Factors.  Fewer factors obtain here.  Listed below are the  
principal tactical factors that would have impacted on the effectiveness of missile 
armed units in Iron Age IIa.  Such factors remained relevant in the archaeological 
periods that followed until the advent of rudimentary gunpowder weapons in the late 
medieval period. 
  
In the tactical environment of shooting some factors have bearing on the target being 
shot at while other factors are derived from the act of discharging the missile weapon 
itself.  The note in the parentheses indicates whether the factor applies to the targeted 
unit (T) being shot at or if the factor applies to the act of shooting itself (S). 
• (T) Shieldless infantry with little to no protective armour. 
Defensive armour was manufactured from a variety of materials such as the tough 
leather of animal hides, thick cloth studded with pieces of animal horn, or reinforced 
with metal scales or rings such as copper, brass, and even iron studs. The 
sophisticated metal-working skills of the Philistines and some other artificers and 
armourers even produced metallic body armour, leg greaves, and helmets.  The shield 
played a particularly valuable security role on the battlefield.  It could be moved and 
positioned to ward off enemy weapons from most directions.  Where shields were 
lacking, especially among densely arranged close formation troops, such warriors 
presented easy targets for enemy missile armed troops.  Certain units were arranged in 
loose formation which was less dense than a phalanx of spearmen but still arranged to 
fight in fairly close proximity to each other.  These formations were less rigid to 
facilitate moving and fighting on broken ground or past obstacles.  All the Syro-
Palestinian armies of IA IIa featured troop formations of these kinds.  When no 
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defensive armour, and in particular no shield, was to be had among such infantry 
formations, the damage done by missile fire was much more grievous.  
• (T) Shieldless troops with protective armour, moving fast, or in a 
dispersed formation. 
Mounted units like chariotry and the steadily increasing numbers of cavalry of this 
period may have had little protective armour.  They could offset their vulnerability to 
shooting by their speed on the battlefield.  Similarly, skirmishing infantry lightly 
armed with javelins, or bows, or slings etc. were usually arranged in a dispersed 
formation that presented a diluted target for shooters.  Dispersed troops had little 
rigidity in the formation and could avail themselves of whatever natural cover or 
protection was at hand, generally scurrying around without the constraints of a tight 
fighting or shooting ‘arrangement’ (formation).  Densely packed infantry formations 
with protective armour had some means of protection against hostile missile fire.  
However, the absence of shields for each of the above troop types would have 
resulted in higher casualties notwithstanding their speed, their dispersed formations, 
or their protective armour.  The root problem simply being that when fired upon by a 
massed formation of missile troops, it is highly unlikely that one’s speed, formation, 
or body armour will afford complete protection.       
• (S) Disordered or shaken. 
If the shooters formation was disrupted for any of the reasons discussed under 
heading 4.4.3., their capability to inflict damage on enemy troops and formations 
would be lessened.  Shaken units of missile armed troops will also perform poorly; 
their nerve and confidence have being broken, and their fighting attitude reduced 
mainly to self defence and survival. 
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• (T) Speed of target. 
Slower moving targets would generally include all infantry and mounted troops 
caught moving slowly when shot at.  Even charging infantry moving at their best 
speeds, encumbered as they are by their equipment, the unevenness of the terrain they 
move across, and by the overriding necessity to maintain their fighting formation as 
they move to engage the enemy, cannot run at their fullest speed possible.  Infantry 
arranged in loose formation are less constrained by tight unit arrangements but some 
of the limitations mentioned still apply.      
 
Chariotry had already developed into a type of shock troop weapon system by IA IIa, 
as compared to the earlier lighter chariots that had served as mobile platforms for 
missile armed troops, so high speed for ramming into or cutting a swath through 
enemy formations was a critical characteristic.  Equestrian technological 
developments and careful customised warhorse breeding programs produced 
increased capacity for speed for such weapon systems within the Syro-Palestinian 
armies of the Iron Age.  Larger and more reliable cavalry arms came into existence 
during the First Millennium B.C.E., coinciding with increasingly large empires. 
Unarmoured and ballistic-armed cavalry formations featured prominently in nearly all 
Near Eastern ancient armies, largely due to the dictates of the terrain which was open 
and extensive.  The trade off of personal security (armour and shields) for speed and 
manoeuvrability remains a tactical factor even in the technologically rich modern 
world of armaments.  In time horses were sufficiently strong to bear the load of well 
armoured riders into the rigours of the melee.  In general however the speed of 
mounted troops counted against the shooters as a ballistic tactical factor. 
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• (S) Target charged into shooting unit. 
The need to defend one against attackers overrides any other task in battle.  If the 
chargers began their attack some distance away from the shooting unit, the shooting 
unit would have to fire in haste and then discard ballistic weaponry and equipment for 
other hand weapons more suited to the impending melee.  If the chargers attacked 
from a closer distance, the ballistic armed unit may not have any opportunity to fire 
off an effective volley at all. 
 
There were certain weapons however that were hurled at the enemy immediately prior 
to contact.  These should be regarded more as melee weapons rather than ballistic 
weapons and include weighted javelins and darts, throwing axes, and the like.  Such 
weapons were found more among troops equipped for the melee than among troops 
organised for ballistic function.   The detailed characteristics of these weapons will be 
more closely examined under Chapter 6. Artefacts of War from Syro-Palestine during 
Iron Age IIa.        
• (T) Target in the open or in cover. 
Walled cities or fortified strongholds provided cover for the defending troops.  
Conversely, such security was sacrificed in open battle and cover was limited to what 
the terrain offered.  Such cover was limited because battle sites were mostly in the 
open to facilitate the manoeuvring of units against enemy units.  Weaker armies often 
sought to compensate for their weaknesses by occupying selected terrain features.  
Hilltops, hedgerows, scrub, woods, or ravines all provided some form of cover from 
enemy missile fire.  Cunning commanders sought to exploit such factors to diminish 
enemy ballistic strengths.   Open terrain, in which little natural cover was available to 
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the enemy, was the optimum terrain for the effective employment of ballistic armed 
troops. 
• (T) Target at long range. 
Ballistic weapons have the advantage of being able to inflict casualties on the enemy 
at a distance.  The distance varies according to the ballistic weapon concerned.  
Slingshot, arrows, and javelins were the most common ballistic weapons of IA IIa.  
They were hurled, flung, or shot by hand or with the assistance of ballistic equipment 
designed to project the weapons over a distance.  The trajectory of these ancient 
ballistic weapons described a flat arc and the weapons destructive power was 
influenced by several technical factors.  A particularly relevant ballistic tactical factor 
is the matter of range.  By definition range, as it applies to weaponry, describes the 
maximum effective distance of a projectile fired from a weapon (Collins English 
Dictionary … 2001, s.v. ‘range’).  The flaw in this definition is its incorrect use of the 
word weapon; the projectile is the weapon, not the means by which it propelled 
towards the target, notwithstanding it be a crude torsion-powered catapult, a 
composite bow or a submarine launched rocket propelled nuclear missile of the space 
age.  The weapon is the destructive device; i.e. the flying rock, the bronze tipped 
arrow, or the 30 megaton nuclear warhead.  
 
Range has always been a compelling factor in the evolution of ballistic weaponry.  In 
antiquity, the range varied according to several factors: strength of the slinger, type of 
bow being used to fire the arrow, the accuracy and technical proficiency of the 
‘shooter’ and so forth.  The ‘maximum effective distance’ referred to in the above 
definition is not the total possible distance of the weapon, but rather the distance at 
which optimum destructive capacity is attained.  Beyond this distance the destructive 
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capacity graph spirals downward on a steep tangent to negligible results.  Generally, 
archery fire was over a greater range than slingshot and javelins.  The latter two were 
employed only at a shorter range.  All the various bows and their accompanying 
catalogue of weapons (arrows) had in common the greater range at which they could 
be employed.  Targets at long range were nevertheless still more challenging targets 
and as this tactical factor notes, shooting at targets over long range was tenuous when 
compared to shooting at them at close range.    
• (S) Size of shooting unit. 
This is generally a plus factor but under certain conditions, including ambush or a 
battlefield of limited space, negative situations associated with the size of a shooting 
unit may arise.  A large or oversized number of lightly armoured missile troops may 
prove a hindrance to the close combat units of the army.  An example to illustrate the 
problem of space and time on the battlefield is the classic example of the Battle of 
Marathon, some 500 years after IA IIa. The battle was between the Greeks and the 
Persian’s punitive expedition, led by the able Persian commander Mardonius.  The 
Persian army had landed near Marathon, intent on marching on unwalled Athens.  The 
Athenians counted by marching swiftly northward, and blocked the path of the 
Persian advance.  Both sides then deployed for battle; Herodotus, admittedly 
untrustworthy for accurate numbers, give the army sizes as approximately 20 000 
Persians and 10 000 Greeks, of whom the greater majority were Athenian hoplites 
(armoured close order spearmen).  Typical of Near Eastern armies, Mardonius’ force 
was surfeited with a large proportion of unarmoured foot archers, better suited to their 
native terrain that was more open and ideal for ballistic weaponry.  Mardonius’ 
principal combat units were armoured cavalry, tasked to attack once the Greek forces 
had been ‘softened up’ by archery fire.  The terrain better suited the smaller Greek 
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force than it did the numerous Persians; steep hillsides and the beach squeezed the 
flanks leaving little room for the cavalry on the Persian right wing to manoeuvre.  The 
Great Marsh obstructed free movement away from the Greek forces and the 
exchanging of lighter units with the heavier melee units that would have deployed 
behind the units of archers.  Effectively, the terrain bottled the Persian forces in.  To 
reduce the Persian advantage in missile power and overall numbers once the battle 
had commenced, the Greek close order hoplites promptly closed with the Persian foot.  
The more lightly armoured Persian infantry were poorly equipped to deal with such 
enemy troop types and the Persian centre was cut to pieces in quick order, especially 
after their wings had been routed and the Greeks on the flanks enveloped the Persian 
centre.  During the Battle of Marathon, the massed ballistic firepower of the Persians 
had little influence on the outcome of the battle.  The Persians were denied the space 
and time necessary for their superior archer units to make an impact on the battle 
(Bury and Meiggs, 1991:158 – 160).  
 
Saturating the target generally increases the ratio of success, even if the targeted 
enemy has the advantages of cover.  But in the torsion and muscle powered world of 
IA IIa weapon technology, the range factor of the weapons must be taken into account 
too.  The ‘self- bow’ (i.e. a bow made of one type of wood rather than the 
combination of materials such as the 'composite bow’) could not project its weapons 
as far as the ‘composite bow’.  The superior composite bow could project its weapon 
a maximum effective range of up to 250 -275 meters.  ‘Effective’ is of course a 
combination of personal skill in hitting the target and the weapons penetrative power.  
To the untrained eye or inexperienced mind such distances are hard to relate to.  To 
anyone with a modicum of musketry training, hitting the target at even 100 meters in 
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the calm, relaxed setting of a modern shooting range can be a challenge.  The modern 
infantry assault rifle has a muzzle velocity of between 760 meters per second and 980 
meters per second, depending upon the specific weapon, and can be employed 
effectively up to 300 meters with sights adjusted to suit the optical specifications of 
the shooter.  The best prospect for ancient ballistic weaponry was to fire in massed 
volleys.   Such collective efforts resulted in large missile armed units that occupied 
space on the battlefield.   
 
Mounted archers developed over time and reflected the huge open tracts of land such 
as found in the steppes of Asia and the vast open terrain of the ancient Near East – 
particularly in northern and southern Mesopotamia.   Space remains a cardinal factor 
in tactics and operational strategy even today and certainly had to be taken carefully 
into account in antiquity as well.  The crude levels of command and control dictated 
the need for careful ‘deployment’ i.e. the arrangement of units of troops on the 
battlefield according to space needed for the effective employment of their weapons 
and fighting formations.  Once underway, the commander’s control over troop 
movements and counter movements were very limited.  A great premium had to be 
placed on careful deployment in set-piece battles.  The units of missile armed troops 
had a specialised role to play but ultimately, and especially in most instances of the IA 
IIa period, it was in the melee that the issue was finalised.  Missile armed units most 
often played a moderating role rather than a decisive role, neutralising or weakening 
the fighting power of enemy combat units.  The size of the missile unit, in appropriate 
settings, influenced the degree to which missile fire could affect the fighting capacity 
of enemy units. 
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To illustrate the scope of ballistic weaponry’s influence on the hard core melee units 
in a battle, one need not look further than the experience of the Roman expeditionary 
force under Crassus in 53 B.C.E. in a poorly conceived campaign against the 
Parthians.  The Parthian kingdom was a loosely compacted monarchy and something 
of a feudal prototype; the baronial elite was extremely heavily armoured cavalry type 
known as cataphracts.  Both rider and horse were well covered by mail armour.  The 
rider couched an extremely heavy lance named a kontos.  These nobles combined into 
units of shock troops capable of knocking out even units of solid legionary heavy 
infantry.  The many retainers of these cataphract nobles were arranged into fast 
moving units of horse archers, and were excellent archers using the composite bow 
with incredible capacity for armour penetration.   
 
Crassus marched against the Parthian king with 35 000 men, the majority legionaries; 
close order heavily armoured infantry with some auxiliary support in the form of 
Gallic horsemen.  The Parthians, 10 000 strong but all mounted and unencumbered by 
slow moving infantry, chose their battlefield well; open terrain with gentle rolling 
hills well suited to cavalry manoeuvres in the vicinity of Carrhae.  The horse archers 
selected the optimum range for the bows and steadily fired volley after massed volley 
into the hapless Roman infantry whose only cover was their personal armour and their 
shields.  Trapped under the blazing desert sun the Romans were at the complete 
mercy of the Parthians once the Persian cataphracts had wiped out the Roman’s 
supporting Gallic cavalry contingent.  Unable to close with the swift Parthian 
horsemen and unable to retreat, the Romans were completely destroyed as a fighting 
force.  Merely a third of the original Roman force, about 10 000 troops, were able to 
regain the Roman frontier in Syria.  The tactical insight is easily culled: in the correct 
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terrain, with competent leadership and ballistic skill, massed archery could cripple 
melee units in terms of their morale and their fighting power (Cary and Scullard, 
1991:255 - 257). 
  
• (S) Attempting to shoot over or past friendly unit or front ranks of own unit 
This again alludes to space as a factor in warfare.  A high premium was placed on 
concentrated firepower as illustrated in the above Battle of Carrhae.  The fairly crude 
ballistic qualities of ancient missile weaponry were compensated for by massed 
firepower on the battlefield.  It was dangerous, unsettling for friendly units involved, 
and prone to accident to attempt to shoot over or through gaps at enemy units.  
Generally ballistic firepower ceased once melee units closed with each other. 
        
4.4.2. The Effects of Disorder on Melee and Shooting. 
Repeatedly the discussion on tactics returns to the original meaning of the word 
taktika: the arrangements and deployments adopted by forces in battle by which to 
gain the maximum ‘advantage’ from their weapons, regardless of time period, era, or 
geographical location (Fourie, 1996:12).  Shrewd commanders sought tactical 
advantage not only in technological aspects of weaponry or in troop quality, numbers 
or disposition, but also by engaging enemy forces in combat while that enemy’s 
arrangement of troops was disordered and operating below its usual capability.  
Optimum advantage of weapon factors and unit organisation also depended on the 
several so-called ‘tactical factors’ outlined above, and commanders laid their plans 
with these tactical factors in mind.  It is thus apparent that fighting and shooting 
capacity can indeed be diminished by skilful manipulation of tactical factors on the 
battlefield.   
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Original advantages derived mainly from technology and innovative troop 
arrangements diminished in time due to the effects of diffusion and other mechanisms 
of cultural exchange.  For instance, Indo-Europeans such as the Hatti (Hittites), the 
Hurrians, and to a lessor extent the Urartians north of Assyria lost their advantage of  
having chariotry and then cavalry while other cultural groups did not; the Philistines 
in time lost their technological lead in iron working skills and so forth.  The effects of 
communication played a major role in disseminating what were once monopolies and 
cultural advantages – and the rate of acculturation increased according to frequency of 
contact, duration of contact, and scale of contact.  Thus, where technological and 
troop arrangements had once accorded advantages, such tactical advantages were only 
temporary, not permanent. 
 
Ongoing tactical advantage thus had to be sought in battle according to skilful troop 
arrangement, referring in particular to deployment and manoeuvre.  Such troop 
articulation was produced in regular armies by the impact of training under drill 
masters and other aspects of military professionalism. In the case of irregular tribal 
warriors, battle advantage was sought by the native attributes of strength, fierceness, 
courage, stamina and cunning leadership.  Further, correctness of deployment for 
battle in the given circumstances, inter alia terrain, weather, time of day and season, 
troop morale, collective temperament, exploitation of terrain, battlefield manoeuvring, 
and leadership were and remain relevant to all warfare and battlefield prowess.   
 
Clear advantages were to be had by compelling the enemy to fight in disadvantageous 
circumstances.  Such circumstances may include attacking the enemy in terrain 
unsuited to the troop types of that army, such as David’s ambush of Philistine close 
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order formation heavy infantry spearman in the broken terrain of the valley of 
Rephaim (2 Samuel 5: 17 – 25).  After the Philistines had regrouped, they advanced 
again through the valley of Rephaim and this time David again forced them to fight in 
a disordered arrangement by attacking their rear by means of a concealed march 
through a balsam forest.  Notwithstanding their superiority in arms and armour the 
Philistines were again roundly defeated.  In both instances David, compelled them to 
fight in disadvantageous circumstances that disrupted their shooting and fighting 
arrangements.  Disorder reduced the shooting or fighting capacity of the Philistines.  
 
Troop combat and movement formations were disrupted temporarily or for longer 
durations, depending upon the nature of the disruption.  More serious disruptions 
which extended over longer periods of time incrementally retarded the units fighting 
capacity, rendering it more and more vulnerable to enemy attack.  The nature of 
battlefield disorder thus varied in scale and scope.  Tactical disorder could degrade the 
tactical situation into tactical fiasco.  This apogee of hell incarnate was all too often 
the lot of the common soldier through the ages rather than some clinical equation of 
force and motion that characterises the ‘drum and bugle’ type writings of some 
military historians before the onset of polemology proper.  Typical causes for these 
disorders at the tactical level of battle and combat, as it pertained to ancient warfare 
are recounted below.   
 
• When troops in close formation attempt to maintain formation or change 
formation while moving, fighting, shooting or crossing difficult terrain. David’s 
ambush of the Philistine forces in Nahal Rephaim illustrates this point.  In the deep 
ravines and such difficult terrain as found in the Hill Country of Judah, the close-
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formation foot of the Philistines lost much of their fighting power when forced to 
change formation to meet David’s ambushes from an unexpected direction.  Having to 
do this while fighting and in difficult terrain reduced the Philistines original tactical 
strength to below that of the lightly armoured loose formation Israelites.  The 
Philistines experienced this twice in short succession, leaving little doubt as to the 
impact of such disordering factors on the fighting power of otherwise strong melee 
forces. 
 
• Following deployment, units manoeuvre on the battlefield for tactical advantage. 
Depending upon their formation, the ratio of units to space, and the type of terrain 
involved, such manoeuvring may be difficult.  For instance, troops armed with 
missile weapons may plan to fall back through their supporting melee units, but if 
attacked before completing such interpenetrating manoeuvres it will result in severe 
disorder for both units.  Some of the most disastrous battles of antiquity include such 
episodes, such as the Roman disaster at Cannae (216 B.C.E.) and the Persian disaster 
at Marathon (490 B.C.E.).  Wily commanders actively sought advantage in the 
terrain factors when fighting against numerically superior forces – forcing enemy 
units to be crowded in upon each other, thus creating disorder in their shooting and 
fighting formations.  When a unit’s ‘fighting spirit’ (expounded upon under heading 
4.4.3. below) was destroyed the unit would flee from the enemy unit or even from 
the threat of enemy units.  Often in their haste to flee the routing unit would attempt 
to force a passage to safety, sometimes through their own friendly units, bringing 
confusion and disorder in their wake for all units so interfered with.  One may refer 
to the inglorious, helter-skelter flight of the Philistine army after David had killed 
their champion Goliath in the dual recorded in 1 Samuel 17.  
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• In the gradual process by which true cavalry eventually developed, its own 
unique vulnerabilities became apparent.  These bear discussion in that cavalry as a 
fighting arm was becoming more important during IA IIa.  Instead of one brain at 
work, cavalry forces had to contend with the fact that two brains were at work; that of 
the rider and the horse.  The horse itself had instincts for self-preservation and was apt 
to bolt or behave skittishly when faced with threatening situations.  Such mounted 
units had additional liabilities for disorder in combat.  Besides outright flight from 
the battlefield, every cavalryman had a moving mount from which he had to fight, in 
essence - an unstable fighting platform.  Thus cavalry tended to be arranged in looser 
formations than foot.  In the case of bow armed ‘horse-archers’, epitomised so well by 
the Parthians of Mesopotamia and other Asiatic horse riders from the great steppes, 
the shooting formations were very open. The latter formations facilitated their loose, 
speedy individualised fighting style.  Such equestrian formations or arrangements 
were suited to the problems unique to cavalry units and influenced by the terrain from 
which they originated.   
 
Horses, comparatively speaking, have poor eyesight.  Their sense of smell is much 
keener.  It was only a matter of time before cunning commanders sought to exploit 
this fact.  Camels, elephants and even ‘dummy elephants’ (i.e. camels to which a 
large collection of wicker baskets and the like were fixed so as to create the 
impression of a large bulky elephant-like creature) were deployed in some ancient 
armies for the express purpose of  disordering enemy cavalry units.  The affects of 
camels as used by Midianites and other desert nomadic groups such as the 
 87
Amalekites, as mounts for battle in their raids was to disorder enemy cavalry in the 
melee. 
     
• Unit formations are arranged and trained to fight to their front.  If the unit 
was charged in its flank or in its rear the resulting disorder was chaotic and severely 
affected the shooting or fighting capacity of the unit attacked in this way.  Even 
Hannibal’s renowned veteran heavy infantry succumbed to the Roman forces when 
the Roman cavalry attacked them in their rear after having first chased off the Punic 
cavalry from the battlefield during the Battle of Zama in 202 B.C.E. 
 
• Foot soldiers were the predominant troop type during IA IIa.  Such infantry  
formations, terrain permitting, approximated each others rate of movement and could 
maintain their fighting arrangements under normal circumstances.  The speed of 
chariotry and the increase of even faster moving cavalry units in the battles of this 
period created new liabilities for field commanders.  Mounted troops manoeuvred at 
greater speed and could turn the flank of unsupported infantry units owing to their 
greater speed and mobility.  Herein lay the true advantages of cavalry; its reasonable 
fighting ability combined with its capacity to outmanoeuvre the slower infantry and 
the more cumbersome chariotry units in battle.  The superior manoeuvring ability of 
cavalry allowed it to attack the slower moving infantry units before they could 
adequately arrange or rearrange their defensive formations.  Foot thus caught while 
moving would be compelled to fight back in a disordered arrangement. 
 
• Units that have experienced panic and consequently have fled the battle become  
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disordered and ‘disarranged’.  Also, troops who have evaded the enemy’s charge by 
abandoning their position on the battlefield, or whose own charge has failed to reach 
the enemy unit because the enemy fled in panic or successfully skirmished out of 
charge reach have ended their movement in disarray.  When a charging unit failed to 
make contact with the enemy, such failure tended to disrupt the charging units 
fighting formation.  The troops in such a unit need to set about reorganising their 
formation by falling in again around the unit officers or standard bearers.   Such 
action takes time and when attempted in the heat of battle may often impact 
negatively on the commander’s tactical plans and compromise his prospects victory. 
 
• The lethality index of certain shock weapon systems at the point of impact, such as  
the ferocious charge of lance wielding armoured cavalry.  The physical impetus of a 
chariot or a cavalry charge into stationary troops does not demand extravagant 
explanations to outline the havoc it would inflict on the stationary unit’s formation 
and fighting capacity. 
 
• Similarly, certain shock weapon systems wrought terror among their opponents 
and challenged such troop’s ability to cope psychologically with these awful weapon 
systems.  Noteworthy amongst these for IA IIa would have been chariots, residuum of 
the Late Bronze Age (c.1500 – 1000 B.C.E.).  With metal wheel hubs screeching on 
ungreased metal shafts, the rumbling of metal-rimmed wheels - sometimes fitted with 
slashing scythes, the thundering of horses hooves, the whole clattering, careening 
contraption hurtling across the battlefield with the singular intent to smash a bloody 
path through the unit in which soldiers stood with only a light wooden or wicker 
shield for protection, it is not difficult to imagine the battlefield stress arising among 
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the troops so targeted.  Fear of the anticipated impact was often enough to send more 
than just the untrained or unseasoned troops into a blind panic and to abandon their 
formation. 
 
• Attempting formation changes while charging, counter-charging or pursuing  
an enemy unit.  Changing formation in the heat of a battle is already difficult enough.  
Attempting to do it while the unit is moving quickly in the circumstances described 
above was a sure-fire recipe for disordering the unit’s fighting or shooting formation. 
 
It is useful to observe in conclusion that the 'disordering' of a typical ancient shooting 
or fighting formation does not necessarily imply that the fighting spirit of that unit has 
suffered.  It means that there has been some physical interference with the unit’s 
arrangement or formation and consequently the shooting or fighting ability of the unit 
has been reduced in its overall effectiveness. 
 
4.4.3. The Effects of Psychology on Tactics.   
 This phenomenon of warfare is generally referred to as morale.  It exists at a variety 
of levels, ranging from the national level, the large scale armed forces level, right 
down to the smallest tactical units.  Morale, the target of psychological warfare or 
moralische kraft as Von Clausewitz (1976:184) labelled the concept, is some kind of 
psychological index of willingness to sacrifice personal safety and the suppression of 
instincts for personal survival for what is perceived as the greater good of the majority 
or the political cause to which the majority is committed.  When morale fails it is 
because the instinct for survival is expressed more strongly than the soldier, military 
force, or nation’s determination to fight on.  In layman’s terms morale may be called 
 90
‘fighting spirit’.  When lacking or broken down in the lower military echelons, 
usually by enemy action, it results in troops breaking ranks and fleeing the harrowing 
experience of battle.  Conversely when present, soldiers fight on with grim 
determination - even when logic suggests it is futile to do so and that death or injury 
will result.  
 
Although the concept is intangible, its impact and influence is clearly evident and 
discernible by its operation among soldiers in warfare.  It is commonly held in all 
ages, including IA IIa that morale can be and must be built.  It is, inter alia, the 
product of training, comradeship, leadership, and discipline.  David’s Adullam band 
exhibited this quality of fighting spirit.  In time the Adullam Band formed the nucleus 
of King David’s trusted household troops.  Unit morale is cumulative in nature, in 
both the positive and negative sense, and is more decisive a factor to local and 
ultimate victory in battle than any of the above-discussed melee or shooting tactical 
factors.  Morale ranks so highly in the military equation of warfare that it has been set 
apart by astute military commanders and philosophers as the decisive factor in all 
warfare, regardless of time and place.  Napoleon, the most celebrated European 
general of all time (bearing in mind that he fought and won more battles than 
Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, and Julius Caesar combined), observed that the morale 
factor is to the physical factor as three to one when comparing decisive factors of 
warfare.  From his own military experience and consistent with his incisive 
philosophical writings on war, Clausewitz taught that the physical and morale 
components of war may be compared to the parts of a sword; “One might say that the 
physical seems little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the 
precious metal, the real weapon, the finely honed blade” (Clausewitz, 1976:185).   
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Troops whose morale has completely failed them in battle are deemed to be ‘broken’ 
and cannot be counted upon to continue fighting.  Such troops seize the earliest 
opportunity to flee the battlefield.  Similarly, but not yet broken are troops whose 
morale may be described as ‘shaken’.    The fighting spirit of shaken troops is brittle, 
not requiring much for them to break down completely.  They fight tentatively and 
without confidence of winning.  In such a state their fighting and shooting ability is 
adversely affected.   
 
The causes of shaken morale are several: 
• When fighting units receive disproportionately heavy casualties in combat. 
• As a result of various unfavourable circumstances or occurrences in the 
engagement.  David’s defeat of the Philistine champion Goliath, or the death of 
Saul and his sons at the Battle of Mt. Gilboa are obvious examples. 
• A unit’s confidence is destroyed when it breaks in combat or when a friendly 
unit breaks and consequently disrupts the given unit’s formation or ‘tactical 
arrangement’.  
 
Such is the scope for the grim art of tactics.  The net results of melee and shooting 
tactical factors, the effects of disorder, morale and the breakdown of it, all combine to 
produce the tactical power and proficiency of troops in battle.  To conclude with Field 
Marshal Lord Wavell’s useful definition: tactics is the ‘art of handling troops on the 
battlefield’ (Fourie, 1996: 12).  The above discussion has provided some substance to 
Wavell’s seemingly innocuous phrase - the ‘handling’ of troops in battle. 
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4.4.4. The Effect of Psychology on Strategy. 
Psychological factors which obtain at the lower levels of strategy affect the outcome 
of the skirmish or the battle.  When psychological factors operate at the national level, 
they affect policy-making and strategy selection which impact on general and total 
strategy choices and ultimately, the outcome of the campaign or the war.  The will to 
fight and how to engage the enemy is a policy matter, and policy ought to dictate 
strategy.  When Saul chose to attack the twin Philistines bases at Gibbeah - Michmash 
after his coronation, this was a policy matter that was tied to a general strategy.  The 
Philistine decision to counter by a combination of military action and technological 
sanction or embargo (1 Samuel 13: 19 – 20) was likewise a political decision 
encapsulated in policy with a concomitant strategy. 
 
A modern scholar, highly experienced as a practitioner in military methodology, 
General d’Armee Andre’ Beaufre, writing about the effects of psychology on warfare 
at the higher levels of strategy observed: “Consider only the outcome which is desired 
to achieve ... to force the enemy to accept the terms we wish to impose on him – a 
decision is achieved when a certain psychological effect has been produced on the 
enemy ....  If the problem is looked at from the right angle, that of the enemy’s 
psychological reaction, a correct appreciation can be made of what the decisive 
factors are - ... the decision is obtained by creating and then exploiting a situation 
resulting in sufficient moral disintegration of the enemy to cause him to accept the 
conditions it is desired to impose on him” (Beaufre in Fourie, 1996:49–50).  This 
suggests that the political context for the skirmishes, battles and campaigns of 
antiquity are vital in order to assess accurately and make sense of the warfare that 
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took place in particular times and places and its effects upon the life-world of the 
common man of Syro-Palestine, IA IIa.    
 
4.5. Logistics as the Final Component for Military Force. 
Repeatedly and throughout the long course of political history an improper 
understanding of and a poor grasp on logistics has precipitated military ruin and 
political failure.  Logistics is the fourth fundamental of military force and a crucial 
component to all successful military statecraft.  Fourie cites as a prime example of 
logistical failure the German’s much vaunted Schlieffen Plan in 1914 which 
ultimately failed because of logistical problems, i.e. that the German army could not 
move any faster than the speed of a walking infantryman (Fourie, 1996: 71).  More 
than two millennia earlier the tiny confederate Greek city-state forces, hugely inferior 
to both the military and the war potential of the Persian Empire in 480 B.C.E., 
effectively put paid to King Xerxes’ political ambitions on the Greek peninsula by 
destroying his fleet, and in essence his logistical capacity for the invasion of Greece at 
the Battle of Salamis (September 480 B.C.E.).  The upshot of this was that without a 
superior fleet to protect his coastal lines of communication the Great King was not 
assured of his ability to supply his massive invasion force. The invasion force, even 
when setting aside Herodotus’ exaggerated numbers of 5 000 000 and accepting the 
moderated number of 180 000 soldiers, would ‘wither like the early morning mist 
against the rising summer sun’ if the supply ships could not consistently provide the 
supplies.  Events proved this assertion true after the naval defeat at Salamis.  The 
Great King Xerxes delegated the task of invasion to his trusted and capable 
commander Mardonius while the Great King himself lost no time in returning to 
Persia to forestall any temptations of political rebellion in the empire’s hinterland.  
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Mardonius promptly withdrew the still massive Persian invasion force to northern 
Greece to see out the winter while waiting for the new campaigning season to begin.  
Logistical considerations again had the final say in the strategic planning and 
performance of a significant military force on the stage of world history.  A more 
modern example was the destruction of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad 
(November 1942 – January 1943) when German re-supply capacity failed. 
 
Master scholars on the art of warfare, including Jomini, explain logistics as the 
‘practical art of moving armies’.  This includes considerations of ‘providing for the 
successive arrival of convoys and supplies’ and ‘establishing and organising lines of 
supplies’.  Van Creveld builds upon Jomini’s definition by observing that if a 
soldier’s calorific intake amounts to less than 3000 calories per day, such troops will 
soon cease to be of any use as soldiers (Van Crefeld, 1977:1).  Likewise, the absence 
of ‘all weather’ roads is problematic and it helps little if a fighting force is not in the 
right place at the right time.  Even in antiquity the existence of good roads was 
recognised as a strategic factor.  The development and maintenance of such roads was 
very highly regarded as a strategic imperative by the Assyrians, the Persians and the 
Romans, each in their turn respectively.  Huge expenditure was authorised for such 
purposes.  The key word here is ‘communications’, [note the plural] which in the 
context of logistics, is understood as ‘the means of travelling or sending messages’ 
(Collins English Dictionary... 2001, s.v. ‘communication’).  Too often military 
historians err by giving only lip service to the logistical aspect of military force in 
their studies.  The anthropological bias of new archaeology demands that due 
attention be given to the lot of the common soldier, directly affected by logistics as he 
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was and thus contributing in a relevant way to the scholastic merits of military 
archaeology.   
 
In Van Creveld’s (1977:1) opinion, logistics does not demand any “great strategic 
genius, but only plain hard work and cold calculation”.  Indeed, some of the biblical 
redaction may yield additional insights, even helpful corrections, by applying 
logistical calculations to the sometimes-fanciful claims of the Old Testament 
chroniclers.  Hans Delbruck achieved this when he applied logistical calculations 
against some of the fantastic claims of ancient historians like Herodotus and Josephus.  
He found for instance that the asserted mustering of troops, let alone their 
manoeuvring in units, was physically impossible on the surface area of some battle 
sites.  The veracity of ancient texts is also subject to correction when the supplies 
needed to sustain such huge armies in the field are appraised.  
 
In retrospect, it is significant to note that more military campaigns have come to ruin 
because of the logistical factor than because of any enemy action.  King Gustavus 
Adolphus of the 17th century, much celebrated for his military acumen, admitted that 
it was food and forage, not he, which commanded the army (Van Creveld, 1977:17).  
In the campaigns of antiquity, none were exempt from the shackles of logistics.  What 
systems of supply are in evidence? What of the foodstuffs, their seasonal harvests, the 
calorific values of the available foods and the volumes of food vis a vis the mustering 
of military personnel and animals?   What of the water sources in Syro-Palestine?  
What of soil types and fertility, plant genus and the category of land in terms of 
suitable farming methods i.e. winter land, dry land, wetland, etc.  What about the road 
networks and the lie of the land?  Moreover, how did the scale, intensity, and duration 
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of the conflict affect the outcome of the conflict vis a vis logistics?  Can these issues 
be reconciled with the primary and secondary historical records of the ancient Near 
East?  An essentially inductive approach will be used to find relevant answers to these 
questions within the timeframe of IA IIa. 
 
4.5.1.  Food and Seasons in Syro-Palestine. 
It is insufficient to list only the foods and seasons such as they existed in ancient 
Syro-Palestine.  Such data needs to be interpreted so that its significance yields a 
greater understanding of the issues belonging to logistics.  After looking at food and 
seasons, attention must also be paid to basic concepts of nutrition to make the data 
intelligible.  Logistics must concern itself with supplies and physical sustenance, 
which in turn leads to a brief look at the energy values of foodstuffs and volumes 
needed.  Subsequently, where texts supply data on the size of the opposing forces, this 
will invite some inductive reasoning as to what volumes of foodstuffs would be 
needed to sustain such military potentials, and the collective energy requirements for 
such feats as were claimed for them.  Obviously the cereal grasses of the day would 
have supplied the bulk of nutritional needs.  Similarly, water supply and road 
networks also play important roles in the realm of logistics and each will be looked at 
in turn. 
 
The Hebrew calendar, as an example of an ancient Near Eastern calendar, was based 
on the lunar months until about 100 B.C.E.  This was the Babylonian practice as well.  
The months of this lunar calendar coincided more accurately with the agricultural 
seasons than the modern Gregorian calendar.  Some of the Hebrew calendar month 
names, such as Abib (meaning ‘the ripening of the corn’) reflect the agricultural basis 
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of their lifeworld and how their day to day activities were arranged to compliment the 
season of the year.  The table below shows the progress of the year, its seasons, and 
the associated harvests and other major agricultural activities associated with that 
particular month.  Logistical planning for the campaigning season took very careful 
account of the data offered in calendars such as example outlined below.   
THE HEBREW CALENDAR 
Hebrew 
Months 
Modern 
Months 
Seasons & 
Climate 
Agricultural Activities 
(biblical references) 
1. Nisan  
(New Year)   
c.  16 March to 
15 April  
Late spring 
rains. 
• Barley harvest begins 
 
2.  Iyyar c. 16 April to 
15 May 
Dry summer 
season begins 
• Barley harvest (Ruth 1: 22) 
3.  Sivan c. 16 May to  
15 June 
Dry summer 
season 
• Winter wheat harvest 
• Early figs ripen 
4.  Tammuz c. 16 June to 
15 July  
Dry summer 
season 
• Winter wheat harvest 
• Grape harvest  
5.  Ab c. 16 July to 
15 August 
Dry summer 
season  
• Olive, grape, fig, walnut 
harvest.  Vintage begins. 
(Numbers 13: 20) 
6.  Elul c.  16 August 
to 15 Sept. 
Dry summer 
season closes 
• Dates, vegetable, cotton, 
pomegranate, summer figs, 
and other grains harvest. 
• General vintage. 
(Isaiah 32: 10) 
7.  Tishri c. 16 Sept. to  
15 October 
Early autumn 
rains 
(ploughing and sowing -  no 
harvests) 
8. Marchesvan c.  16 October 
to 15 Nov. 
Autumn / early 
winter 
• Rice harvest 
(winter wheat and barley 
planting) 
9.  Chislev or 
Kislev 
c.  16 Nov. to 
15 December 
Winter (Sowing of other cereal 
grasses) 
10.  Tebeth c.  16 Dec. to 
15 January 
Winter rains and 
snow on high 
ground 
(no harvests) 
11.  Shebat c.  16 January 
to 15 February 
Late winter • Almonds blossom 
• Winter figs and citrus 
harvest 
12. Adar  
(Year End) 
c.  16 February 
to 15 March 
Early spring • Harvest citrus fruit 
• Flax pulling 
(Data from Bimson et al, p.64 and from Church Education System Old Testament Student Manual 
[Religion 301] p.18). 
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Very relevant too to this discussion of food supply is the question of agricultural yield 
per hectare of agricultural land.  Various climatic regions in Syro-Palestine would 
have produced different yields of grain per hectare.  Using a generalised approach, 
let’s assume for arguments sake that the food being produced is the staple wheat.  
Let’s assume further that the ancient method of farming is fairly crude and labour 
intensive, and that iron implements are very scarce to non-existent, impacting 
negatively on final crop yields.  Dry land farming techniques were applied, relying on 
the previous rain season for the soil’s moisture content.  The genus of wheat was not 
one of the modern cultivars familiar to us but probably something such as I-corn, an 
ancient but local variant related to modern wheat.  In contrast to modern agricultural 
yields of approximately three to four and a half tons per hectare, ancient wheat 
growers operating under typical circumstances outlined above would average about a 
half ton per hectare.  Exceptional rainfall at the correct time and assuming everything 
else goes well could see optimum yields reaching approximately the one ton mark.  
Without the benefits of modern fertilisers, further compounded by their system of 
continuous planting in the same fields every season, the resultant crops produced an 
ever-diminishing yield.  
 
4.5.1.1. Some Basic Concepts of Nutrition.  Unhealthy soldiers are counter 
productive to the prospects of successful military-statecraft.  They cannot perform 
their functions well or in some instances even at all and become either redundant or a 
severe liability until their health and vitality is restored.  It is an important function of 
military practitioners at all levels to concern themselves with the health of their 
military charges.  This, among other things such as clothing and billets, means 
nutrition.  Common wisdom dictates that the “basic raw material of good nutrition is 
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good food” (Davis, 1981:5).  Nutrition is taken to mean the process of taking in and 
absorbing nutrients, and the process of being nourished.  To nourish is ‘to provide 
with the food necessary for life and growth” (Collins English Dictionary ... 2001, s.v. 
‘nutrition’ and ‘nourish’).  
 
Food is energy – but it is also much more than that; food supplies the material for the 
growth and repair of every part of our body.  Energy is however the principle focus 
here and is explained as the capacity for intense activity and vigour (Collins English 
Dictionary ... 2001, s.v. ‘Energy’).  The relevance of energy is self evident in the 
context of this discussion on logistics.  The sources of energy or the fuel for the 
human body are fats, carbohydrates, and proteins.  The body in effect ‘burns’ these 
fuels to produce and to store energy, and to repair or grow body tissue.  In broad 
terms, when foods containing these sources of energy are digested energy is derived 
from them to be used and stored in the body.  The total energy produced when the 
body burns up food can be scientifically measured using the measurement term 
calorie.  The calorific value of any fuel, including non-foodstuffs, is determined by 
the amount of heat that fuel produces in the burning process.  A calorie is thus the 
amount of heat needed to raise one gram of water through one degree Celsius 
indicated by the lower case letter ‘c’.  When dealing with foodstuffs however, the 
energy value of foods is calculated by the amount of heat needed to raise one 
kilogram of water through one degree Celsius.  The term of measurement in this case 
is a kilocalorie (kcal) though it has become common and accepted practice to use the 
higher case ‘C’, as Calorie.  Logistical planning has had certain constants to work 
with from antiquity to the present time, including the basic fact that the average adult 
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needs between 2000 and 3000 calories per day to have energy sufficient for activity 
and the maintenance of good health (Davis, 1981:7, 80–83).  
 
Foods occur in nature as a combination of proteins, fats, and carbohydrates, each 
component serving a particular nutritional need.  Fats and carbohydrates are used 
mainly for the production and storage of energy and heat while protein is used for 
building and repair.  The body needs carbohydrates for the energy and sugar they 
supply.  Typically carbohydrates are found in cereals, fruit, and vegetables, all of 
which were cultivated in the Near East in antiquity and which constituted the staple 
diet of the peoples of the region.  Regarding sugar, plants are nature’s sugar 
manufacturers; their green leaves using the radiant energy of the sun to produce 
simple sugars which are then stored in the form of starch in the seeds and tubers.  
Starch in the form of all cereals, beans, peas, potatoes, and other roots and tubers, is 
the principle source of energy.  The successful cultivation of cereal grasses, including 
wheat and to a lesser extent barley, were significant to ancient food security and 
played key roles in the transition from nomadic to sedentary lifestyles.  It becomes 
obvious that the dictates of all levels of strategy and operational strategy in particular, 
are shackled to food and fodder supplies. 
 
Likewise, fats are a major energy source for the body.  Fats exist in two basic 
categories; animal fats and so-called vegetable fats.  The table below firstly alerts us 
to what are the principle sources of fats and *secondly to the ready availability of 
these items to people who lived in ancient Palestine. 
PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF FATS  
ANIMAL VEGETABLE 
*BUTTER *ALMONDS 
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*CHEESE BRAZIL NUTS 
*EGGS FILBERTS  
(a kind of a hazel nut.  Walnuts and almonds were 
the nuts more common to ancient Palestine ) 
*CREAM PEANUTS 
*BACON  COCONUTS 
*PORK AVOCADO 
*FISH LIVER OIL VEGETABLE OILS 
(*sunflower, safflower, *sesame, *olive, corn, 
*cottonseed) 
*MEAT FATS 
(lard, mutton fat, etc.) 
 
FATTY FISH  
(herrings) 
*OLIVES 
(Data from Davis, 1981:57–58). 
 
At least two major vegetables and many of the listed animal sources of fats were 
readily available in the ancient Near East.  Good health requires that we take in more 
vegetable than animal fats in our diets.  Sugars provide instant sources of energy 
while fats tend to give a longer, more constant source of energy.  In cold climates and 
winter months, or when hard physical labour increases, there is an increased need for 
fat in the diet (Davis, 1981:chapters 1, 2, 8 and 9).   
 
Suffice it to say on the matter of protein that water aside, protein makes up the largest 
proportion of the human body.  It is impossible for human life to exist without 
protein.  A constant supply of it is needed at all times to sustain life.  A protein 
deficiency in the diet is characterised by anaemia, lack of muscle tone, fatigue, and 
poor resistance to infectious diseases.  There is a lot of evidence, past and present, 
which shows a lowering of resistance to infection after times of hardship and 
starvation.  Such epidemics of serious disease tend to follow disasters, wars, and other 
causes of famine (Davis, 1981:chapter 11).  
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4.5.1.2. Energy Values of Syro-Palestinian Foodstuffs.  Let it be assumed that the 
modern nutritionist and the paleo-botonist and –zoologist are agreed upon the energy 
values of the following foodstuffs, and that the passage of time has not affected the 
energy values of these genetically unmodified foods in any significant way.  The 
foods listed below are common, if not a comprehensive, to the region and the period 
of this dissertation.  The table shows the relationship between the components (how 
many grams of protein, grams of fat and grams of carbohydrates) in a 100g portion of 
that foodstuff and how much energy it makes available to the human body when 
consumed.  The foods are ranked according to their energy-providing values.  A 
backslash symbol ( / ) represents only a minor trace of that component in that 
foodstuff, too small to be measured.  Heat affects the energy value of food.  The 
effects are indicated and the cooking method has been shown in parenthesis.  All 
other foodstuffs entered on this table reflect values of such food in the uncooked state.  
NUTRITIONAL DATA OF FOODSTUFFS COMMON TO THE NEAR EAST 
Food Type 
(100 gram portion) 
Energy 
(kcals) 
Protein 
G 
Fat 
G 
Carbo - 
Hydrates 
G 
1.  Sunflower-seed oil 899 / 99.9 0 
2.  Lard; soft white pig fat  891 / 99.0 0 
3.  Olive oil 884 0 100 0 
4.  Butter 740 0.4 82.0 / 
5.  Almonds, (shelled) 598 18.6 54.2 4.3 
6.  Sunflower seeds 560 24.0 47.3 19.9 
7.  Cheese, Cheddar 406 26.0 33.5 / 
8.  Oatmeal, raw 401 12.4 8.7 72.8 
9.  Egg yolk 339 16.1 30.5 / 
10.  Flour, rye 327 16.3 2.6 68.1 
11.  Wheat, shredded 324 10.6 3.0 67.0 
12.  Flour, whole-wheat 318 13.2 2.0 65.8 
13.  Pork, roast   286 26.9 19.8 0 
14.  Lamb chops, (grilled) 277 18.3 22.6 0 
15.  Liver, calf (fried) 254 26.9 13.2 7.3 
16.  Dates 248 2.0 / 63.9 
17.  Raisins 246 1.1 / 64.4 
18.  Bread, rye 243 9.1 1.1 52.1 
19.  Currents, dried 243 1.7 / 63.1 
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20.  Bread, whole-wheat 216 8.8 2.7 41.8 
21.  Figs, dried 213 3.6 / 52.9 
22.  Peaches, dried 212 3.4 / 53.0 
23.  Wheat husks 206 14.1 5.5 26.8 
24.  Fish, Kipper (baked) 205 25.5 11.4 0 
25.  Beef (roast) 192 27.6 9.1 0 
26.  Olives, ripe, black   184 1.2 20.1 3.2 
27.  Chicken, (roast) 148 24.8 5.4 0 
28.  Eggs, (boiled) 147 12.3 10.9 / 
29.  Turkey, (roast) 140 28.8 2.7 0 
30.  Barley, pearl (boiled)   120 2.7 0.6 27.3 
31.  Olives, green 116 1.41 12.7 1.3 
32.  Potatoes, (baked) 105 2.6 0.1 25.0 
33.  Lentils, (boiled) 99 7.6 0.5 17.0 
34.  Potatoes, (boiled) 80 1.4 0.1 19.7 
35.  Milk, goat’s 71 3.3 4.5 4.6 
36.  Milk, cow’s 65 3.3 3.8 4.7 
37.  Grapes 61 0.6 / 15.5 
38.  Apples 56 0.2 0.3 13.9 
39.  Peas, (boiled) 52 5.0 0.4 7.7 
40.  Apricots 51 1.0 0.2 12.8 
41.  Cherries 47 0.6 / 11.9 
42.  Beetroot, (boiled) 44 1.8 / 9.9 
43.  Figs 41 1.3 / 9.5 
44.  Kale; a type of cabbage) 39 4.5 0.7 6.1 
45.  Orange juice 38 0.6 / 9.4 
46.  Plums 38 0.6 / 9.6 
47.  Peaches 37 0.6 / 9.1 
48.  Buttermilk 36 3.6 0.1 5.1 
49.  Egg white 36 9.0 / / 
50.  Oranges (peeled) 35 0.8 / 8.5 
51.  Spinach (cooked) 30 5.1 0.5 1.4 
52.  Melon, cantaloupe 24 0.6 / 5.3 
53.  Carrots 23 0.7 / 5.4 
54.  Grapefruit 22 0.6 / 5.3 
55.  Peppers, green 22 1.2 0.2 4.8 
56.  Beans, string green 19 1.9 0.2 2.7 
57.  Artichokes, Jerusalem (boiled) 18 1.6 / 3.2 
58.  Cabbage, white 15 1.7 / 2.3 
59.  Pumpkin 15 0.6 / 3.4 
60.  Onions (boiled) 13 0.6 / 2.7 
61.  Lettuce 12 1.6 0.4 1.2 
62.  Cucumber 10 0.6 0.1 1.8 
63.  Celery 8 0.9 / 1.3 
64.  Lemon juice 7 0.3 / 1.6 
65.  Celery (boiled) 5 0.6 / 0.7 
(Data from Davis, 1981:338 – 348). 
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With the above data at our disposal we gain some idea of the volumes of food needed 
to sustain units of warriors in the field.  The mustering of sizeable military forces for 
the pursuit of political goals by means of military statecraft present huge logistical 
challenges.  Most often offensive operations had to be planned to coincide with the 
harvest seasons of the principle cereal grasses.  Defensive operations had to contend 
with the difficulties of siegecraft.  When logistics broke down or proved inadequate, 
offensive operations had to be suspended or the defenders had to capitulate.  Little 
wonder that plagues and famine came in the train of warfare.  Some rudimentary 
calculations can be made to determine what volumes of typical foodstuffs, in their due 
harvest seasons, would be necessary to sustain those forces in the field.  The 
manpower claims of the texts become measurable and assist scholastic efforts to 
reconcile texts with cultural remains and the geography of the region concerned. 
  
4.5.1.3. Energy Requirements for Relative Activities. 
The basal metabolic rate (henceforth BMR) is a measurement of how much energy 
the human body consumes to perform its basic functions such as muscle tension to 
keep balance, pumping action of the heart, breathing actions of the lungs, and the like.  
The average BMR over a 24 hour period is given as 1500 calories.  It does not include 
work, exercise or other forms of activity.  Besides supplying the 1500 calories for the 
BMR, sufficient food must be supplied for various military activities.  Differences in 
calories needed are produced by climate (the colder the season or climate, the more 
calories are needed), gender (females need fewer calories than men; Davis gives 2 200 
calories as the standard requirement for women) or age.  Older humans require fewer 
calories due to a slowing down of physical activity etc.  Most fighting and military 
campaigning occurred in the summer seasons, most warriors and conscripts were 
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men, and the latter tended to be in their early period of manhood.  These 
generalisations are deemed appropriate and sufficient for the topic at hand.   
 
The table below gives a sampling of typical physical activities and proposes 
approximate military equivalents.  The calories needed for one person to perform one 
such activity for the period of an hour is given alongside.  With these values to hand, 
all that remains for calculating the victuals aspect of logistics is to consider how many 
soldiers were present and the duration of the activity, the accuracy of the calculation 
depending on the accuracy of the data in the textual records. 
ACTIVITIES AND ENERGY SUPPLY  
Normal Activity Approximate Military Equivalent Calories 
(per hour) 
Digging Preparing fortified defensive works such as walls, 
parapets and earthworks, or undermining them. 
600 
Running Storming enemy units or positions 570 
Jogging Manoeuvring at speed under weight of combat 
equipment 
500 
Playing squash Hand to hand fighting during the tactical melee 480 
Exercising Porting military equipment and supplies  360 
Walking fast Route marching such as during strategic operations 350 
Horseback riding Movement of cavalry and chariotry units  350 
Bowling (10 pin) Drawing of archery weapons and hurling of light 
spears, javelins, and slingshot and other ballistic 
missiles. 
250 
Walking Marching. 180 
Sitting Passively occupying defences or an interval before 
resuming the march.    
100 
(Adapted from Davis, 1981:87) 
These generalised laboratory findings provide at least a basis for logistical insight.  It 
should be clear to even the military novice that such fine cataloguing of energy 
consumption does not reflect with precision upon empirical reality.  Combinations of 
several of the above activities can take place for any amount of time, thus 
compounding the calculation of energy consumption.  Scholars in the field of strategic 
studies such as Martin van Creveld, when evaluating the victuals (food and water) 
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aspects of logistics, tend to work with the rounded off generalisation of 3000 calories 
per person per day (Van Creveld, 1977:1).  The fictitious example that follows will 
serve both to illustrate the food supply aspect of logistics in the ancient Near East as 
well as to provide a simplified rule of thumb gage for calculating volumes needed for 
military forces in the field per day.  The logistics for a mustering of 3000 warrior 
strong force required the following considerations; 
(a) Food 
3000 kj (kilojoules) per warrior per day. (Roughly double the normal calorie intake 
for adult males per day due to increased physical activity associated with combat plus 
BMR).  
= 3000 kj x 3000 warriors 
= 9 000 000 kJ (minimum) needed from foodstuffs. 
 
Bread remained the staple foodstuff for all peoples throughout the ancient Near East.  
This would have been typically supplemented by seasonal fruits, nuts, and olives 
(Matthews, 1995.  pp. 19 – 20). The food consumed before or during the day by 3000 
warriors may have included the following conjectured volumes to achieve the 
minimal energy and nutritional values per warrior: 
 
FOODSTUFFS 
ENERGY 
CALORIES  
Kcals / 100g 
 
QUANTITY PER 
WARRIOR 
 
ENERGY 
VALUE 
*  WHEAT BREAD 216 8 x 100g SERVINGS  1728 kj 
* BLACK OLIVES 184 1 x 100 g SERVING 184 kj 
DRIED FIGS 213 1 x 100g SERVING 213 kj 
DATES 248 1 x  100g SERVING  248 kj 
ALMONDS 598 1 x 100g SERVING 598 kj 
GOAT’S MILK 71 2 x 100g SERVING 142 kj 
 TOTAL / WARRIOR 3113 kj 
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The required energy / nutritional value: 3000 warriors x 3113 kJ = 9 330 000kJ. 
*A standard modern loaf of bread is approximately 800g in mass.  A supermarket 
standard sachet of olives, drained of brine, is 100g.  This may be helpful in visualising 
the quantities of food involved to meet the daily nutritional requirements of the 
ancient warrior, and by extension, the unending challenges of supplying those needs. 
To supply a force of 3000 warriors for one day, the following volumes are required: 
• Wheat Bread: 800g x 3000 = 2 400 000g or 2 400 kg of bread 
• Black Olives: 100g x 3000 = 300 000g or 300 kg of olives 
• Dried Figs: 100g x 3000 = 300 000 or 300 kg of dried figs 
• Dates:  100g x 3000 = 300 000 or 300 kg of dates 
• Almonds: 100g x 3000 = 300 000 or 300 kg of almonds 
• Goat’s Milk: 200g x 3000 = 600 000 or 600 kg of goat’s milk 
Assuming the ideal logistical situation, where these or suitable seasonal equivalent 
foodstuffs were available, the total daily volume of food for a force of 3000 warriors 
would have been approximately 4 200 kg, or 4,2 metric ton’s.  Using this as a rough 
gage, the general formula of 1,4 tons suitable food per 1000 warriors (or 140 kg’s 
of food per 100 warriors, or 1,4 kg’s per warrior) has some merit.   
(b) Water. 
Minimum water intake per day / warrior: 500 ml.  This must be increased according to 
activity levels and local climatic conditions. 
Thus; 
3000 warriors x 1 litre each = 3000 litres. 
To state this in a formula: 1 litre per warrior per day (minimum). 
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4.5.2. Water Sources in Syro-Palestine, as Typical of the Fertile Crescent at Large. 
The second part of the victual aspect of logistics is water supply.  The human body is 
composed largely of water: more than two-thirds of its make up is water.  This large 
volume of water is distributed among the cells, the tissue fluids that surround them, 
and the blood plasma.  Davis asserts that for the kidneys to function properly as the 
body’s dedicated fluid filtering organs, the average person must have a daily intake of 
approximately one pint (where a pint = 474  ml.) of water (1981: p.199).  Round off 
to a half litre (500 ml) for practical purposes.  This intake provides for the obligatory 
water loss in the filtering and excretion of wastes.  It is possible under ‘survival’ 
conditions to get by with less, as long as there is sufficient liquid to remove toxins and 
other body wastes.  Climate and activity also influence water loss and adequate 
replacement must be supplied to assure continued health and vitality.  Not to be 
overlooked is water that is also supplied to the body from foodstuffs, as outlined from 
the following table of sample foods.  This however is obviously inadequate to meet 
the minimum demands of health and nutrition as discussed above. 
 
PERCENTAGE OF WATER COMPONENT IN FOODS   
FOODS PERCENTAGE OF WATER 
Vegetables 75 – 95% 
Fruits 75 – 90% 
Milk (whole) 88% 
Fish 50 – 80% 
Cottage cheese 79% 
Meats 50 – 70% 
Cereal’s 10% 
Nuts 5 – 8% 
(Data from Davis, 1981:199). 
 
Water supply and replenishment are key aspects of successful logistical planning. 
Careful consideration must be given to the availability of water; the dryer the 
environment, the effects of climate, access to local infrastructure, density of 
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population, and the consistency of weather patterns - all the greater the need for 
painstaking logistical planning.  Neither offensive operations nor defensive actions 
are viable if the volume of water supply is an irreconcilable problem.  Natural and 
artificial supplies are thus crucially important to military operations and cognition 
must be taken of water supply volumes in all its various forms in order to gauge the 
scope for strategic operations.  It should be obvious that water supply would vary 
according to region and season.  Water supply has prompted extravagant engineering 
works such as Hezekiah’s Tunnel, Babylonian canals and the renowned Roman 
aqueducts.  The circumstance of the common man is our point of departure here.  We 
must look for answers regarding water supply en masse, at least sufficient for 
sustaining large concentrations of warriors.  For purposes of inductive reasoning, it is 
noteworthy in ecological terms to mention an observation by Bimson et al that overall 
climate patterns have not altered radically since antiquity in the Near East.  The 
author observes: “Accepting that fluctuations can and do occur, there is no 
archaeological evidence for significant change.  Near the Gulf of Aqabah, for 
example, excavated Roman gutters still fit the springs for which they were 
constructed” (Bimson et al, 1992:14).   
 
A brief review of water sources including modern measurements of mean annual 
rainfall and annual dew amounts may be instructive for a background to the water 
aspect of logistical studies in the region.  Such a review will open to our minds the 
several hard and uncompromising factors which ancient strategists had to take 
cognition of in their forward planning for operations in this region. 
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4.5.2.1. Springs, Wells, Streams and Rivers.  The Jordan River in Israel, the Litani or 
Leontes in Lebanon and the Orontes which flows through Lebanon, Turkey, and Syria 
are the perennial streams and rivers in the Levant (Craffert, 1995:16).  Perennial 
streams are quite rare with only the Far ‘a and the Malih remaining active to the 
present day in Israel itself.   Further east and southwest lay the major rivers Tigris and 
Euphrates of Mesopotamia and the Nile of Egypt.  Many wadi’s (Arabic for dry 
riverbeds), which contain water for short periods, criss-cross the landscape and are 
seasonal.  Springs (or ‘ain’ in Arabic) are defined as a source of a permanent stream 
of water.  Biblical texts use the word ‘ayin’ to describe them.  The common well is an 
artificial water source, dug into the water table, and ought to be regarded as a 
relatively poor water supply for logistical planning purposes (Zertal, 1988: 342–343). 
 
Man is inclined to settle as close to a perennial water supply as possible.  As a general 
rule of thumb, demographic patterns – particularly in terms of density, serve as an 
indicator of existing water supply. This pattern was affected by the diffusion of 
technology in water supply and storage.  During the Late Bronze Age, large collar-rim 
pithoi, with an approximate capacity of 150 – 200 litres (this is comparable to a 48-
gallon drum that holds about 181 litres) served as water storage apparatus.  Water was 
transported from distant sites by the householder’s donkey and gathered into these 
large collar-rim jars.   
 
Zertal’s study of the water factor in settlement patterns shows the gradual 
disappearance of the collar-rim pithoi with a corresponding increase of plastered 
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cisterns over the same period.  At the site Izbet Sartah a statistical analysis of pottery 
types was carried out; the pithos represented 27% of all jars found in the 12th century 
strata, while pithos in the early 11th and late 11th century strata represented 19% and 
17% respectively of all pottery at that site.  Very few rock-hewn cisterns were found 
in the region during the 12th century, but by the 10th century the plastered cistern had 
become a common household apparatus (Zertal, 1988:351) - a very relevant 
observation for IA IIa apropos the steady increase in Israel’s manpower component of 
her war potential.  
 
Zertal’s study was made in the vicinity of Dothan, which lies in the ‘Mediterranean’ 
climatic zone of Palestine and may be taken as a reflection of the diffusion of hydro- 
technology throughout the ancient Near East by IA II, particularly in comparable 
climatic conditions.  The increase of plastered cisterns was attributable to the 
increasing amounts of iron tools then in circulation among the general population, and 
the technical know-how to successfully work the hard limestone rock.  Standard 
household bell-shaped cisterns could hold nearly 30 cubic meters of water.  This 
quantity is more meaningful when considered in a domestic context.  In a normal 
civilian lifestyle (non-military), the average daily quantity of water consumption is 
about 20 litres per person per day (excluding bathing).  That calculates out to 7 cubic 
meters per year.  For livestock provision, the following table has been taken from 
Zertal’s paper and gives some helpful guidelines (Zertal, 1988:346). 
ANNUAL WATER CONSUMPTION BY DOMESTIC ANIMALS 
Animal (per head) Water per year (cubic meters) 
Sheep 3 – 4 
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Cattle 9 
Donkey 4 
Horse, mule, camel 8 
(Data from Shmueli in Zertal, 1988:346) 
  The average agrarian Iron Age 1 household would typically have included say 5 
persons, 2 donkeys, 4 cows and oxen, and 20 sheep.  Total domestic average 
requirement for such a household per year would be 160 cubic meters.  The household 
cistern could thus supply basic water requirements and would need to be refilled over 
five times in the course of the year.  Alternatively, the household would need 
additional cisterns if water supply for refilling were limited.   The net result was a 
change in earlier settlement patterns.  It was possible for people to settle further and 
further away from principal water sources (Zertal, 1988:350).  The changing 
demography began to also change lifestyle patterns in the region.  Concerning the Iron 
Age in general, the two major preoccupations were agriculture and defence (Bimson 
et al, 1992:54) – and water supply was a key factor to both.  These developments had 
significantly begun to alter the war potentials of the states and political entities 
throughout the region.     
 
4.5.2.2. Dew.  The highest measurements of annual dew are recorded along the coast 
with its moist air currents and in the high lying places of the Mediterranean climate 
zone of Palestine.  This would hold true for other regions under similar climatic 
conditions in the ancient Near East (Bimson et al, 1992:15).  The dew factor has a 
more direct bearing upon agriculture and war potential than upon operational strategy 
and military potential.  Its value is most evident in the hot and drier summer months.  
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Such dew is sufficient to sustain dry farming in the absence of rain, giving assistance 
to the vine harvest and some relief to dry pastures in times of drought (Bimson et al, 
1992:14). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Data from Bimson et al, 1992:15) 
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4.5.2.3. Rainfall Seasons and Water Catchment.  The chart of climatic zones are most 
instructive for recording precipitation.  Rainfall is seasonal, and closely associated 
with the cool season.  The early rains in Palestine result from misty sea air 
encountering the hot, dry air from the land.  Thus toward the end of the dry summer 
months, the months of Tishri to Marchesvan (mid-September to mid-October), 
thunderstorms and irregular rainfall occurs.  The more regular rains, colloquially 
referred to as the ‘former rains’ follow thereafter.  Occasionally because of drought 
the former rains only arrive in the month of Tebeth (late December to early January).  
These former rains are eagerly awaited as they bring relief from heat and produce 
bright clear skies.  The ‘latter rains’ come toward the end of the cool season, normally 
around the month Nisan (mid-March to mid-April).  The mean annual rainfall is 
illustrated in the map below; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       (Data from Bimson et al, 1992:15) 
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The importance of rain is not limited only to the victuals aspect of water supply and 
replenishment throughout the region, but it also bears upon that aspect of logistics to 
do with the mustering of troops and ‘communications’ i.e. movements of military 
forces.  Modern all-weather roads did not exist so the movement of numerous 
personnel and animals along dirt roads and tracks in inclement weather soon reduced 
the same to mire and bog.  Strategic operations and tactics were adversely affected 
under such conditions.  Operating in unit formations was a salient characteristic of 
warfare in the ancient world and was quickly reduced to chaos under wet conditions.  
Mounted troops were severely inhibited under inclement conditions.  Thus knowledge 
of the wet and dry seasons is largely commensurate with knowledge of the viable 
campaign season as well – a general factor that is helpful in fleshing out the cultural 
backdrop to the ancient textual records.  The map below illustrates the regional 
similarities between Palestine and the remainder of the Near East. 
 
 
 
 
 
(place Fertile Crescent / Isotope map here) 
 
 
 
 
The Ancient Near East’s Fertile Crescent. 
(picture from Miller and Hayes, 1986:32)   
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4.5.3. Road Networks and General Topography: Aspects of Communications 
When the ancient Near East is considered in its geographical entirety Palestine stands 
out as the most important strategic junction.  It is variously described, even as a ‘land-
bridge’ between the three continents of the ancient Near East.  Indeed, the macro-
geographic view identifies Palestine as the outstanding isthmus of planet earth, 
connecting as it does the world-island of Europe, Asia and Africa.  Accordingly, keen 
logistical attention will be paid to the communications aspect of Palestine.  The road 
network played a vital cultural role, affecting in its wake the course of world history.  
Sea-born communications between the Indies and the Mediterranean converged on 
Palestine, as did the transcontinental east-west land-routes.  The east-west high 
mountain chains from Asia Minor to Kurdistan, in concert with the deserts to the 
south and east, combined to concentrate the routeways of the Fertile Crescent.   
 
4.5.3.1. Highways, Main Routes, and Secondary Roads.  In Palestine itself three 
great trade routes have for millennia-long traversed the region.  Firstly, the so-called 
‘Way of the Sea’ which runs along the low coast from Egypt to the Valley of 
Esdraelon, east of Mt. Carmel (Esdraelon is the Greek name for its Hebrew equivalent 
‘Jezreel’).  This trunk road then turns inland toward the Sea of Galilee.  There it turns 
northward, skirting along the western shore, through the Syrian Gate and central 
depression to Damascus.  At Damascus the road turns eastward where it joins the 
caravan trails to Mesopotamia.   
 
The second great trunk road is remembered to us as the ‘King’s Highway’.  It follows 
the edge of the Transjordan plateau from the Gulf of Aqabah toward Damascus.  The 
King’s Highway marks a zone of increased rainfall, an important factor in logistical 
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studies.  It is also noteworthy that it was along this route that the host of emancipated 
Israel migrated from Egypt to Canaan.  Several settlements were established along 
this route. 
 
The third major trunk road is the shortest; it is located between Sinai and Canaan and 
connects a series of important wells in the northern Negeb.  This highway keeps west 
of the forbidding, barren depressions of the eastern Negeb.  Besides the strategically 
important wells, the road also links historically important sites from Kadesh-barnea 
and Beersheba to Hebron, Jerusalem, Shechem and Megiddo.  This major road like 
the two mentioned above was on a north-south orientation.  The central trunk road 
traced the watershed of central Palestine.  All these highways were heavily travelled 
from the Middle Bronze Age onwards and endowed the communities who settled 
along their course with rich trade and culture contacts.  Only for small periods of her 
history was Israel able to exercise control over these principal travel routes without 
upsetting the strategic interests of the great regional powers that dominated the 
terminals of these routes.  “Even in Solomon’s day the coastal highway was too 
tightly controlled by the sea powers to warrant interference there (1Kings 9: 11 and 
10: 22), while Edom was Israel’s long time deadly enemy because it dominated the 
routes from the Gulf of Aqabah where Israel obtained its copper”. 
 
Several minor transverse routes connected these parallel-running highways.  Their 
significance to the logistical infrastructure needs to be noted.  Much of the movement 
of military forces within Palestine took place between Israel and her enemies along 
these highways and byways.  The important byways included the Gaza – Beersheba – 
Petra route, Ashkelon - Gath – Helvan, Joppa – Bethel – Jericho, Joppa – Shechem – 
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Adam – Gilead and the Vale of Esdraelon – Megiddo – Gilead route (The New Bible 
Dictionary ... 1974, s.v. ‘Palestine’). 
 
4.5.3.2. General Topography.  Five geographical zones are used to describe the  
topography of Palestine.  The seaboard of the Eastern Mediterranean is referred to as 
the Littoral, the western mountain chain i.e. the Judean-Galilaean Highlands 
extending to include Lebanon and the Ansariya mountains, and thirdly the rift valleys 
which include Arabah, Jordan valley, Biqa and Ghor.  The fourth and fifth geographic 
zones of Palestine are the eastern mountains i.e. the highlands of Transjordan, Mt. 
Hermon, and Anti-lebanon, and the deserts of Negeb, Arabia, and Syria. 
 
Beyond Palestine, but exerting great cultural pressure on her, lay Egypt and 
Mesopotamia, the cultural powerhouses of the ancient Near East.  For regional 
topographical context however, a few geographical observations are made here.  
Unlike the modern state of Egypt, which comprises some 386 200 square miles of 
territory, Egypt of antiquity was the land reached by the Nile river – effectively about 
4% of the territory mentioned above, the rest being uninhabitable desert.  Even in 
modern times, upon the current summit of millennia-long technological evolution, 
some 99% of Egypt’s population still only live within the 4% of habitable territory 
alongside the Nile River. 
 
Mesopotamia was the other principal hydraulic culture of the ancient Near East.  
Mesopotamia is an artificial name used to describe the whole Tigris-Euphrates valley.  
Babylonia, the southern portion, was a flat area of about 8000 square miles.  The 
Arabian desert separated it from Palestine to its east, Assyria lay to its north, and the 
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broken terrain of Elam made up its western border.  The Persian Gulf was 
Mesopotamia’s southern boundary.  Assyria was located in the upper Mesopotamian 
plain, bounded on the west by the Syrian desert, to the south by Babylonia, to the 
north and east by the Urartian and Persian hills.  Even more so than Babylonia, 
Assyria enjoyed no significant natural defences.  The meridian of both Egypt and 
Mesopotamia’s vast war potentials belong to other archaeological periods, but their 
power in terms of their cultural influence was still a major factor and bore heavily 
upon the conglomerate cultures of Palestine during the IA IIa period. 
 
4.5.4. Logistical Supply Systems in Iron Age IIa. 
Van Creveld (1977:231) observes that logistics “is nothing but an endless series of 
difficulties succeeding each other”.  His assertion is probably timeless, the degree of 
‘difficulties’ only varying according to scale of operation and to technological 
sophistication of the peoples involved.  In the agrarian based economy of IA IIa, scale 
of operation and technological evolution were rudimentary rather than advanced in 
comparison to the huge empires that were still to follow in the first millennium B.C.E. 
 
Well-devised systems are an effective way of dealing with difficult and recurring 
problems and challenges.  What movement and supply systems obtained, if any, in the 
ancient Near East IA IIa period?  While technology, one of the four basic components 
of the foundations of military force, constantly imposed changes upon logistical 
supply systems, the rate of change was at best minor and only at a very gradual rate.  
There are certain fundamentals that were and still are reliably consistent.  These 
include the average range and marching speed of foot or mounted warriors, water 
consumption and the amount of calories needed to sustain vigour and health for both 
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man and beast.  Also, the topography and nature of terrain and the general consistency 
of regional weather patterns and seasons.  Working within the given spatial and time 
frame of IA IIa Near East, these constant factors invite empirical based research.   
 
Movement was mainly on foot and the logistics for most operational strategy was 
reckoned in terms of infantry route marches.  Most operations in IA IIa Palestine and 
the surrounding region was carried out within a 400 km radius from Jerusalem.  This 
spatial band included within its range the Nile delta, the Lebanon, Edom, Moab, 
Ammon, Gulf of Aqabah, and Cyprus.  Twice that range reached Mesopotamia.  
Drawing from my personal experience as an infantry platoon sergeant in a modern 
army, the average marching range, with kit weighing up to 70 pounds (or 31 kg’s) is 
about 20 km in fairly good terrain.  This marching range would be reduced if heavily 
laden troops had to negotiate their way through difficult terrain or across country in 
the absence of roads and increased to about 30 km’s per day when such exigencies 
warrant the strain.  Operating closer to home allowed the troops to reduce their 
campaign gear and consequently their total encumbrance.   
  
For applied logistical calculations, movement as an aspect of logistics will be 
assumed as an average of 20 km’s per day.  Highly disciplined armies such as the 
armies of Republican Rome were toughened–up so as to march an average of 30 km’s 
day under normal conditions, still leaving sufficient time at the end of the day to build 
a camp covering approximately 80 square meters.  Connolly asserts that the Roman 
army could force-march up to 50 km’s a day if hard pressed to do so (Connolly, 1975: 
52).  A group of warriors would move at the speed of the slower majority, the crude 
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units of the yet-developing cavalry still being an ancillary component of most armies 
during this period.  The infantry remained the main fighting arm of the IA IIa period.   
 
The table below is based upon the above mentioned rate of march factors and serves 
both to illustrate and provide a generalised data table for the movement component of 
logistics.  The selection of places is based on general trade nodes for the region.  
Operational strategy within the Near East during the IA IIa period would have 
traversed the geographical points listed below;  
MOVEMENT ASPECT OF LOGISTICS 
 
Nation – State 
/ King 
 
Principle 
Base(s) of 
Operations 
Operational 
Destinations in 
the Region 
(places) 
Distances 
between 
Places 
(as the crow flies) 
Infantry  
Marching 
 Rate  
@ 3.5 km 
/ h 
Minimum 
Campaign Days 
needed for 
Movement 
United Israel      
1. Jabesh in   
  Gilead   
  (Ammonites) 
 
72 km’s 
 
20, 5 
hours 
 
2 days and a 
morning 
 
 
• Saul 
 
 
Gibeah  
2. Berothai 
(Zobah, Aram) 
260 km’s 74, 3 
hours 
9 days hard 
marching 
1. Gath (Tell  
es-Safi 
option) 
Kadesh-barnea 
(Amalekites) 
 
93 km’s 
 
26, 6 
hours 
3 days and a 
morning  
2. Adullam Keilah 4,5 km's 1, 3 hour   1 morning 
3. Wilderness  
  of Ziph.  
En-gedi 24 km’s 6, 8 hours  1 day 
4. Ziklag 
 
Kadesh-barnea 
(Amalekites) 
88 km’s 
 
25,1 hours 3 days hard 
marching 
5. Hebron Jerusalem 
 
30.6 km’s 8,7 hours 1 day’s hard 
march  
6. Jerusalem Helam 150 km’s 42,9 hours At least 5 days 
hard marching 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• David 
7. 
Mahanaheim 
Jerusalem 61 km’s 17,4 hours 2 days march 
1. Hazor 142 km’s 40,8 hours At least 5 days 
march 
2. Megiddo 89 km’s 25,4 hours 3 days march 
3. Gezer 33 km’s 9,4 hours 1 day’s march 
4. Ezion- 
   Geber 
260 km’s 74,3 hours At least 9 days 
hard march 
 
 
 
• Solomon 
 
 
 
Jerusalem 
5. Tarsus  
 (Que/Cilicia) 
730 km’s 209 hours About 26 to 30 
days march 
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Philistia      
1. Gibea 50 km’s 14,3 hours  2 days march  
• Gath 
 
Gath 2. Jerusalem 48 km’s 13,7 hours 2 days march 
1. Ezion-geber 228 km’s 65,1 hours 8 days march 
2. Kadesh- 
   Barnea 
101 km’s 28,9 hours About 3,5 days 
march 
 
• Gaza 
 
 
Gaza 
3. Tanis –  
    Zoan  
244 km’s 69,7 hours About 9 days 
march 
1. Jerusalem 66 km’s 18,9 hours  2,5 day march 
2. Tyre 188 km’s 53, 7 
hours 
6,7 day march 
 
• Ashkelon 
 
Ashkelon 
3. Thebes  810 km’s 232 hours 29 - 35 days 
march at least. 
1. Hebron 50 km’s  14,3 hours 2 days march 
2. Nineveh 835 km’s 239 hours 30 – 35 days 
march at least 
 
• Ashdod 
 
Ashdod 
3. Rabbah 124 km’s  35, 4 
hours 
4,5 days march 
1. Acco 152 km’s 43 hours 5,5 days march 
2. Ugarit 394 km’s 112,6 
hours 
14 days march 
 
• Ekron 
 
Ekron 
3. Dor 84 km’s  24 hours 3 days march 
 
Aramaean 
states 
 
Principle 
Base(s) of 
Operations 
Operational 
Destinations in 
the Region 
(places) 
Distances 
between 
Places 
(as the crow flies) 
Infantry  
Marching 
 Rate  
@ 3.5 km/ 
h 
Minimum 
Campaign Days 
needed for 
Movement 
1. Sidon 86 km’s 24,6 hours 3 day’s march 
2. Kadesh (in 
Galilee) 
87 km’s 24,8 hours 3 day’s march 
3. Hazor 85 km’s 24,5 hours 3 day’s march 
 
• Aram 
 
Damascus 
 
4. Jerusalem 220 km’s 62,9 hours 8 day’s march 
1. Ugarit 90 km’s 26 hours 3,3 day’s march 
2. Gozan (in 
Beth-Eden) 
390 km’s 112 hours 14 day’s hard 
march 
3. Qarqar 78 km’s 22,3 hours 2,8 day’s march 
 
 
 
• Zobah 
 
 
 
Hamath 
4. Jerusalem 209 km’s 59,7 hours 7,5 day’s hard 
march 
1. Nineveh 240 km’s 68,6 hours 8,6 day’s march 
2. Aleppo 268 km’s 76,6 hours 9,6 day’s march 
3. Mari 262 km’s 74,9 hours 9,4 day’s march 
 
 
• Gozan 
 
 
Gozan 
4. Haran 82 km’s 23,4 hours 3 day’s march 
 
Phoenician 
city –states 
     
1. Ugarit 95 km’s  27 hours 3,4 day’s march • Arvad Arvad 
2. Simyra 18 km’s 5 hours Half day’s march 
1. Berytus 46 km’s  13 hours 1,6 day’s march  
• Byblos 
 
Byblos 2. Hazor 125 km’s 35,7 hours 4,5 day’s march 
1. Dor 107 km’s 30,6 hours 3,8 day’s march  
• Sidon 
 
Sidon 2. Tanis / Zoan 
   (Egypt) 
 534 km’s 153 hours 20 day’s march 
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1. Jerusalem 166 km’s 47,4 hours 6 day’s march  
• Tyre 
 
Tyre 2. Tarsus 
    (Cilicia) 
529 km’s 151 hours 19 day’s march 
 
Transjordan 
States 
 
Principle 
Base(s) of 
Operations 
Operational 
Destinations in 
the Region 
(places) 
Distances 
between 
Places 
(as the crow flies) 
Infantry  
Marching 
 Rate  
@ 3.5 km 
/ h 
Minimum 
Campaign Days 
needed for 
Movement 
1. Medeba 29 km’s 8,3 hours 1 day march 
2. Jerusalem 44 km’s 12,5 hours 1,5 day’s march  
 
 
• Ammon 
 
 
Rabbath-
ammon 
3. Damascus 177 km’s 50,8 hours 15,8 day’s march 
1. Rabbah-
ammon 
187 km’s 53,4 hours 6,7 day’s march 
2. Hebron 136 km’s 38,9 hours 4,9 day’s march 
 
 
• Edom 
 
 
Sela (Petra) 
3. Memphis / 
Noph 
416 km’s 119 hours 14,9 day’s march 
1. Aroer 5 km’s 1,4 hours Half morning 
march 
2. Jerusalem 70 km’s 20 hours 2,5 day’s march 
 
 
• Moab 
 
 
Dibon 
3. Heshbon 30 km’s 8,6 hours  One day’s hard 
march 
 
Mesopotamia      
1. Nineveh 440 km’s 126 hours 16 days march 
2. Memphis / 
Noph 
1516 km’s 433 hours 54 day’s march 
 
 
• Babylonia 
 
 
Babylon 
3. Jerusalem 1070 km’s 305,7 
hours 
38,2 day’s march 
1. Mari 266 km’s 76 hours 9,5 day’s march 
2. Carchemish 516 km’s 147,4 
hours 
18,4 day’s march 
 
 
1. Assur 
3. Tyre 772 km’s 220,6 
hours 
27,6 days march 
1. Lachish 978 km’s 279 hours 35 day’s march 
2. Tarsus 
  (Cilicia) 
726 km’s 207,4 
hours 
30 day’s march 
 
 
2. Nineveh 
3. Megiddo 868 km’s 248 hours 32 day’s march 
1. Samaria  916 km’s 262 hour’s 33 day’s march 
2. Ecbatana 521 km’s 149 hours 18,6 day’s march 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Assyria 
 
 
3. Calah 
(Kalhu) 
3. Damascus 731 km’s 208,9 
hours 
26 day’s march 
 
Africa 
Connection 
 
Principle 
Base(s) of 
Operations 
Operational 
Destinations in 
the Region 
(places) 
Distances 
between 
Places 
(as the crow flies) 
Infantry  
Marching 
 Rate  
@ 3.5 km 
/ h 
Minimum 
Campaign Days 
needed for 
Movement 
1. Megiddo 938 km’s 268 hours 33,5 day’s march  
1. Thebes 
 
2. Hazor 1000 km’s 286 hours 36 day’s march 
1. Jerusalem 560 km’s 160 hours 20 day’s march 
2. Sais (Delta) 136 km’s 39 hours 5 day’s march 
 
 
• Egypt 
 
2. Memphis 
3. Ur 1100 km’s 314 hours 40 day’s march 
1. Tyre 1550 km’s 443 hours 55 day’s march • Libya Cyrene 
2. Thebes 1400 km’s 400 hours 50 day’s march  
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1.Memphis 1980 km’s 566 hours 70 day’s march  
• Nubia 
(Cush) 
 
Napata 
(near Nile’s  
4th cataract ) 
2. Thebes 1260 km’s 360 hours 45 day’s march 
(Distances calculated on maps from Bimson et al, 1992).  
 
One final logistical supply system needs to be considered.  Maritime travel and trade 
was already a well established fact in the ancient Near East.  Such travel is in many 
ways easier than overland travel (Ap –Thomas in DJ Wiseman, 1973: 262).  The 
arrival of the confederated Sea Peoples had already reshaped the political landscape of 
the East Mediterranean during the Late Bronze Age.  The Phoenicians and the 
Egyptians had extensive networks of maritime trade, their vessels plying their trade 
across the sea routes of the Mediterranean and beyond by the onset of IA IIa.  By this 
time period sea travel and maritime logistics were already at an advanced stage in the 
region.  King Hiram of Tyre and Solomon established a merchant fleet at the port of 
Enzion-geber (Elath) wherewith to trade up and down the Red Sea.  
   
Regarding maritime enterprise and maritime travel’s bearing on logistics, several 
factors interact at sea interact to determine a vessel’s sailing speed, such as wind 
speed and direction, design and displacement of vessel, proficiency of captain and 
crew, tides and currents.  Ships fell into one of two possible categories, armed vessels 
suited for maritime combat and the very ‘beamish’ merchant vessels that functioned 
as transporters.  Such vessels are variously described as a floating walnut or as a deep 
bowl.  These merchant vessels had a carrying capacity of about 100 to 150 tons, and 
were dependent upon a single square sail for their propulsion.    
 
For at least some kind of orientation to nautical travel constraints, one rudimentary 
example is provided below; 
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• Maritime travel from Crete to Alexandria, Egypt. 
Distance (as the crow flies):  483 km 
Approximate time in hours for an average, small sized sailing vessel (assuming a 
favourable breeze):  50 hours or approximately two days steady sailing.  
 
4.6. The Early Beginnings of Maritime Power in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
The coast of Palestine, as far north as Dor near Carmel, is exposed to sedimentation 
from the Nile.  The problem of silting, combined with the smooth coastline of the 
Plain of Philistia and the Plain of Sharon has challenged the development of enduring 
ports.  Joppa (modern Jaffa) to the south-west endured better than most but its 
longevity owed more to its proximity to Jerusalem.  During IA IIa Joppa was a place 
of importance; it served as Solomon’s principal port for economic liaisons in the 
Eastern Mediterranean (see 2 Chronicles 2: 16).  Sea power was never a high priority 
component of Israel’s war potential.  This is born out by the fact that Israel never 
pursued her own maritime development, opting rather to contract the services of the 
Sidonians and other Phoenicians who had a predisposition for maritime operations.  
The population makeup of coastal towns was such that gentiles were nearly always 
the predominant cultural group.  In New Testament times only Joppa, as a coastal 
town, had a majority Jewish population.   
 
Economics as a core issue of public interest lies not coincidentally at the heart of 
politics as well.  To trace the beginnings of maritime power in the Eastern 
Mediterranean in IA IIa one need look no further than maritime trade.  Naval power 
which reflects military potential at sea owes its raison d’etre to the practical 
expediency of protecting the political power’s interests, particularly the sphere of 
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economic interests.  During the first millennium B.C.E., naval power evolved to 
become keen instruments of imperial power.   
 
4.6.1.  Early Maritime Vessels. 
For purposes of clarity in maritime power it is important to distinguish between 
maritime vessels and the functions for which they were built.  Mesopotamians 
negotiated the Tigris river on tiny wicker framed vessels, covered in animal skins.  
These small boats were called Guffa’s.   These coracles were sealed with bitumen.  
Such small boats were modes of local transportation.  Technological progress is also 
important here; the easiest way to transport things to markets beyond ones own 
locality was by water.  Agricultural surpluses made possible by increasingly 
sophisticated irrigation systems were transported on the principal waterways of the 
ancient Near East, the Tigris, and Euphrates, Nile, the Mediterranean and other 
neighbouring seas.  These were the great freight highways of the day.   
 
Egypt’s hot and dry climate was not conducive to cultivation of large trees, so the 
innovative natives fashioned reed-boats by tying bundles of dried reeds together.  
Successful trade and maritime experience and technical progress moved them on to 
building boats from whatever wood they could obtain, mostly acacias.  In contrast to 
Egypt’s vegetation, the city-states of Phoenicia had large reserves of tall trees in the 
Lebanon and Syria to draw upon.  Their stronger vessels included proper keels and 
were more seaworthy.  Tall masts from such timber allowed for the development of 
sophisticated masts and rigging.  Greater efficiency at sea resulted in greater volumes 
of trade and commerce, and consequently, the capacity for a greater war potential. 
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4.6.2. Early Maritime Powers in the Eastern Mediterranean, IA IIa  
Three political powers exerted a leading influence upon the development of maritime 
power in the Eastern Mediterranean during IA IIa.  Egypt, the Phoenician city-states 
(principally Tyre and Sidon), and the Greeks.  The Greeks are peripheral to this study; 
at the time of King Saul they were entering into a dark-age in consequence of the 
Dorian invasions.  Later, under Athenian leadership, they become the leading 
maritime nation throughout the Eastern Mediterranean.  
 
The earliest sea-going vessels were built in Egypt, but these were technically inferior 
to the Phoenician vessels because the Egyptians lacked the raw materials wherewith 
to make keels – the backbone of a ship.  The Egyptian’s early sea-going vessels were 
larger versions of the river reed-boats.  They were curved in shape, rising high out of 
the water at each end.  To support these ends, a strong rope was fastened between 
them, and suspended for the length of the ship above the deck. Thirty or more slaves 
drove the ship with oars.  In time this was supplemented by a crude sail and rigging 
arrangement.  Egyptian maritime history predates IA IIa by more than two millennia.  
In 3000 B.C.E. Egypt’s maritime trade routes stretched nearly 1300 km’s down the 
Nile and by canal to the Red Sea.  By this date, Egyptian traders were sailing across 
the Mediterranean Sea to Crete and to the shores of Phoenicia. 
 
The Phoenicians for their part were quick to learn of how profitable it was to trade by 
sea.  Two excellent principal seaports, Tyre and Sidon, lay beyond the silting problem 
of the Nile.  Phoenicia’s economy was largely based upon her maritime trading 
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activities.  The close ties between maritime trade and naval power to guard such 
interests was manifest in Phoenician naval architecture; with access to large and 
suitable hardwood in their homeland, Phoenician ships included extended keels.  The 
extended keel projected forward, making a ram for attacking enemy vessels.  The 
Greeks began to sail in the Mediterranean from about 1300 B.C.E.  The Mycenaean 
culture was the late Bronze Age (c.1600 – 1100 B.C.E.) culture of Greece.  By 1200 
B.C.E. the Mycenaean Greek influence had reached Egypt, the Cyclades, the Levant, 
Cyprus, and western Asia Minor.  
 
These Bronze-Age vessels endured for several centuries, ferrying tin and various 
other cargoes of value across the Mediterranean and neighbouring seas.  Such 
primitive sea-going vessels were oar-driven, and in most instances further 
supplemented by a set square sail.  Ships were generally categorised by the system of 
oars that propelled it.  The oars were arranged in banks one above the other.  Thus 
ships were classed as bireme (two banks of oars), trireme (three banks), quadreme 
(four banks), and quinreme (five banks).  During the Iron-Age, the all-purpose 
Phoenician-type vessel was eventually replaced by customised vessels; the sleek 
warship and the bulkier cargo carrying vessel.  The warship of the Iron-Age was a 
shallow, open galley, fitted with a sail and oars.  Its main armament was its centreline 
ram.  Ancient naval tactics for engaging enemy vessels entailed mainly ramming.  
The sail was furled during combat and the galley’s oarsmen powered it into battle.  
Logistics for these ancient warships dictated that they could only remain at sea for a 
limited period of time.  A warship of 200 crew had a minimum requirement of 280 
kg’s of food (140kg / 100 crew) and 200 litres of water per day.  The warships were 
designed to minimise weight and bulk so as to increase the all-important speed and 
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quickness of the vessel – its primary combat tactic being that of a sea-born ramming 
contraption.  Everything was secondary to that.  Like land based armies, ancient 
warships were equally tethered to the dictates of logistics (Jones, 1987:52).  
 
A large merchant ship could carry about 400 tons, the same load as 4000 pack 
animals. Such vessels had a minute fraction of the logistical needs of such a large herd 
of pack animals.  Merchant ships had no ram extending from their keels and were 
broader in the beam (width).  The latter rose higher out of the water and were 
powered only by a single sail.  Oarsmen would have taken up cargo space.     
 
The logistical value of ships and boats was not lost on the political powers of 
antiquity.  Indeed, that it was easier and quicker to load and transport goods on local 
rafts and barges soon became applicable to international trade in antiquity as well.  A 
good-sized raft or a well-laden vessel had greater transport capacity than many pack 
animals – and did not require quantities of fodder and water to sustain it.  Thus early 
in his history man had gained the valuable insight of rivers being key trade routes and 
that the seas were highways of significant value (Coggins, 1967: 8).   
  
NOTE: The Greek name for a warship of the classical period was a trieres (plural ‘trieries’).  The Romans called it a triremis and 
English scholars have traditionally followed the Romans and called it a ‘trireme’.  
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CHAPTER 5.  THE CHRONICAL OF ISRAEL’S CONFLICT IN SYRO- 
  PALESTINE, ca.1045 – 931 / 930 B.C.E.  
The lion’s share of conflicts for this period available for scholarly research is recorded 
in the biblical texts, redaction and other problems notwithstanding.  Other textual and 
non-textual sources of information include evidence of warfare in IA IIa but even 
when such cultural material remains are found in situ, the data they provide is at best 
only partially intelligible.  This section of the dissertation will survey various 
available records of Israel’s warfare for IA IIa in Syro-Palestine and evaluate the 
continuous evolution of Israel’s foundations of military force.   
 
Within this context, the political dialogue or interaction between nations is a struggle 
for power to control and allocate given values.  Clausewitz (Howard and Paret, 
1976:7) brought clarity to political philosophy by asserting that war was the 
continuation of politics by other means, and that war was the ultimate arbitrating form 
of political dialogue.  ‘Power politics’ is the modern phrase that refers to authoritative 
relations between state actors.  From the present, the summit of all ages past, scholars 
can look back across time with a whole battery of sophisticated time-evolved 
scholarly concepts from the empirical and analytical domains of science and trace and 
interpret therewith the trends and occurrences with greater confidence and accuracy.  
Bearing the dynamic nature of science in mind, unanimity still eludes the scientific 
community in many areas of polemological enquiry.  For instance, there is little 
scholastic agreement among modern political scholars (Fourie, 1996:4) regarding the 
idea of universal ‘principles of warfare’ based upon maxims and prescriptive absolute 
guidelines.  Thus no attempt will be made to use any such dubious (and sometimes 
subjective) yardsticks in this chronicle of IA IIa conflicts.  What will serve to light the 
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way for this study of conflict in antiquity however is Andre Beaufre’s assertion that 
warfare is about the “acquisition and maintenance of freedom of action” (Fourie, 
1996:73).  Political actors in this defined archaeological period increased or decreased 
in their ‘freedom of action’ by means of statecraft.  Frequently military statecraft was 
the selected policy instrument.  What bearing this had on the lot of the common man 
in the ancient Near East at this time are findings for the conclusion of this dissertation.   
 
Political power is measurable in absolute and in relative terms, and is not properly 
assessed by means of a ‘bean count’ of military hardware alone.  To this end, military 
force is a salient concept; it is a measurement of four phenomena: (1) military 
potential, (2) war potential, (3) technological capacity, and (4) logistics.  The political 
actors of the ancient Near East for this period will be studied in terms of their military 
force as they engaged in ‘political dialogue’ with Israel, as resources permit. 
 
5.1.  The Reign of King Saul, ca. 1045 – 1011 / 1010 B.C.E. 
Policy-making and policy-implementation for the loosely confederated tribes of 
ancient Israel was entering unchartered waters in the period IA IIa.  A new regime 
was introduced which, over time, would change Israel’s political landscape and bear 
upon the political world of the ancient Near East.  The introduction of the monarchy 
was also the introduction of a new war potential for Israel.  The monarch was tasked 
with Israel’s security.  It was now a secular prerogative rather than a sacral one to 
determine policy that would secure Israel’s political interests.  An important 
component in the crafting of realistic (achievable) policy is the availability of means 
and expertise to realize it.  The rudimentary taxation that was introduced in the time 
of Saul was now formalised in the reign of King David.  The effects of taxation 
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proved a two edged sword to United Israel’s war potential.  On the positive side 
Israel’s military potential increased to strengths hitherto never before reached.  
Taxation had been paid in the form of gifts to the king’s court until David’s reign.  
David initiated a census to establish the tax system on a more formal and efficient 
footing (2 Samuel 24: 1 ff).  War booty, tribute paid by conquered peoples, and local 
revenues paid to the royal court describe the kinds of taxation - the means for the 
pursuit of political objectives.  Such revenue strengthened Israel’s still modest war 
potential, setting it on a sounder organisational base and on a permanent footing.  
 
The negative aspect is evidenced by the burgeoning tax load placed on the shoulders 
of the commoner.  Taxation was constantly increased, even to the extent of 
introducing a rotational system of corvee (1Kings 9: 20 – 21) in the latter part of IA 
IIa.  Eventually the weight of the expanded tax system led to the irreparable political 
rupture of the United Monarchy.  This was a critical blow to both the war and military 
potentials of Israel and Judah.    
 
Similar to the Roman Republican era to follow later in the Western Mediterranean, 
the increasing scale of military potential needed for the pursuit of political power by 
IA IIa Israel placed correspondingly greater burdens on the lot of the Israelite 
commoner.  This was compounded by economic damage to the interests of the 
Israelite yeomanry as they struggled to maintain themselves in their difficult agrarian 
circumstances. Israel was in fact wrestling the same increasingly difficult political 
crises that changed Republican Rome to Imperial Rome.  The Israelite experience 
reached the decisive point quicker though, and was not drawn out incrementally by 
degrees over centuries.  1 Samuel 8 succinctly lists the abrupt transition to the new 
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political dispensation of monarchy.  After the pattern of other monarch’s the Israelite 
king would ostensibly provide for Israel’s security with a small standing army 
supported by a complimentary cadre system for expansion of the military potential to 
meet any crises arising.  The yeomanry would now be largely left to their pursuits of 
economic stability and prosperity, only to be mustered in times of national crises.   
 
Ironically, the political transition to the regime of monarchy, undergirded by taxation 
which supplied the means for a professional core of soldiers and secular functionaries, 
was also the root cause of the outbreak of bitter civil war.  Other critical problems in 
hindsight were the absence of principles of succession.  The common practise among 
contemporary neighbours was hereditary succession.  This principle was assumed by 
the house of Saul.  Furthermore, unlike their Egyptian, Canaanite and Mesopotamian 
counterparts, Israelite kings were subjected to explicit public criticism in their secular 
roles if they strayed from or compromised any aspects of pure Yahwistic worship 
beliefs and practises.  In some extreme instances the prophets promoted regicide.  It 
was never to be forgotten among the Israelites that in “the religious prescriptions of 
the covenant there was no mention of kingship, and for the relation between the 
Israelites and their God, mortal kingship was irrelevant and a foreign custom” (Vogel 
and Van Oosten, 1983:97-98).   
 
When the tribes united under Saul to fight the Philistines they numbered 
approximately 33 000 warriors in total.  In line with royal practise of the period and 
throughout the greater region, Saul established a ‘royal bodyguard’ of 3000 men.  
More modest in both size and finery than future Persia’s Immortals (ten thousand 
strong and arrayed in lavish ceremonial dress), or the Hittite royal guard several 
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thousand strong, or the Sherden bodyguard (from the Sea Peoples) recruited in large 
numbers, Saul’s bodyguard nevertheless still served a similar purpose; they 
constituted an elite and permanent fighting force. They came under the direct 
command of the king and the crown prince Jonathan who served as a sub-general.  
The Israelite bodyguard was divided into three companies of 1000 warriors each.  
Saul commanded the first and second and Jonathan the third (Wise in Windrow, 
1981:29).  Even the secular texts are vague regarding details describing the 
organisation of the tribal levies of Israel. 
 
5.2.  King Saul and the Expulsion of the Philistines at Gibeah-Michmash: a General            
       Strategy is Revealed [1045 B.C.E].  
At the commencement of Saul’s reign the Philistine’s political domination of western 
Israelite territory was underwritten by strategically-sited strongholds.  Important 
amongst them was the stronghold at Gibeah-Michmash.  From this twin village 
location astride the Wadi Suweinit in Benjamite tribal land, some five kilometres 
north of Jerusalem (the latter also still a Canaanite stronghold at this time), the 
Philistines could monitor and control traffic flowing eastwards towards Jericho and 
beyond.  Furthermore, the Gibeah-Michmash twin garrisons formed a debilitating 
wedge between Israel’s northern tribes and those in the south.  Any economic 
advantage associated with these east-west arteries accrued to the Philistines and their 
war potential rather than to the Israelite latecomers. 
   
A general strategy was formulated by Israel’s newly coroneted king - one that would 
evolve and become more discernible by its operation.  At the core of Saul’s general 
strategy lay the first order political goal of establishing Israel’s sovereignty.  Saul had 
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to formulate policy and implement a strategy that would accomplish the desired 
outcome.  This political objective had to be tailored to suit the military potential at the 
king’s disposal.  Given the parochial nature of the confederated tribes, Israel’s full 
military potential was still largely unrealised.  Success in the military undertaking at 
Gibeah-Michmash would rally the northern tribes to his royal standard and thereby 
increase the military potential at his disposal.  Greater political goals lay ahead that 
required significantly greater military potential relative to the balance of power in the 
region.  Saul had to increase his ‘freedom for action’ from the Philistine yoke and 
moreover, had to get the attention of and bring the still recalcitrant northern tribes 
under his nominal kingship.  Without the northern tribes Israel’s full war potential 
would never be harnessed.  At the level of operational strategy Saul’s goal was the 
removal of the Philistine garrisons in their key location at Gibeah-Michmash.  To 
offset his still very limited military potential Saul had to find the appropriate 
operational strategy.  Thus Saul's choice of a dual surprise attack. 
  
5.2.1. Military Potential of King Saul’s Assault Forces.   
Some 3000 warriors were mustered for the attack on the Philistine twin stronghold.  
Saul commanded the larger 2000 strong division and his son Jonathan the 1000 strong 
division.  The divisions comprised units of slingers, javelins and light spearmen 
shielded and unshielded.  These may have been further supplemented by various 
peasant implements.  Most of the troops would have been Benjamites from the 
surrounding precincts.  Benjamite tribesmen were renowned for their fleetness of foot 
and their proficiency with missile weapons, all of which points to loose formation 
foot, supported by ancillary light troops.  Side arms of various types would have been 
bronze daggers and the like.  Iron weaponry would have still been rare amongst the 
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Israelite yeomanry.  The beginnings of Saul’s small standing army would have been 
no more than a personal tribal retinue.  Such would have been better equipped than 
the tribal yeomanry including some iron weapons and various oddments of body 
armour.  No mounted troops such as cavalry and chariotry were available to Israel at 
this time and Saul planned his operational strategy without them.  The terrain at 
Gibeah-Michmash would have precluded such weapon systems from having a role in 
this engagement anyway (1 Samuel 13: 2).  
 
5.2.2. Military Potential of the Two Philistine Garrisons at Gibeah-Michmash.   
The garrison sizes are not specified in the text.  The basic military rule of thumb in the 
modern era for attacking fortified positions or strongholds with reasonable prospects 
for success is to attack with a numerical superiority of at least 3:1.  If this 
generalisation may be used, and if the rounded-off biblical number of Israelite 
attackers is taken at face value at 3000 warriors, inductive reasoning would place the 
combined Philistine garrisons at an approximate strength not exceeding 1000.  The 
twin strongholds, again using inductive logic, were not equally strong or equally well 
manned.  Jonathan’s division at 1000 strong was 50% the size of King Saul’s.  The 
reasoning here arrives at the induced conclusion that Jonathan’s target stronghold 
numbered about 300 defenders and that King Saul’s approximately 700 strong.   
      
These well-sited Philistine military strongholds were in the local villages of Gibeah 
and Michmash, located on the northern high ground and on the southern high ground 
respectively.  Philistine forces of the period were typical IA IIa infantry with superior 
defensive armour and suitably armed for the period with light spear and shield.  These 
troops were deployed in garrison or stronghold duty.  Tactical formations were not a 
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primary issue unless they sallied forth from their fortified positions to attack enemy 
troops beyond the village’s defensive walls.  In the field the more heavily armoured 
foot may have been arranged in close-order formations, supported by loose formation 
auxiliary troops (Miller and Hayes, 1986:136). 
 
5.2.3. Technological Aspects: Operational Strategy and Tactical Factors.   
Of great tactical importance was the broken terrain around Gibeah-Michmash.  On 
such terrain the movement of Philistine close-formation armoured foot would have 
been impeded and the effectiveness of their spear-armed phalanxes reduced.  When 
seeking reasons for Saul’s tactical success against these strongholds, one must be 
careful to distinguish between the melee tactical factors, such as height advantage, 
that pertain to the actual fight, and operational strategic factors that stand independent 
of tactical factors.  In operational strategy, not all aspects of mountain warfare accrue 
to the defenders advantage. Clausewitz points out (Howard and Paret, 1976:17) that 
defensive mountain warfare, in terms of operational strategy, may be categorised as 
relative or absolute; that is, for the duration of an engagement (relative) or as part of a 
permanent static defence (absolute).  The Philistine camps at Gibeah and Michmash 
fall into the disadvantageous category of absolute mountain warfare and the whole 
episode occurs within this operational strategic context.  The increased tactical 
defence value such high strongholds enjoyed were offset by the downsides at the level 
of operational strategy.  Some of the main disadvantages include ‘the decisively 
passive character’ of such defence works.  The tactical initiative is yielded totally to 
the attacking enemy.  In any attempt to gain or regain the initiative some of the 
tactical advantages had to be sacrificed; either the advantage of prepared defences or 
the loss of mobility upon which pointed and edged weapons depended for their 
effectiveness (Clausewitz in Howard and Paret, 1976:418-420).   
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Saul’s tactical advantages included the element of surprise and probably greater 
numbers, both of which would have offset any height advantages the static Philistine 
defence may have initially enjoyed.  Michmash and Gibbeah were both in the 
Benjamite tribal land so Saul would have been able to rally many loyal followers to 
his standard.  Regarding numerical superiority both in tactics and in operational 
strategy, this factor alone is the most common element in victory.  The surprise factor 
is allied to the numerical superiority factor and when used effectively and in 
conjunction with each other these factors would have more than offset the 
disadvantages of attacking an improved defensive position on high ground.  By means 
of surprise tactical superiority can be delivered at the decisive point.  In addition, the 
tactical effect of surprise is also experienced psychologically, impacting severely 
upon the enemies fighting spirit (Clausewitz in Howard and Paret,1976:198). 
 
Reasons for the successful outcome of Saul and Jonathan’s simultaneous attacks on 
the twin Philistine garrisons at Gibeah-Michmash lie within the explanations provided 
above.  Victory in battle is most often secured even before the opening volleys are 
fired.  This brings us to consider the logistical factors at Gibeah-Michmash.      
 
5.2.4. Logistical Factors: Seasons, Distances, Mustering and Volumes.  
The season is not specified in 1 Samuel 13.  The redaction of this passage was sacral 
rather than profane and aimed at emphasising the inspired role of the prophet Samuel 
in the selection of Israel’s early kings, with especial emphasis on the house of David 
(Miller and Hayes, 1986:138).  The limited scale and nature of the conflict, and its 
short duration however allow for its occurrence at most times of the year.   
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The logistics for a mustering of 3000 Israelite warriors required the following; 
(a) Food 
1,4 tons of food / 1000 warriors required.  (For details of this generalised formula, 
see section 4.5)   
Thus, Israelite forces of 3000 total: 1,4 x 3 = 4,2 tons of food supply / day.   
 
(b) Water 
 1 litre of water / warrior required. 
Thus, Israelite forces of 3000 total: 1ltr x 3000 = 3000  litres of water / day. 
Interpreting the above military related data invites the following deductive 
questioning and inductive reasoning: 
• Could the tribal lands of this force of predominantly Benjamite warriors produce 
such quantities of food? (Consider soil fertility in Benjamite tribal lands and 
efficiency of the agricultural methods of the day). 
• How developed was terrace farming methods by IA IIa and had the Bejamites 
occupied their tribal land long enough to develop such labour intensive projects? 
• Were there adequate crop surpluses to allow for raids of this kind? 
 
5.2.5.  Political Aftermath and Strategic Dialectics.   
Having won this strategic site from the Philistines, Saul chose to establish the twin 
hilltop villages as his own base of operations.  The victory did not persuade all the 
Israelite tribes of Saul’s prowess as a military leader (1 Samuel 10:27) and some 
refused to acknowledge his claims to suzerain authority.  Religious institutions, like 
agrarian societies, are generally conservative in nature and the concept of kingship 
was not universally welcomed throughout the land.  Nevertheless, the Philistine grip 
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on the central hill country had been pried lose.  If this situation was maintained the 
Israelite institution of monarchy could be more effectively developed throughout the 
territory of the confederated Israelite tribes. Saul’s status, and with it his claim to 
regal authority, had been elevated beyond the parochial boundaries of the tribe of 
Benjamin.  The prospects for a centralised regime had increased and in turn would 
significantly increase Israel’s war potential.  An increased war potential would in turn 
improve her military potential and correspondingly, her capacity for further military 
statecraft in the region.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Geba, the pass across Wadi Suweinit to Michmash. 
(photograph from Bible Lands, 1986: Southern Samaria, F2-3). 
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5.3.  King Saul and Raising the Siege at Jabesh – Gilead [c.1045 / 1040 B.C.E.]. 
Still early in the opening years of King Saul’s reign and prior to the political 
consolidation of all the tribes under his authority, another conflagration arose for Saul 
to function in his political capacity as military leader.  The conflict presented him 
with a further opportunity to rally the northern tribes to his military standard and win 
their fealty.  An Ammonite force under their monarch King Nahash was besieging 
Israelite settlers of the tribe of Manasseh at Jabesh-Gilead, east of the Jordan, and in 
territory considered by the Ammonites to be within their sphere of political control.  
Distinct and exactly demarcated territory such as characterises modern states did not 
exist in ancient Near East (Miller and Heyes, 1986:141).  The Manassen settlers 
appealed to Saul for assistance.  Saul took full advantage of the situation, using it to 
rally the tribal-minded yeomanry to his monarchical standard. 
 
5.3.1.  Military Potential of King Saul’s Relief Force.   
1 Samuel 11: 1 – 11 records that some 300 000 warriors responded to Saul’s call to 
arm’s.  This generously rounded-off number, 10% of which the redacted text is at 
pains to point out were Judean, points to the headway Saul had begun to make among 
the Israelite tribes.  Yet a significant number still withheld their support, provoking 
feelings of political retribution among the victorious warriors against the Israelite 
detractors (1 Samuel 11: 12 – 13).  Saul’s large force engaged the Ammonite siege 
force in three divisions of infantry.  The terrain on which the battle was fought is 
described as rich pasture land, on rolling hills and suited for livestock.  Such terrain 
favoured loose formation troops, although material evidence suggests more lightly 
armoured troops, as was the case for Israel in these early days of the monarchy.  This 
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engagement occurred prior to mounted forces becoming a substantial part of the 
armies of the ancient Near East. 
 
5.3.2. Military Potential of the Besieging Force of King Nahash of Ammon.   
The number Ammonite soldiers besieging the Israelite settlers at Jabesh-Gilead were 
not specified in the biblical text.  Chariotry are not mentioned but would have added 
little tactical value anyway to the task of laying siege.  There are indicators that the 
Ammonite force was substantial; The battle endured from the ‘morning watch’ until 
‘the heat of day’ – it took several hours before the large Israelite army could force a 
decision.  (The ‘morning watch’ ended at sunrise and the ‘heat of day’ suggests 
sometime past midday.)  This together with the fact that Saul had attempted to muster 
warriors from all of Israel and that King Nahash was himself present at the battle and 
took an active role in the engagement indicates to some extent the scale of the 
Ammonite besieging force. 
         
5.3.3.  Technological Aspects: Operational Strategy and Tactical Factors.   
A besieging force is itself vulnerable to attack by a relief force.  The cordon of the 
besiegers is designed for breaking through the defences of the besieged facing them. 
The besiegers would be dispersed around their objective, according to the strengths 
and weaknesses of the town or city defences.  Such a force, especially when surprised 
by another enemy force from an unexpected quarter, can only offer an uncoordinated 
defence.  Moreover the besieging force is still vulnerable to the besieged enemy 
sallying out to attack them when the besiegers turn to engage the relief force.  
Clausewitz is emphatic that the tactical advantage accrues to the relief force when 
engaging besiegers in their positions and those positions are easily pieced (Clausewitz 
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in Howard and Peret, 1976:540).  The terrain around Jabash-Gilead offers little by 
way of natural defence, being described as pasture-land.  It was less hilly and wooded 
in contrast to that portion of the Gilead further north toward the Yarmak River where 
the terrain is more difficult. 
 
Ammonite arms and armour would have been reminiscent of the Late Bronze Age 
armies of the region.  The Israelite soldiery relied on their tactical advantages 
including numbers, the surprise factor, and the advantage of the initiative.  The 
average Israelite yeoman would not have been as well equipped as his Ammonite 
counterpart.     That the battle began at first light suggests that the Israelites force-
marched into their deployment positions during the night and engaged the Ammonites 
before they could organise a properly prepared defence.  The comprehensiveness of 
Israel’s victory over the Ammonites is alluded to in the biblical account: “... they 
which remained were scattered, so that two of them were not left together” (1 Samuel 
11: 11).  It was customary for the victors to strip the dead of weapons and equipment 
following the battle.  The large size of the encounter and the decisive victory that 
followed would have yielded a large amount of war material to the Israelites.    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Picture from Reader’s Digest Atlas of the Bible, 1981:91)  
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5.3.4. Logistical Factors: Seasons, Distances, Mustering and Volumes.   
No season is indicated in the text.  The mustering of such a huge number of warriors 
for this engagement, even if only 10% of the given force size actually took part, 
required considerable logistical resources, organisational skills and control factors.   
 
The logistical factors for such a military undertaking would have approximated the 
following: 
(a) Food for 3000 warriors over a period of three days (assuming that the Israelites 
mustered and force-marched with all speed, and that the army dispersed at the 
earliest opportunity after the battle).   
3000 warriors x 1,4 metric tons of food supplies / 1000 warriors 
= 4,2 tons of food supplies x three days (at least) 
= 12, 6 tons of food for the Israelite relief forces. 
(b) Water supply; this would be affected by the force march, heat of day, and intensity 
of activity.  The minimum intake of 0,5 to one litre would be wholly inadequate - 
a more likely estimate would be at least three to four litres per warrior.  Most of 
the Israelite warriors would have had to cross the Jordan River and several 
perennial streams and brooks exist in the vicinity, so replenishment was possible 
depending upon the time of year. 
Thus, 3000 warriors x 5 litres of water = 15 000 litres x 3 days 
= 45 000 litres of water for the Israelite force for the Jabash-Gilead battle. 
(c)    Regarding victuals for the Ammonites, the assumption is that their force was 
substantial in size.  Any army that remains stationary runs into huge logistical 
problems. Supplying adequate provisions to a besieging army is an esoteric matter 
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often glossed over by the novice yet a keen point of interest to both a 
quartermaster-general or to a mind trained in the practical aspects of logistics.  It 
provides for empirical investigation.  Traditionally, the Gilead was rich and well 
developed in agriculture.  Archaeological surveys show settlement in the Gilead as 
early as 24 –23 centuries B.C.E.  If the Ammonites besieged the people of the 
tribe of Manasseh at Jabesh-Gilead at the end of the growing season, then food 
supplies in the region would have been at their most plentiful.  Logically, and 
assuming a standard yield of cultivated local foodstuffs, if the ratio of Ammonite 
besiegers / soldiers to the Israelite besieged settlers was one to one, then there 
would be an adequate supply of food at Jabesh-Gilead.  If the food yield was a 
year’s supply, then there would be sufficient for the siege to last a year, assuming 
the besieged could last that long.  If the annual food yield was sufficient for a 
local population numbering about 50% of the Ammonite besiegers, then the 
Ammonite besieging force would be able to maintain the siege for about six 
months.  As it turned out, the siege was of limited duration, ending in defeat for 
the Ammonites.  
 
5.3.5.  Political Aftermath and Strategic Dialectics.   
Lifting the siege and driving off the Ammonites was a watershed event for Saul’s 
political career.  His sphere of authority was extended to the extreme boundaries of 
Israel’s tribal territory.  Neighbouring kingdoms, princedoms, and peoples could no 
longer ignore the reality of the Kingdom of Israel as it established itself in the region.  
All the tribes now stood unanimously united behind their king.  Saul’s political 
leadership had been fully tested on this occasion.  His ensuing success was a 
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convincing argument in his favour for those parochial tribalists - still ambivalent (1 
Samuel 10: 27) about his credentials to serve as Israel’s political leader.        
 
The belligerent Ammonites yielded their claims over what was territory originally 
within their sphere of political and economic interest.  King Nahash survived the 
battle but was obligated thereafter to follow a more subversive policy toward Israel.  
The Ammonite King gave moral and practical support to the enemies of King Saul, 
including the future renegade David.  Nevertheless, Ammon had been effectively 
neutralised and accepted the differences between the Ammonite and Israelite military 
potentials.  The Ammonites no longer posed an explicit threat to Israel for the 
remainder of Saul’s reign. 
 
5.4.  King Saul’s Defence Against Philistine Retaliatory Attacks.  
The institution of the monarchy provided for enduring political actions that would 
realise long-term goals.  Saul’s general strategy was to establish Israel as a sovereign 
state and operational strategies were pursued to this end.  Within this ambit, Jonathan, 
the eldest son of Saul and a ranking officer within the king’s retinue, launched a raid 
against the Philistine stronghold at Geba, north-east of Jerusalem.  The scale of the 
Philistine response was not anticipated; Jonathan’s raid provoked a major retaliatory 
attack.  King Saul’s general strategy had miscalculated the political will of the 
confederated city-states of Philistine and placed Israel in a desperate position.   
 
Notwithstanding Saul’s skill at optimising Israel’s defence, the biblical record (1 
Samuel 13) makes clear that the scale of the pan-Philistine attack was huge and that 
many Israelites fled to Gilgal for refuge.  Gilgal lay in the broken terrain of the Jordan 
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Valley.  Those courageous enough to stand by the king’s standard did so fearing the 
worst.  At Gilgal Saul awaited the arrival of the prophet Samuel who, by performing 
sacrificial rites of the priesthood, would invoke Yahweh’s favour on the Israelite 
army.  Samuel’s delay and the desperate nature of the political situation led Saul to 
overstep the bounds of his kingly prerogatives and assume ecclesiastical authority 
which he did not have.  His compromise under pressure precipitated divine rejection.  
This was the first instance – but would not be the last time that an Israelite monarch 
would be rejected on grounds of compromising the Abrahamic covenant and the 
Mosaic code which proscribed performance of priestly ordinances by none save those 
who held the appropriate office in the priesthood to officiate in those ordinances.  
 
 
5.4.1. Military Potential of King Saul’s Army. 
Approximately 600 foot soldiers of Saul’s 2000 strong division were with him at this 
time (1 Samuel 13: 2 and 1 Samuel 14: 2).  These soldiers comprised Saul’s small 
standing army.  This nucleus, together with Jonathan’s division of 1000 warriors, 
some 3000 in total (1 Samuel 13: 2), represented the professional core of Israelite 
soldiers, the beginnings of Israel’s standing army.  Their arms and armour would have 
been the best in Israel, having first choice of captured arms and armour from the 
ongoing skirmishes with Israel’s enemies and having accumulated significant 
quantities of war materiel from their outstanding victory over the Ammonites at 
Jabesh-Gilead in c. 1040 / 1045 B.C.E.  The arms and armour would have been 
mostly Bronze-Age equipment, with a small amount of the still rare but greatly 
esteemed crude iron equipment.   
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The terrain chosen by Saul suited his defensive operational strategy.  Unlike the 
Philistines permanent defensive posture at Gibeah - Michmash, which Clausewitz 
(Howard and Paret, 1976:360-362) characterised as absolute, i.e. permanent and thus 
disadvantageous to operational strategy. Saul’s choice of broken ground for a 
temporary defensive action was relative in character.  The advantage now accrued to 
the defender, forcing the enemy to attack against specific prepared and alert defences 
with no element of surprise to unbalance the defence. 
 
5.4.2.  Military Potential of the Philistine Force.  
1 Samuel 13: 5 employs a redactive chronicling device to generalise the hugely 
superior numbers of the Philistines on this occasion.  The record alludes to 30 000 
chariots, 6 000 cavalry, and ‘innumerable’ infantry.  One could be excused for 
thinking the biblical record was describing, in exaggerated terms, the main field army 
of the Late Assyrian war machine of Tiglath-Pileser III in 745 B.C.E., rather than a 
relatively large and much earlier period Philistine coalition expeditionary force.  Such 
large numbers of chariots and cavalry at the time of IA IIa is an anachronism serving 
to highlight the dire situation Israel was in to a later audience on the occasion 
described in 1 Samuel 13. 
 
5.4.3.  Technological Aspects: Operational Strategy and Tactical Factors. 
With only the small standing army and time desperately needed to muster the tribal 
yeomanry, Saul was obliged to stage a holding action, employing what later became 
known among Roman commanders as a ‘Fabian strategy’.  By this operational 
strategy Saul sought to delay the engagement of enemy forces until he could swell the 
numbers of his army and gain more favourable circumstances that those prevailing.  
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As part of this operational strategy Saul left his base of operations at Gibeah and 
occupied a position further to the east of Gilgal, north-east of Jericho.  Something of 
Saul’s military acumen is in evidence here; firstly a Fabian operational strategy is 
about delaying the engagement, which is achieved to some extent by drawing the 
Philistines further eastwards and away from their city-states on the Levant.  Secondly, 
the difficult terrain that Saul occupied largely negated the huge numerical superiority 
of the Philistines.  Terrain is considered to be the great ‘leveller’ between opposing 
combat forces of disparate size and quality.  A living memory example for modern 
scholars is the Pacific Campaign of World War Two between the outnumbered and 
outgunned Japanese defenders and the superior attacking American marines with their 
huge accompaniment of naval and aerial support.  The terrain factor, inter alia, called 
forth a huge effort on the part of the Allied forces to overcome the determined but 
significantly outnumbered and relatively under equipped Japanese defenders.  
Thirdly, by drawing the Philistine force eastwards, Saul rendered them more 
vulnerable to the still mustering Israelite yeomanry.  Once mustered, the latter could 
threaten the Philistine’s line of communication, and threaten envelopment.  By such 
measures, Saul sought to undermine the larger Philistine force.   
 
The climatically harsher terrain of the Jordan Valley would have complicated the lines 
of communication for the already ‘innumerable’ Philistine force and rendered the 
Philistine’s principal strike force of chariots useless, whatever their true number.  
Although the Philistine’s chariots were excellent shock weapons, at this stage of 
military technology the effective use of such required flat terrain.  Saul was too 
experienced to afford them such an opportunity.  If the Philistines failed to force a 
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decisive victory quickly, the effects of logistics would precipitate the deterioration of 
their sizeable army and the advantage would swing to the Israelites. 
 
For their part, the Philistines had dislodged the Israelite standing army under King 
Saul from their permanent base of operations at the strategically important site of 
Gibeah - Michmash.  Having thus secured this favoured site, and confident that their 
‘stolen march’ had bottled up Israel’s standing army in Transjordan, the Philistines 
divided their forces into three divisions and set about ravaging Israelite territory.  1 
Samuel 13: 6 - 10 notes the ‘strait’ Israel was in, that many fled and sought safety 
away from the Philistine force.  Saul’s Fabian strategy was in serious danger of going 
awry as they awaited the arrival of Samuel to invoke the favour of Yahweh.  Some of 
the men’s nerve failed them and they began to desert Saul (verse 8).  Even the 
Athenian leaders in the example of the Peloponnesian War found the application of a 
belatedly named ‘Fabian strategy’ a challenging and an unpopular strategy.  Under 
such pressures, Saul made a serious blunder and exercised ecclesiastical authority that 
he did not have.  Samuel came upon him in the very act and forthwith declared 
Yahweh’s rejection of Saul as king of Israel for his inappropriate sacrificial offering, 
and immediately returned to Gibeah. 
 
The Philistines were content to accomplish the objective of their punitive expedition, 
i.e. to reduce or destroy the Israelite’s war potential, without necessarily engaging 
Saul in his eastern fastness.  The strategic dialectics of the campaign thus far had 
produced a situation favourable to the Philistines who had organised their force into 
three divisions which set about plundering and devastating Israelite settlements, 
agricultural installations, and other economic interests.  Saul’s son Jonathan initiated 
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another response in the military dialogue of this engagement.  With the help of his 
armour bearer Jonathan attacked the main Philistine force which had regained the 
former Philistine garrison at Michmash.  Jonathan’s boldness resulted in the rally of 
the Israelite warrior’s morale and to the unexpected general route of the Philistine 
army from Israelite territory (1 Samuel 14: 1-23).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Picture from Reader’s Digest Atlas of the Bible, 1981:91) 
 
5.4.4. Logistical Factors: Season, Distances, Mustering and Volumes.   
The season was not relevant to the theme of the redactors but one may surmise that 
the Philistines, with the aim of crippling Israel’s war potential, began plundering 
their crops and installations. The Philistines would have chosen the timing of their 
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punitive expedition carefully.  The principal grain crop, wheat, was harvested some 
weeks following the harvest of barley, which had a shorter growing season.  The 
lower altitude areas such as the Jordan Valley ripened first and were followed by the 
areas of higher altitude, finishing in the terraces of the highlands.  Barley was 
harvested during the month of April and May, and followed by the wheat harvest.  
By timing the expedition to coincide with harvest time, the Philistine army would use 
the Israelite crops for their own provisioning, deny the enemy the food needed to 
sustain themselves during the coming year, and would still have had their own crops 
to return to after the expedition.  Food shortages in the year ahead would have a 
lasting weakening and negative impact on Israel’s war potential.  
  
The logistics for the soldiers mustered would have theoretically required at least the 
following; 
(a) Food 
1,4 tons of food / 1000 warriors. 
Thus, the Israelite force of approximately 600 under Saul’s command at Gilgal: 
Where 1,4 tons of provisions supplies 1000 warriors per day 
0,84 tons of provisions will supply 600 warriors per day multiplied by the amount 
days needed for the ‘decision’ to be reached.   
(b) Water 
Gilgal was in close proximity to the River Jordan so the 1 litre per person per day was 
easily maintained. 
(c) Communications.   
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The late spring rains would be largely over by now and the onset of the dry season 
would have been imminent.  The dry roads and countryside would have facilitated the 
march of Philistine expeditionary force. 
 
5.4.5.  Political Aftermath and Strategic Dialectics.   
The ravaging of Israelite lands by the Philistine forces is reminiscent to modern 
readers of Sparta’s tactics against Athenian land forces during the Peloponnesian 
War (431 – 404 B.C.E.). Rather than engaging the superior Spartan land forces, the 
Athenians sought instead to improve their tactical position against Sparta by taking 
up their defences behind Athens’ long walls.  The ravaging of an opponent’s territory 
was, besides provocative and demoralising for the passive defenders, an effective 
blow against the war potential of that opponent.  The consumption of the 
forthcoming year’s crops and provisions and the destruction of agricultural 
installations in an agrarian economy was the ancient equivalent of strategic bombing 
of industrial installations by bomber forces during World War Two.  Such 
operational strategy diminished the materials and supplies, and diverted available 
yeomanry manpower to emergency food production that could otherwise have served 
the military statecraft policy.  Thus the enemy war potential for the pursuit of such 
policy was undermined, including the population’s will to fight.  The Philistines set 
out to diminish the growing political threat that Israel now posed under King Saul by 
destroying components of the latter’s war potential.  The invader could achieve this 
even if the enemy’s deployed armed forces were not engaged and reduced during 
such an operation.  When Saul declined battle the Philistines continued to pursue a 
political conclusion by attacking social and economic installations that contributed to 
Israel’s war potential. 
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The eventual and positive outcome of this engagement produced various results for 
Israel.  For their very competent king, it became a watershed event in his personal 
career as Yahweh’s chief political appointee.  For the Israelites collectively, it was a 
key milestone in demonstrating the military potential of the new regime of monarchy. 
For the Philistines on the other hand, the erstwhile confederate power of the region 
Canaan during IA 1, it pointed to the start of their political decline.  Yet acceptance of 
shifts in war potential and factors leading to those trends are not easily discerned.  It is 
an esoteric political yardstick.  Differences in perceptions of own and rival political 
power have and will continue to lead to eruptions of warfare between political 
opponents.  Warfare serves as the functional arbiter in the contradictory claims to 
political power between the political belligerents.  With such a low lethality index for 
the weapon systems of this archaeological period, resolving the dispute regarding 
their respective war potentials would still take many years. 
 
5.5.  King Saul’s Military Statecraft and Political Consolidation [1039 to 1011 
B.C.E.]   
1 Samuel 14: 47 – 52 scantily summarises the many years of campaigning Saul 
undertook to establish the political Kingdom of Israel.  During this period Saul carved 
out Israel’s territorial boundaries and her political sphere of influence. 
 
5.5.1. Military Potential of King Saul’s Campaign Forces.   
Saul’s military forces, primarily his royal bodyguard, would have carried out the raids 
against the Edomites (southeast), Moabites (east), Ammonites (east), Zobahites 
(north) and the Amalekites (south).  This growing nucleus of seasoned soldiers was 
the principal core of Israel’s standing army.  The vagueness of 1 Samuel 14: 52 
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supplies few clues as to the specific details of the forces involved.  Attrition required 
that Saul continued to actively recruit military personnel from among the Israelites.  
The spoils of such campaigning would have added to the levels of battle experience, 
combat and general military proficiency and war material. Throughout this period 
Israel steadily increased her military potential.  What data can be gathered in this 
regard has to be gleaned from secular sources.  Saul’s military potential for this 
campaign would have been the royal bodyguard of 3000 warriors.   
 
5.5.2. Military Potentials of the Ammonites, Edomites, Moabites, Zobahites and  
Amalekites.   
The smaller military potentials of each of the above was a reflection of the limited 
war potential possessed by these enemies of Israel.  The Ammonites, Moabites, and 
Edomites had settled into the Transjordan region around the beginning of the 13th 
century B.C.E. and were regarded by the Israelites as closely connected by a common, 
collective ancestral heritage (Bartlett in Wiseman (editor), 1973:230).  The intrusions 
of the Israelite tribes into Canaan occurred around the same time period, only 
marginally later.  Political rivalry between these earlier settlers and Israel for the 
values of the region punctuated their interrelated history.  All of these early kingdoms 
gained political purchase during the peculiar and coincidental political nadir that beset 
the traditional great powers of the ancient Near East during IA IIa.  These fledgling 
minor states had little war potential to speak of.  Their subsequent political histories 
describe their eventual absorption by the resurgent larger political entities.  
Sometimes they amalgamated and at other times they were reduced to provincial 
status.  All these later political outcomes point to the tenuous nature of the political 
assertions made by these IA IIa petty kingdoms.  Even during this early period of their 
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histories political dialogue with United Monarchy Israel often resulted in political 
reverses and periods of political vassalage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Saul’s Campaigns of Political Consolidation from 1039 to 1011 B.C.E.  
(Map from Miller and Hayes, 1986: 140) 
 
The agrarian economy of these Transjordan states was never adequate to sustain the  
manpower necessary to engage other political units in the region on the basis of 
parity, let alone superiority.   The Transjordan states were precariously located on the 
narrow 30 km strip between the Jordan River valley and the borders of the of the 
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Syrian and Arabian deserts.  The northern region of the Transjordan was the best of 
the three states in terms of climatic conditions suited for agriculture, which suggests 
why the tribes Reuben and Gad were allocated Transjordan territory there.  Even so, 
this narrow belt on the western edge of the Fertile Crescent was relatively densely 
populated and full advantage was taken of the north-south principal trade and 
communication route, the ‘Kings Highway’ which traversed all three territories.  The 
topography of the Transjordan is hilly in the north, rising into the broken mountains 
of Edom in the south.  This terrain provided additional defence value against attacks 
from aggressors like Israel, and compensated to some degree for their limited war 
potentials.  “Their situation on the heights above the Rift Valley meant that none of 
them was an easy object of attack from the west, and only rarely could Israel hope to 
subdue Ammon, Moab, and Edom” (Bimson et al, 1992:23).  The Edomites were 
culturally aligned with the Amalekites and the Arabs.  By the onset of the Iron Age 
however, they had tribal chiefs and even kings as their rulers, indicative of their 
transition to an agrarian lifestyle.  Subjugation by Israel when it did occur was 
temporary.  Thus Israel often opted for a ‘raiding’ type of operational strategy against 
these enemies.    
 
The Zobahites were an Aramaean people located in the north beyond Damascus.  
Zoba was a prosperous kingdom that flourished during the early Hebrew monarchy, 
during the aforementioned political vacuum caused by the internal problems of the 
traditional great powers of the ancient Near East.  Accordingly the great powers 
pursued very little by way of foreign policy objectives.  As Saul sought to expand 
Israel’s sphere of political interest in all directions it was inevitable that this would 
affect the Aramaean kingdoms to the north.  Zoba was a leading but nevertheless still 
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a minor kingdom, typical of the city-states of Aramaea (Syria), wherein political 
power constantly ebbed and flowed.  Both Saul and David subdued Zoba in turn.  
 
The Amalekites in the northern Sinai and the Negev were nomadic.  Against these 
raiders 1 Samuel 14: 48 records that Saul ‘raised the host of Israel’.  The Amalekites 
did not necessarily possess greater war and military potentials than Israel’s other 
enemies, but to counter the Amalekites raiding operational strategy required greater 
manpower than Saul’s small standing army could muster.  Of all the named peoples 
the Amalekites probably had the smallest war potential.  Their military potential 
would have varied over time.  Saul’s campaign against them did however curtail their 
capacity to launch raids against Israel’s southern regions for a period of time. 
 
5.5.3. Technological Aspects: Operational Strategy and Tactical Factors.   
It would be an anachronism to imagine Saul engaging a modern type Israeli military 
force in a modern military operation against neighbouring Arab states or PLO 
guerrilla forces.  The kingdom of Saul was not the modern nation-state that has 
evolved through the ages.  These conflicts are best understood as “frontier skirmishes 
for the most part or temporary eruptions of violence resulting from plundering raids”.  
This was not fully mobilised warfare in the modern sense between firmly established 
states with clearly defined territorial boundaries (Miller and Hayes, 1986: 142).   
 
Technically, a raiding strategy a propos operational strategies in general was 
commonly employed to achieve political ends among these newly emergent 
kingdoms.  In contrast to what Jones calls a ‘persisting strategy’ the merits of a 
raiding strategy are evident when seen in the context of the period.  Raids were 
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temporary intrusions into hostile territory.  As a function of politics, such an 
operational strategy had objectives that were at once economic (booty), military 
(defeat of enemy forces), and political (diminishing of enemies war potential) in 
nature.  IA IIa was also the period in which true cavalry as a weapon system began to 
augment the composition of Near Eastern armies which for a long time had comprised 
a preponderance of foot soldiers.  This increased the capacity for raiding operations.  
Mounted raiders in earlier periods had typically been camel-born warriors such as the 
Midianites of the Judges era (see Judges 8).  But these were more mounted infantry 
than cavalry.  Midianite mounted warriors often fought dismounted as loose formation 
foot.  The diffusion of numbers of larger and stronger bred horses, specially bred as 
weapon systems, made raiding strategies even more effective.  Before the advent of 
sizeable forces of mounted warriors, the primacy of retreat over pursuit was already 
well established.  Now mounted raiders could carry out deeper raids into hostile 
territory and avoid battle nearly at will because of the raiders increased mobility.  
Moreover, raiding strategies lay well within the technical scope of the political 
entities under discussion.  The military potential of these states comprised primarily 
militias who were generally poorly equipped and insufficiently articulate to cope with 
more sophisticated ‘persisting strategies’ (i.e. large scale invasion and indefinite 
occupation of enemy territory), as practised by the greater powers such as Egypt and 
the various Mesopotamian powers. 
  
5.5.4. Logistical Factors: Season, Distances, Mustering and Volumes.   
The nature of a raiding operational strategy is such that it is practical in any season.  It 
was most effective against the typically agricultural economies of the day when 
launched just before harvest time.  Some writers have described such an operational 
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strategy as a ‘logistic strategy’ (Jones A, 1987:57-59).  The forces of King Saul would 
have been mainly foot soldiers.  From Gibeah to Zobah was about 260 km as the crow 
flies, about nine or ten days of hard marching for a group of foot warriors.  The 
Ammonite capital, Rabbah, lay some 68 km’s from Saul’s base of operations at 
Gibeah, about two to three days hard march for seasoned warriors.  The paucity of the 
biblical record dealing with Saul’s raiding strategy against his neighbours discourages 
serious research of the supplies aspect of the logistics involved.  The raiders aimed at 
sustaining themselves at the expense of the people or territory they raided.  
 
The anti-Saulide redaction of the Books of Samuel gives little credit to Israel’s first 
king for his use of military statecraft in establishing the secular kingdom of Israel.  
Such political achievements did not sit well with their prevailing religious 
conservatism.  A closer look at the logistics of Saul’s political achievements is helpful 
at this point.  During these approximately thirty years of hard campaigning the 
Israelite army’s military potential grew substantially, numbering about 33 000 in a 
general mustering.  Saul was the first to establish and maintain a ‘royal bodyguard’. 
They formed the professional nucleus around which the tribal levies could muster.  
The royal bodyguard numbered about 3000 soldiers and were divided into three 
companies.  This division was the standard formation of the Israelite army.  As seen at 
Geba, King Saul commanded two such divisions of foot soldiers while Jonathan the 
crown prince commanded the other, each company or division numbering 1000 foot 
soldiers.  Details regarding the mustering and organisation of the levies are unclear 
(Windrow, 1981:29). 
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5.5.5. Political Aftermath and Strategic Dialectics.   
The raiding operational strategy employed by Saul was well suited to realising the 
political goals of the newly founded Israelite monarchy.  Saul’s general strategy was 
to expand Israel’s sphere of political influence and to diminish the war potential of his 
enemies.  These raids were carried out mostly by Saul and his retainers.  Their success 
was in proportion to their own limited but steadily growing military potential.  While 
damaging to the political interests of Israel’s opponents, these raids did not have the 
capacity to do more than that.  The Transjordan states could not be dislodged from or 
be completely subjugated in their highly defendable home territories.  Israel would 
have to increase both her war and her military potential to accomplish such extensive 
political goals.  This was achieved by the Assyrians, drawing upon their remarkable 
military potential for campaigns in the region. 
 
Well-established regional powers such as Zobah of Aram inevitably clashed with the 
aspirant political goals of King Saul.  While Saul gained the advantage at this time, 
the war potential of this strong political opponent dictated that she would remain a 
political problem into the future.  Similarly, the Amalekites as a nomadic foe, could 
be hurt, but Israel’s military potential was still insufficient to eliminate them entirely.  
By the end of Saul’s reign Israel was politically positioned to emerge as the dominant 
regional power.  Saul’s nascent administration would have added to the war potential 
of Israel, the benefits being largely enjoyed by his successors.    
 
5.6. David as Renegade Warband Leader and Raids on Canaanites   
During the course of Saul’s campaigns discord arose between the king and David, an 
outstanding officer within the formers inner military circle.  David eventually fled the 
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king’s court and sought refuge in his tribal territory of Judah.  After placing his 
parents in Moab for their own safety, beyond the immediate reach of Saul, David 
secured himself at Adullam in the Shephelah.  Over time other political outcasts, 
malcontents, and opponents of King Saul joined David there and a substantial band of 
renegade warriors assembled under David’s political leadership.  Saul’s determination 
to capture David required that David be constantly on the move.  The political 
allegiance of the local population to King Saul denied David any opportunity for 
respite.  In due course it became necessary for David and his band to move beyond 
Saul’s sphere of political authority.  Thus David removed himself for security reasons 
to the Philistines and placed himself under the political authority of King Achish of 
Gath.  King Achish employed David and his band as raiders against Saul’s Israelite 
kingdom.  To this end they were assigned the Philistine village of Ziklag that lay 
between Philistia proper and the southern hill country of Israel. 
 
5.6.1. Military Potential of David’s Adullam Band. 
A cursory reading of 1 Samuel 23: 13 suggests that David’s small army had grown to 
about 600 strong at the time of the Keilah incident.  When Saul discovered David’s 
whereabouts he set about planning to entrap David with a besieging force.  Unsure of 
the trustworthiness of the residents of the town, David abandoned the town and led his 
men into the Wilderness of Ziph.  It is improbable that this band of warriors, 
numbering around 600 on the face value of the biblical text, could have supported 
themselves in the arid circumstances of the Wilderness of Ziff. 
 
Ziklag, some 20 km’s east-south-east of Achish, became David’s base of operations.  
From here he launched raids – allegedly against Israelite interests but in fact against 
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various persisting Canaanite settlements and strongholds further south.  False reports 
were fed to Achish who believed David had alienated himself from the Israelite 
population.  1 Samuel 30 contrarily observes that David in fact operated with his own 
general strategy in mind, the aim of which was in fact to foster loyalty to himself 
among the southern tribes.  Thereby David fostered a support base for his future claim 
to the Israelite throne.  This was accomplished operationally by providing protection 
to the southern tribes of Israel and to share with them the spoils of his raids against 
the Canaanites and Amalekites.    The political experience gained, together with the 
spoils of war, provided a steady increase to the war potential of David’s warband.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wilderness Region of Ziff and Ziklag 
(Map from Bimson et al, 1992: 35) 
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5.6.2. Military Potential of the Geshurites, Gezrites, and Amalekites. 
Like the Amalekites of the southern deserts, the Geshurites and the Gezrites of Syria 
in the north-east were nomadic peoples.  They moved around the fringes of the settled 
areas, occasionally raiding and plundering the local populations that they passed 
through.  Their military potential varied over the years and seasons.  That such 
nomadic raiders persisted throughout the history of the biblical lands points to their 
longevity as political entities.  Most times the status of all these nomadic groups was 
that of political irritant, at other times under unusual circumstances, they grew into a 
serious political menace such as the camel mounted Midianites that raided in large 
numbers during the period of the Judges (Gideon, c.1169 – 1129 B.C.E.).    
 
5.6.3. Technological Aspects: Operational Strategy and Tactical Factors. 
A signal advantage of a raiding operational strategy is that it allows smaller forces to 
concentrate against selected targets of opponents, even against opponents with larger 
war and potentials.  Exploiting the advantages of surprise and possessing the 
initiative, this is achievable because the raiders are not compelled to fight against 
forces of equal or superior strengths.  Thus the common practise of raiding strategies 
among the nomads and renegade groups such as David’s Adullam Band.  According 
to Clausewitz, there is no simpler nor higher law of strategy than that of keeping one’s 
forces concentrated (Clausewitz in Howard and Paret: 1976: 204).  The concentration 
of strength at the ‘decisive point’ is basic to success in warfare.  In the context of the 
raid, the decisive point is the village or settlement being plundered.  If the raider’s 
military potential is greater than the defences of the settlement, it generally follows 
that the raid will be successful, especially when combined with the tactical element of 
surprise.  Targets are thus carefully selected according to the military potential of the 
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raiders.  David’s band of 600 warriors would have been able to launch successful 
raids against most or all nomadic temporary settlements.     
   
5.6.4. Logistical Factors: Seasons, Distances, Mustering and Volumes.   
At Keilah it became clear to David that his safety was not assured as he moved among 
the towns and villages of the southern tribes.  David and his band of marauders were 
perceived in this instance as a liability rather than an asset in southern Israel.  A closer 
look at the practical aspects of logistics – an ever present reality of military force 
proper - will contribute to our understanding why this was so, even though David 
already enjoyed the status of a folk hero among these selfsame southern tribes.  
Consequently David was prompted to lead his Adullam Band out of Israel’s territory, 
establishing a new base of operations at Ziklag, ostensibly in the employ of Achish.  
David’s withdrawal relieved the small Israelite towns and villages of Judah of the 
increased burden of provisioning their own community needs, and furnishing supplies 
to the royal house, as well as to David’s steadily growing warband.   
 
The many small towns and villages scattered throughout Palestine and the nature of 
their agricultural limitations were governed by several logistical factors that may be 
induced here.  The growth of the town and later, the walled city was, inter alia, a by-
product of the development of surpluses in food production (cereal grasses 
especially).  Secondly, such sedentary patterns are evidence of man’s ever-increasing 
capacity not only to produce but also to artificially manipulate food and water storage.  
Also significant was the impersonal technology for data capturing and transmission of 
information in ever-increasing sophisticated writing and numbering systems.  Such 
sophistry was the price demanded for the successful establishment of urban 
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settlements.  During IA IIa however, these critical urban trends were still rudimentary 
in nature and the logistical capacity of these several small towns and villages was 
accordingly very limited, hence their characteristic plurality and small size.   
 
In the southern regions of Israel, including the Negev, which includes the so-called 
Wilderness of Zif, towns and villages were vulnerable to the ravages of drought, 
disease, and warfare.  Here the intemperate climate was unsuitable for food 
production because of low precipitation levels (about 100 mm’s per annum – half the 
minimum rainfall needed for effective crop production).  The margin for short-term 
recovery from crop failure or political setbacks was very low.  Under such trying 
agricultural circumstances it is easier to understand the local population’s ambivalent 
attitude toward David and the political feud Saul waged upon him and the high risk to 
anyone who gave support to him. To the itinerant marauding band, and to others who 
employed operational strategies such as raids, every urban settlement was a magazine 
for logistical purposes.  What Jones points out in general terms regarding logistics for 
an army in a given region also has bearing on a marauding-band such as David’s 
Adullum Band: “The ability of an army to be furnished with food in a given vicinity 
depended in part on the season of the year.  If a region was self-sufficient in food, an 
army could acquire by purchase or force what it needed from the stored food supplies.  
Immediately after a harvest, the army would have access to a year’s supply; just 
before a harvest the army would find the granaries empty; in the winter, halfway 
between harvests, the granaries would contain a six months’ supply” (Jones,1987:46).   
 
Regarding the agricultural capacity (entailing factors such as climate, human and 
natural resources, and the degree of scientifically developed agricultural methods) and 
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the actual agricultural yields within the territory concerned, several factors combine to 
determine total logistical volumes in the region.  The presence of soldiers was a dire 
situation for settlers, especially so in difficult geographic conditions.  Jones expounds 
further: “The ratio of the size of the army to the population of its area of concentration 
also affected the army’s ability to feed itself.  If the ratio were one soldier per civilian, 
then the soldiers could subsist as long as the civilians, assuming the soldiers deprived 
the civilians of everything.  If there were ten soldiers per civilian, the soldiers could 
exist one-tenth as long as the civilians” (1987:47).  Jones illustrates this with an 
example; “...if the army reached a region 180 days prior to harvest and it outnumbered 
the civilians 10 to one, (bear in mind the smallness of the Syro-Palestinian villages 
and David’s ever-increasing Adullum band) it could remain for 18 days before it must 
move, assuming it found all of the available food, denied any of it to the civilians, and 
then left them destitute upon departure” (1987:47).  The political dynamics that 
motivated David to remove to Philistine territory are better understood when viewed 
in the context of logistics outlined above.  
 
5.6.5. Political Aftermath and Strategic Dialectics.   
David’s goal of succeeding to Israel’s throne remained his principal ambition and his 
actions in this episode were geared to achieving that.  Besides divine approbation, 
which Samuel had already confirmed by this stage (1 Samuel 16: 13), the law of 
common consent or popular acclamation was a key factor that David had to factor into 
his general political strategy.   Rather than provoke a negative reaction and 
confrontation born of overburdening Israel’s agrarian peasantry, David chose to 
employ a new stratagem.  Under the guise of an anti-Saulide marauding band, David 
would draw from the logistical resources of the Philistines to sustain his Adullam 
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band.  Furthermore, he would promote his political claim by simultaneously attacking 
political entities in the region that were hostile to the Israelite settlers, deceiving the 
still powerful Philistines into believing that the Israelite threat was being dealt with, 
and by winning the hearts and minds of the Israelites by distributing among them the 
spoils he gained from his raids. 
 
This period also provided David with the opportunity to gather to him an experienced, 
capable, and loyal inner-circle of officers who were well tried and tested.   The 
officers of his Adullam warband would in time also become the chief officers and 
personal retinue of David when he succeeded Saul.  These men became David’s 
proven officers and remained loyal to him throughout their lives.  Many held senior 
political offices after David’s accession to the throne (Miller and Hayes, 1986:186). 
 
Destructive raids were a substitute for the king’s victories in the field of battle.  These 
victories served as David’s political credentials in the eyes of the people.   David’s 
raids against hostile nomadic forces were clearly part of his general strategy that 
aimed at winning the minds and hearts of the Israelites.  It obviated the danger of 
raids from these nomads on Israelite settlements and brought material benefits to 
many of the Israelite settlers as well.  This was the de facto preordained task and 
stewardship of Israel’s monarch.  Originally, Saul had won support and justification 
for his claim to the throne at Jabesh in Gilead and through his several battles 
thereafter.  The objective of David’s general strategy was not lost on Saul or Israel in 
general. 
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5.7. King Saul’s Final Battle at Mount Gilboa [1010 B.C.E.]. 
The pursuit of political dominance in the region brought Israel head to head with yet 
another large force of the confederated Philistine city-states in 1010 B.C.E.  Saul’s 
several military successes allowed the Israelite tribes to spill over into the richer 
lowland agricultural areas from earlier Canaanite communities.  Prized among these 
was the Jezreel Valley, a region of agrarian wealth into which the Manassites had 
begun to encroach.  The Plain of Jezreel was one of utmost importance to 
communications between the coast and the countries to the north and east.  Its 
strategic and economic value made it a bone of contention between several rulers - 
including the traditional great powers of the Near East.  The Jezreel Valley below 
Mount Gilboa became the site of several battles over the ages.  It was the granary of 
Palestine in ancient times (Negev, 1972: 173).  The Philistines understood full well 
the dire consequences to their war potential if the Jezreel Valley slipped from their 
sphere of influence.   
 
5.7.1. Military Potential of King Saul’s Army at Mount Gilboa.   
The presence of the king’s military retainers, Jonathan the heir apparent and two other 
princes, and the large mustering of Israel’s militia all point to Israel’s fullest possible 
military potential being deployed for battle against their IA IIa arch-enemy the 
Philistines.  Owing to the critical importance of this battle, the Philistine leaders’ 
preferred to not have David and his band present (still a Philistine vassal at this stage) 
for fear of possible collusion with the Israelite enemy during the forthcoming battle (1 
Chronicles11: 19).  It suggests that not withstanding the Philistines superior military 
potential the large Israelite host was not to be taken lightly. 
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5.7.2. Military Potential of the Philistine Force at Mount Gilboa. 
The Philistine forces were deployed en masse.  Large phalanxes of armoured, spear-
armed close formation foot comprised the bulk of the Philistine forces.  Philistine 
chariots would have played a key role, probably serving as shock troops in accord 
with the Philistine battle-plan.  The gentle terrain suited the employment of these 
weapon systems.  2 Samuel 1: 6 mentions Philistine horsemen fighting in conjunction 
with the chariots.  If this passage is correctly rendered such early period cavalry 
would have played a supporting role to the chariot arm, guarding the vulnerable flanks 
of the chariots and exploiting confusion amongst the enemy once the chariots broke 
through the enemy battle-line.  The Philistines also employed archers to good effect 
during the battle.  The text reports Saul was badly wounded by Philistine archers and 
had to withdraw from the battle as a result (1 Samuel 31: 3).  While the various troop 
types are broadly identified and the forces involved were numerous, no specific 
numbers are given in the books of Samuel or Chronicles. 
   
5.7.3. Technological Aspects: Operational Strategy and Tactical Factors.   
Mount Gilboa lies on the southern end of the Plain of Esdraelon as the Greeks later 
renamed it.  This gentle valley is one of the most blood-soaked of all the world’s 
battlefields having witnessed the battles of many of the great powers of the world 
since early antiquity right through to the modern era.  Moving northwards along the 
‘Way of the Sea’, the ancient highway enters the Jezreel valley.  At the entrance to the 
valley stood the flourishing settlement Megiddo, which translated from Hebrew aptly 
means ‘the place of troops’ (Church Educational System.  Old Testament Student 
Manual, Rel.302, 1981:291).  The superior war potential of the confederate Philistine 
forces would have been easily deployed here with no inhibiting terrain for their close 
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formation foot and their chariot corps.  The more lightly armoured Israelites would 
have been hard pressed to withstand the Philistines in such open terrain.  
 
 The advantage of tactical surprise, often a feature of Israel’s operational strategy 
against more powerful enemy armies and previously applied to great effect in broken 
terrain, could not be counted on in the Plain of Esdraelon.  The Philistine commanders 
planned for a direct, heavy frontal assault on the lighter enemy, their forces well 
suited to such an attack.  Philistine archers were present in the open terrain to support 
the attack.  Most of the tactical advantages accrued to the Philistines on the Plain of 
Esdraelon.  Philistine weapon systems, such as archery, close formation foot in spear 
armed phalanxes, prototype cavalry and chariotry all without exception achieved 
optimal tactical results in fine weather, which appears to have occurred on the day of 
battle.  The Israelites, assumed inferior in arms and armour, and would thus have 
fought mainly as loose formation foot.  Bad weather and broken terrain would have 
given the Israelite troop types at least some advantage, but such was not the case. 
  
5.7.4. Logistical Factors: Seasons, Distances, Mustering, and Volumes.   
No indication is given of inclement weather that complicated the tactical factors of the 
battle.  The outcome of the battle in favour of the Philistines supports the case for fine 
and temperate weather on the day.  Strong wind would have adversely affected 
Philistine archery and rain would have severely curtailed the effectiveness of their 
chariots.  Temperate and dry seasons spanned the months from mid April to early 
September or ‘Iyyar’ to ‘Elul’ on the Hebrew calendar (Bimson et al. 1992: 64). The 
distances to the Plain of Esdraelon from the main Philistine regions, such as Gaza 
furthest south (approximately 150 km’s), and Gath to the north (approximately 90 
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km’s), could not be covered in less than a week to ten days of marching.  The 
mustering of these confederate forces would include their organising into units under 
local and overall commands.  For the Israelites Saul’s greatest support base still lay in 
the south among the tribe of Benjamin.  But the scale of the political setback for all of 
Israel suggests that the mustering extended to all the tribal yeomanry, including the 
northern tribes.  It is not possible to give accurate data on the volumes of food and 
water needed to support these large forces.  The Jezreel valley was significant for its 
agricultural richness.  The timing of the campaign would have considered the 
availability of food for harvesting which also points to the early summer months.  The 
cereal crops would have been only recently harvested and still available to a large 
invading army.  Such cereal crops could be further supplemented by the early fig and 
grape harvests.  The ensuing Philistine victory would have allowed the victors to 
further discomfort the vanquished Israelites by denying them their food stocks already 
harvested or still maturing in the Jezreel Valley.  The months of May and June (‘Sivan 
and Tammuz’) would be a worthy guess for the Philistine invasion that culminated in 
the Battle of Mount Gilboa. 
 
5.7.5. Political Aftermath and Political Dialectics.   
The fortified city Megiddo was established to protect a key trade route and political 
lines of communication.  Trade caravans from or to Egypt plied their way along this 
route through Philistia.  Aside from the obvious economic advantages regained by the 
Philistine cities in securing this line of communication, Saul’s young Kingdom of 
Israel was thrown into serious political disarray.  The continuance of the Israelite 
monarchy was not assured after the disaster at Mount Gilboa.  All the political and 
territorial gains that Saul’s vigorous campaigning had secured appeared to be lost.  
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Domestic political anarchy threatened to engulf Israel and to minimise her remaining 
war potential.  David took advantage of the ensuing political turmoil to make his bid 
for the throne.  The newly founded kingdom threatened to cleave along northern and 
southern tribal lines.  Saul’s surviving son Ish-Bosheth, spurred on by leading 
political actors such as Abner, laid claim to kingship over Gilead, the Ashurites, 
Jezreel, Ephraim, Benjamin and all Israel (2 Samuel 2: 2).  Factional fighting between 
the Saulide supporters and those that supported the house of David was drawn out 
over a number of years, eroding further the military potential that had served Saul’s 
United Monarchy.  Philistine political gains continued in this period of political chaos 
for Israel, including regained control over the Central Hill Country.              
 
5.8. Civil War between the House of Late King Saul and House of King David [1010 
– 1003 BCE]. 
During the political upheaval in Israel following the Battle of Gilboa David moved to 
Hebron in the territory of his native tribe Judah.  Here he was crowned at the age of 
30 by his fellow tribesmen as their king.  Hebron became the Adullam Band’s base of 
operations for the next seven years.  Ostensibly still in the employ of Achish of Gath, 
David’s removal from Achish to Hebron appeared to consolidate Philistine control 
over southern Israel.  In time David’s true political objectives became manifest.  
David was exercising direct political control through the Adullam Band over southern 
Israel in his own name.  This was a political balancing act: on the one hand David had 
to bide his time with the Philistines who in the post-Gilboa period were politically 
dominant in the region again.  On the other hand, he had to deal with the remnants of 
the house of Saul in the persons of Ish-Bosheth and Abner while avoiding the trap of a 
political objective beyond the capacity of the military force currently at his disposal. 
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5.8.1. Military Potential of the House of Saul.   
Ish-bosheth largely inherited the political structure and systems established by his 
father Saul.  The negative impact of the Battle of Mount Gilboa had seriously 
impaired the Israelite kingdom’s military potential.  The pro-Davidic slant of the 
Books of Samuel is largely silent in their detailing of the chaos that existed during this 
seven year interregnum of Israelite Monarchical history, further eroding the military 
potential of the House of Saul.  The seven year long war of attrition with David 
suggests that neither side had the military potential to force a decisive result.  Little 
information is given of the composition of the opposing forces of King Ish-bosheth 
and David other than to point out that David’s forces grew stronger while Ish-
bosheth’s forces grew weaker (2 Samuel 3: 1).  Little remained of Saul’s veteran 
standing army with its attendant officers.  Replacements of a lower calibre and 
inexperienced officers must have been drafted into Abner’s rebuilt army.   
 
5.8.2. Military Potential of the House of David.   
David’s warband relocated from Ziklag to Hebron.  This relocation was only 
belatedly understood by the Philistines and by then Israel’s crippling civil war was 
over.  At the outset of the war between the two contending royal houses, David was 
still seen by the Philistines as a vassal warlord.  This allowed him to operate his 
growing warband with the advantage of not dividing his military potential between 
several fronts.  David’s own seasoned veterans had been spared from the slaughter of 
the Battle of Mount Gilboa.  This tough nucleus of warriors, the original so-called 
‘Thirty’ had grown into the Adullam Band of 600 warriors.  It had continued to 
expand as more and more Israelite became disillusioned with Saul’s autocratic 
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leadership toward the end of his reign.  As the civil war drew to a close this band of 
veterans had evolved into the equivalent of a royal bodyguard of elite warriors.    
 
5.8.3. Technological Aspects: Operational Strategy and Tactical Factors. 
Typical of many low intensity wars, a significant amount of ‘behind the scenes 
politicking’ was taking place.  The political struggle manifest itself on the battlefield 
in the form of low-level skirmishes and raids.  For security reasons Ish-bosheth 
transferred his court from Gibeon in the tribal areas of Ephraim and Benjamin further 
to the east to beyond the easy reach of their raiding parties.  For the remainder of his 
reign Ish-bosheth administered Saul’s steadily diminishing kingdom from Mahanaim 
among the Gileadites who were always loyal to his father’s house.   That the civil war 
dragged on for seven years attests to the correctness of this action, though ultimately 
the war was lost as David grew in favour with the people and the elders of Israel, 
culminating in his anointing as king over all Israel soon after the assassination of Ish-
bosheth in c.1003 BCE. 
 
5.8.4. Logistical Factors: Seasons, Distances, Mustering and Volumes 
The only recorded ‘battle’ recorded during this period took place at Gibeon which lies 
inside the tribal lands of Benjamin, Ish-bosheth’s home territory.  The site lay about 
53 km north of Hebron.  It appears that David’s forces were on the offensive and were 
maintaining the initiative.  The outcome of the battle, even allowing for pro-Davidic 
redactive influence, reflects a micro incident of the overall trend of the civil war.  The 
many Benjaminites who fell during the battle indicate in a convoluted manner the 
persisting loyalty of the tribe to their monarch and the direction the civil was heading.   
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5.8.5.  Political Aftermath and Strategic Dialectics.   
The weakening of Ish-bosheth’s political position resulted from having to deploy a 
reduced and damaged military potential on at least two fronts.  David’s military 
actions against Ish–bosheth were viewed by the Philistines as a continuation of his 
warband raids against Israel, a perception they were duped into holding ever since 
David was based at Ziklag.  The Saulide military task lay beyond the scope of 
resources at hand, it was politically unrealistic and with no prospect of changes in the 
regional political landscape the seasoned Abner realised sooner than his young naive 
sovereign that the logical conclusion could only be eventual defeat.  The longer the 
civil war continued, the greater the damage to Israel’s total war potential.  Israel 
would still have to face several implacable regional enemies besides the Philistines.   
 
During the civil war Ish-bosheth had to literally fight on multiple fronts; against a 
powerful Philistine raiding operational strategy from the west and north, and against 
David’s undermining forces from the south (2 Samuel 2: 12 – 32).  The Transjordan 
region was also hostile to the house of Saul, recalling how David had left his parents 
with the Moabites for their protection from Saul.  David also politically 
outmanoeuvred Ish-bosheth by forming an alliance with Saul’s old enemy King 
Nahash of Ammon.    In piecemeal fashion, David won over the support base of 
Saul’s house.  The battle at Gibeon, if David did indeed have the initiative to choose 
the battle site, may reflect his general strategy of dislocating the House of Saul from 
its traditional support base.  By the time Abner entered into direct negotiations with 
David, only a small remnant of Saul’s kingdom remained.  The civil war was abruptly 
concluded when both Abner and Ish-bosheth were assassinated (Miller and Hayes, 
1986:169). 
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5.9. The Reign of King David, 1011 / 1010 – 971 / 970 B.C.E. 
Diplomacy, military statecraft, and respect for the Abrahamic covenant by which he 
retained divine approbation and the support of the charismatic prophets were the 
principle means David employed to consolidate and expand the small kingdom he 
received from King Saul.  The first years of David’s reign were a struggle for survival 
against the Philistines and other hostile Near Eastern contemporary kingdoms.  Like 
other even greater political powers before and after his reign, these wars for survival 
evolved into wars of foreign conquest that aimed initially at security but in time 
evolved into campaigns of foreign conquest.  At its zenith David’s kingdom stretched 
from the Gulf of Aqabah and the border of Egypt to the upper Euphrates in the land of 
Aram to the north.  Economic security was also a key factor within the scope of 
David’s general strategy, providing depth to Davidic Israel’s war potential.  David’s 
campaigns had won access to and retained control of important east – west trade 
routes, bazaars, and commercial centres (Bimson et al, 1992: 42). 
 
David’s original retainers were known as ‘The Thirty’.  During his renegade years the 
‘Thirty’ expanded into the Adullam Band, numbering about 600.  Following the death 
of Saul and his move to Hebron in southern Judah, David recruited a second band.  
These two units formed David’s own royal guard.  David’s top military and his 
political inner circle were all drawn from his long time comrades of ‘The Thirty’.  
Regulations, promotions, and political appointments were decided upon by this inner 
circle.  Even the field commanders of the tribal militia were drawn from ‘The Thirty’.  
The Israelites of the royal guard formed a regular corps known as the ‘gibborim’ or 
mighty men.  Drawing upon his experience and associations as a mercenary 
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commander in Philistine service while based at Ziklag, King David raised a second 
regular corps from outside of the United Monarchy.  This second corps comprised 
mostly Philistines from Gath, some 600 ‘Gittites’ in all.  This second regular corps 
also included Cherethites and Pelethites who lived as neighbouring Sea Peoples to the 
Philistines in the southern Levant.  The Cherethites were originally natives of Crete 
and the Pelethites passed through Crete as part of the Sea People migration to the 
Eastern Mediterranean (The New Bible Dictionary … 1974, s.v. ‘Cherethites’).  This 
mercenary corps was used to deal with internal clashes and rendered extensive and 
loyal service during Absalom’s rebellion.  The mercenary corps was commanded by 
Benaiah ben Jehoida with the Gittite Ittai as the second in command. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
David’s Kingdom. 
(Map from Bimsom et al, 1992: 42) 
During his entire reign, David’s entrusted field command of the army to the very 
capable generalship of Joab.  At the time David ascended the United Monarchy’s 
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throne, the army was almost entirely composed of loose formation spear armed foot, 
well suited to fighting in the broken terrain of Palestine.  This main core of the Early 
Hebrew army was supported by javelin, sling, and bow armed light troops.  It should 
be remembered that the Hebrews had only in recent years begun to make inroads into 
the lowlands and plains and that their fighting formations were undergoing changes 
very gradually.  Captured chariots of the two-horse type and some early proto-type 
unarmoured cavalry began to feature in this expanding regular army.  1 Chronicles 18: 
3 – 4 records that after defeating the Aramaean king Hadadezer, some 7000 horses 
and 100 chariots were captured.  Chariots were a common arm in the arsenals of the 
Philistines, Canaanites and the Aramaeans.   
 
King David imposed a complex system of national service for every able-bodied man 
over the age of 20 years throughout Israel.  Thus the bulk of the Israelite army was its 
tribal levies.  The parochialism of tribal levies was effectively countered by David by 
mustering men from all tribes (except the Levites) into the same corps.  Their loyalty 
was firstly to the person of the King now, rather than to Israel.  This occurrence of 
change in basic allegiance and tactical adaptation presages the Roman experience in 
the transitory period of Marius to Augustus (c.105 BCE – 25 BCE) during which the 
republic succumbed to imperialism.  The motivation in both political case histories 
was the search for greater war and military potentials.  The common man of both 
states had originally been a yeoman, beset with great personal difficulty in rendering 
more and more military service as a conscript within republican regimes.  The pursuit 
of greater war potentials demanded more commoners be permanently called to arms 
to realise the greater political goals through the instrument of military statecraft. 
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Accordingly, during King David’s reign twelve militia brigades were constituted, 
each totalling 24 000 men.  Such brigades were further divided into large and smaller 
subunits; each had 12 battalions numbering 1000 soldiers, and smaller units of 100’s, 
50’s, and tens.  These subunits mustered troops according to their fighting style and 
weapon specialisation.  1 Chronicles 12 broadly outlines these specialisations; 
Benjaminites showed particular aptitude in the close range ballistic support (slings 
and bows) i.e. ‘psiloi’ specialists, acting in concert with the heavier troops.  Gad, 
Reuben and half of Manasseh was sword and buckler armed and excelled as melee 
specialists, with some aptitude for archery.  Zebulon showed expertise in close 
formation fighting, being able to fight effectively in closed ranks such as in spear 
armed phalanxes.  Issachar showed a particular propensity as raiders and scouts – 
perhaps recalling their long experience with persisting strong enemy settlements in 
their tribal homeland in the lush Jezreel Valley.  The priestly Levites with their 
religious zeal made for especially reliable troops for guarding unstable border areas. 
Each brigade was assigned its own calendar month for active service, the other eleven 
forming an active reserve and still pursuing their civilian livelihoods.  Thus the full 
mustering of levies was 12 x 24 000 which totalled 288 000.  1 Chronicles 27: 1 -21 
lists the field officers of the levy, identifying Amasa ben Jeter at the commanding 
officer of the entire levy.  In David’s time Israel’s sphere of political control and 
influence extended far beyond the original borders of Saul’s early kingdom.  The 
extent of Israel’s military potential during IA IIa expanded to allow them to deploy 
confidently on any terrain, including the open terrain that had formerly advantaged 
the chariot based armies of their erstwhile technically superior enemies. 
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5.10. King David Attacks the Canaanite Stronghold Jebus [c.1001 BCE.]. 
 
Hebron, the principal city of IA I Judah was poorly sited as a future capital for a 
united Israel.  By contrast Jerusalem was sited on excellent natural defences, had 
never been allocated to any tribe and thus did not provoke the provincialism 
problem among the tribes.  Roads approached Jerusalem from several directions 
and it lay fairly close to the major trade routes and highways that networked the 
region.  Limited water supply in the surrounding limestone hills would prove 
difficult to future enemy besieging forces yet its inhabitants could access a natural 
spring nearby.  Investing this Canaanite stronghold without incurring a Pyrrhic 
victory was the tactical puzzle that David and his commanders had to unravel. 
 
5.10.1. Military Potential of the Jebusites. 
The site of Canaanite Jerusalem was very strategically sited in terms of topography 
and proximity to the trade routes.  Jebus, as it was named prior to David’s investing it, 
was a Canaanite enclave and had withstood all of Israel’s earlier attempts to take it by 
force of arms, including efforts by the highly acclaimed Joshua (Judges 1: 8).  At best 
some of the city precincts which lay outside the city-walls were successfully invested 
and some Benjamites had been settled there (Judges 1: 21).   The city was not large at 
this time but its defence value was significant, mainly due to its location in the Judean 
hills.  It was a citadel, a fortified village surrounded by deep ravines on three sides.  
That its defenders had become complacent regarding their security reflects something 
of the strength of this citadel (The New Bible Dictionary…1974, s.v. ‘Jerusalem’). 
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5.10.2. Military Potential of King David’s Assault Force. 
A major portion of David’s force was employed in a decoy siege against the Jebusites.  
While David was directing the siege, his trusted lieutenant Joab with a picked force of 
warriors penetrated Jebus’ defensive walls.   Scholars debate the means by which Joab 
actually gained access to the fortress.  The popular view is that the Hebrew word 
sinnôr, which means ‘watershaft’ (2 Samuel 5: 6 - 10), refers to a watershaft by 
which means David’s men entered the city, i.e. Warren’s shaft on the E side of Ophel 
Hill.  Alternatively, Albright showed that the term sinnôr was in fact a Canaanite 
word meaning ‘grappling iron’ or ‘hook’ which suggests that the conquering Israelites 
actually scaled the walls to conquer Jebus (The New International Dictionary of 
Biblical Archaeology....1983 s.v. ‘Jerusalem, Old Testament’).  Whichever is correct, 
this daring attack was successful and the Canaanite enclave became a new Israelite 
possession.   
 
5.10.3. Technological Aspects: Operational Strategy and Tactical Factors 
Jerusalem continues to frustrate archaeological efforts to filter its occupational history 
for various reasons, inter alia the fact that its site has been continuously occupied for 
more than 40 centuries.  Scholarly estimates of its precincts at the time of King David 
generally limit its walled-in area to the southern spur of Ophel Hill.  The noteworthy 
natural defences included the Himnon Valley on the south and west, and the Kidron 
Valley on the east side.  Only the northern flank was without natural defences, and 
man-made defences compensated for this.  The rough plateau on which Jerusalem was 
located is about 762 m above sea level and the ravines around it were even deeper at 
the time of King David, bearing in mind how centuries of rubble and debris have been 
dumped into these ravines.      
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5.10.4. Logistical Factors: Seasons, Distances, Mustering, and Volumes 
In this early period it must be noted that the purpose of fortifications in the Bronze 
and early Iron Ages was not related to general strategy or to complex offensive or 
defensive strategies such as the Maginot Line between France and an aggressive and 
resurgent post World War One Germany.  Such thinking would be anachronistic.  
Ancient fortifications served simply to amplify the defence value of the given 
domestic settlement.  The invasions of antiquity were stringently governed by the 
periodic nature of seasons.  Such military statecraft lacked the advantages of logistical 
sophistry now available to military commanders of the modern era.  Thus the ancient 
inhabitants of Jebus, Athens, Carthage or Byzantium could retire behind their strong 
walls and wait for the tyranny of logistics to impose its relentless and impartial will 
on the undersupplied belligerents without the city’s walls.  As Clausewitz stated it: 
“By their fortifications, towns sought to ward off the storm clouds of war” (in Howard 
and Peret [eds.], 1976: 393].  In that the warriors from settlements had the benefit of a 
permanent refuge, they also could impose their political will to a disproportionate 
scale in the region.  They could sally out and operate against the interests of their 
enemies and then retreat to the security of their fortification.  Such fortifications 
promote the scope for hostile action. Such military architecture multiplies the defence 
capacity of even small urban settlements to a disproportionate value (The New Bible 
Dictionary…1974, s.v. ‘Fortification and Siegecraft’).   
 
Thus Jebus still existed after the Israelite invasions of Joshua, the reign of the Israelite 
‘judges’, and King Saul.  Notwithstanding the tactical superiority of David’s veterans 
and the superiority of Israel’s military potential, a fortress such as Jebus has a serious 
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debilitating effect on these notable enemy strengths.  Even the weak and the poorly 
trained can stand up to a superior foe when fighting from within the tactical 
amplification of a fortification. 
 
5.10.5. Political Aftermath and Strategic Dialectics 
Rather than posing a serious political threat to the Israelites, Jerusalem offered King 
David a means for unifying the still parochial Israelite tribes.  The new capital was an 
instrument of domestic diplomacy; well sited between the northern and the southern 
tribes and not a city of any given tribe.  This served King David’s nation-state 
building ambitions very well.  At a later date David transferred Israel’s principal 
cultic object, the Ark of the Covenant from Shiloh to Jerusalem, further cementing his 
relationship with the all-important Levitical priesthood leadership.  Jerusalem was not 
only to be the political capital for the united monarchical state of Israel it was to be 
the religious capital as well (Miller and Hayes, 1986:171).  Such increased national 
cohesiveness added immense strength to the war potential of the state.  The conquest 
of Jerusalem constituted one of the most important political acts of David’s career.  
His penetration of the city’s defences yielded an undamaged political asset with no 
costly expense in military potential in the face of many hostile neighbours.  
 
5.11. King David’s Defence Against Philistine Forays at Nahal Rephaim  
Since the Battle of Mount Gilboa the Philistines had reasserted their political 
dominance over the Kingdom of Israel.  David had been a Philistine vassal 
commander of a military band and had acted under the hegemonic leadership of King 
Achish of Gath.  The Battle of Mount Gilboa had plunged Israel into serious political 
disarray.  The internecine fighting between those still loyal to the House of Saul, 
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represented by Ish-bosheth and those loyal to David had dragged on for around seven 
years.  Still the Philistines recognised no change in David’s vassal status, perceiving 
him as fighting a war of attrition against the Israelite enemy who had been the bane 
of Philistine political ambitions in the region.  Too late did they recognise David’s 
actual personal political ambitions.  His political manoeuvring had by the end of the 
Israelite civil war produced an Israelite military potential that surpassed what the 
Philistines had previously fought during Saul’s reign.  The Philistine’s responded 
promptly to arrest this strategic development by despatching powerful raiding forces 
against Israel’s new centre of political consolidation (2 Samuel 5: 6 – 25).  
 
5.11.1. Military Potential of the Philistine Raiding Force 
The core fighting units of Philistine forces were armoured spearmen, reminiscent of 
their Aegean roots.  More lightly equipped auxiliaries supported these proto-type 
hoplites in the field.  Common to most Syro-Palestine armies of Iron Age II were 
chariots but it is unlikely that such a troop-type would have been taken into broken 
terrain such as the Sorek Valley system where their tactical effectiveness would be 
largely nullified.  Little tactical for-thought appears evident on the part of the 
Philistines in their preparation for this punitive expedition.  Notwithstanding the 
tactical disadvantages of the rugged terrain, the Sorek Valley led directly from 
Philistia to the new Israelite capital now renamed Jerusalem.  The Philistines may 
have assumed that the appearance of a large raiding force would send the civil war 
weary Israelites scurrying for cover, as had been the case in the intervening years 
since the Battle of Mount Gilboa. 
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5.11.2. Military Potential of King David’s Defence 
The basis of Israel’s new military potential was a reunited Israel, with a hardened 
core of loyal regulars, well-equipped and experienced under David’s skilful political 
and military leadership.  The political pendulum had begun to swing emphatically 
back in favour of Israel and the proverbial writing was on the wall for the city states 
of Philistia although this would only become clear in the evolutionary passage of 
time.  The biblical text gives no breakdown of the Israelite forces in either of the two 
clashes in the valley of Rephaim.  From David’s ambush tactics in difficult terrain, it 
is evident that Israel’s typical loose formation foot formed the fighting nucleus.  
 
5.11.3. Technological Aspects: Operational Strategy and Tactical Factors 
The influence of the terrain and the effects of surprise must have been major tactical 
factors in the outcome of this battle.  To a well-seasoned campaigner’s eye the 
Rephaim Valley or Nahal Rephaim was ideal terrain for taking on more heavily 
armoured troops equipped as hoplites.  To be effective armoured spearmen must fight 
in close formation.  Unbroken terrain, such as found in the Jezreel Valley in the 
vicinity of Mount Gilboa optimises their tactical effectiveness.  The rugged terrain of 
the Hill Country of Judah was the ideal place to successfully attack close formation 
troop types such as the Philistine spearmen.  David had worked in close proximity to 
Philistine forces during his exile and was well familiarised with their typical order of 
battle.   
 
Such terrain setting has been the preferred choice of commanders of tactically weaker 
forces.  Terrain is the ‘great equaliser’ in battles.  It significantly improves the 
prospects for inferior military forces against stronger opponents.  Repeatedly Israel’s 
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military commanders resorted to the terrain factor to even the tactical odds against 
them.   1100 years later (AD 132) the Second Revolt against Imperial Rome irrupted 
under Simon Bar Kochba’s patriotic leadership and Nahal Rephaim was again the 
well chosen site of Israelite fighting against enemy invaders (Reader’s Digest, 1981.  
Atlas of the Bible: 203).  The more lightly armed fighters, fighting in a looser 
formation, could effectively employ hit-and-run ambush tactics against their 
encumbered infantry opponents in such rough terrain. These factors considered 
together with heightened morale from recent military and diplomatic successes, and 
under David’s capable generalship and familiarity of the enemy and the battlefield 
site, produced very positive and significant military results.   
 
5.11.4. Logistical Factors: Seasons, Distances, Mustering, and Volumes. 
The small distances in the region between Judea and Philistia and the anticipated 
brevity of such a raid suggest that the logistic aspect had little bearing on this clash.  
There is no reference to weather, season, or mustering of the forces, other than the 
Philistine raiding operational strategy included large forces (2 Samuel 15: 5).  The 
distance to be covered between Ashkelon and Jerusalem was about 66 km’s and from 
Gath further north, about 48 km’s - within three days march for the Philistine foot.  
 
5.11.5. Political Aftermath and Strategic Dialectics 
The formal coronation of David as king of a re-united Israel with international 
recognition by at least one neighbouring city-state (King Hiram of Tyre, 2 Sam. 5: 11) 
left the Philistines in no doubt of David’s new status.  As king of Israel his regal duty 
centred upon the defence of Israel.  David’s political ambitions were now laid bare at 
the chagrin of the Philistines.  The latter lost no time in attempting to remedy this 
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development that threatened their political pre-eminence in the region.  Although the 
Deuteronomistic historian treats the details very lightly, the full weight of this 
confrontation and the political threat the reunification of Israel posed to Philistine 
interests in the region is alluded to by the writer’s reference to “...all the Philistines 
came up to seek David”...(2 Samuel 5: 17).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nehal Refaim, site of David’s ambush of the Philistine Punitive expedition. 
(photograph from Bible Lands, 1986: Judaean Hill Country, J1-4).  
  
Asiatic warfare, as a general strategy, placed a high premium upon the destruction of 
the opposition king or leader.  The death of David would have swiftly returned Israel 
to the chaos that followed Saul’s last battle at Mount Gilboa.  All of David’s political 
initiatives would have come to nought.  Notwithstanding the correctness of their 
general strategy, the tactical situation that David forced upon them by attacking them 
in Nahal Rephaim reduced their operational strategy to failure.  Philistine persistence 
in a subsequent attack fared no better.  Ironically, like Saul, David too had publicly 
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demonstrated divine affirmation of his claim to Israel’s throne by routing the arch 
enemy of the early United Monarchy.  There was little room for rival claimants after 
David had restored Israel’s security and demonstrated his fitness for kingship. 
 
5.12. Resurgent Israel’s Political Expansion in Syro-Palestine [1000 BCE – 955 BCE] 
David set about consolidating the home front.  The domestic consolidation included 
the establishment of Jerusalem as the religious capital of the state.  The Ark of the 
Covenant was transferred to Jerusalem from Shiloh.  Deference was shown to the 
priesthood officers and David demonstrated his own submission to Yahweh by the 
appropriate offering of sacrifices and invoking divine sanction for the state and for his 
political role within it.  In all the political activity of these campaigns, David was 
careful to observe both the spirit and the letter of the covenant (2 Samuel 7 and 8).  
Beyond Israel’s territory there was little agreement between the regional political 
entities as to what were the relative strengths between them and King David’s Israel.  
These campaigns record the tests of relative political strengths within the Syro-
Palestinian region (Miller and Hayes, 1986: 180 – 185). 
 
5.12.1. Military Potential of King David’s Campaign Forces.  
The forces David employed in these campaigns would have varied considerably 
according to the enemy’s military potential, specific logistical factors such as distance 
and season, and the political priority attached to such a campaign.  David’s campaigns 
to extend the frontiers and security of Israel spanned many years, sometimes drawing 
only lightly on Israel’s war potential and in other instances very heavily.  Against the 
Edomites southwest of the Dead Sea, 1 Kings 11: 15 – 16 states that David’s 
commander in chief Joab, and all Israel, campaigned for no less that six months in the 
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territory of Edom, laying utter waste to their war potential.  One can make an 
educated guess that David’s royal guard remained on active duty throughout the 
campaign, supported by at least one or two brigades of militia every month in accord 
with the established military national service regime outlined in 5.9 above. 
 
5.12.2. Military Potential of Israel’s Enemies in Syro-Palestinian. 
Philistines (west), Moabites (east), Ammonites (east), Aramaeans (north), Edomites 
(southeast).  That the Philistines were in political decline comes as an after-sight and 
reminds us of the adage that nothing conquers so thoroughly as culture.  The earlier 
military advantages enjoyed by the Philistines had been incrementally lost over the 
previous three to four centuries as neighbouring peoples had gradually acquired the 
Philistine’s technical skills in iron working.  Their long-standing reputation of 
military prowess and their huge military potential still however posed a significant 
military threat for Israel. 
   
The Moabite-Israelite relationship soured and David subjugated them, putting large 
numbers to death.  Thereafter the Moabites became tribute-paying vassals of Israel 
until after Solomon’s death (2 Samuel 8: 2). 
 
 The Aramaeans (later known to us as Syrians) at the time of the United Monarchy 
were a collection of feuding petty kingdoms.  The kingdoms of Damascus and Zobah 
were cursorily reduced by David to vassal status and brought under Israelite control (2 
Sam.8: 3 - 8).  Hadadezer of Zobah allegedly lost some 1000 chariots, 700 cavalry, 
and 20 000 infantry to King David at the initial battle.  These inflated numbers of 
chariotry and cavalry reflect to some degree the Hurrian legacy as a major horse-
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producing region for the ancient Near East.  Military support from Damascus for 
Hadadezer of Zobah was also severely routed with heavy losses.  The size of the 
Damascan reinforcements is not given but the record claims David slew 22 000 
infantry in the engagement and followed this up by planting Israelite garrisons in 
Damascus’ territory.   
 
Israel’s political relationship with the Ammonites ruptured into open hostility.  The 
earlier cordial relationship that David had enjoyed with the older king, King Nahash, 
did not continue when the latter’s son became the royal successor.   Newly installed 
King Hanun insulted David’s ambassadors and hired Syrian mercenaries to fight 
Israel.  The biblical account (2 Samuel 10: 6) records that some 33 000 mercenaries, 
mostly infantry, were hired from the Aramaean cities Beth-rehob, Zoba, and Ish-tob.  
Notwithstanding the purportedly large mercenary army hired by King Hanun of 
Ammon, the extent of the threat is placed under question.  David did not personally 
lead the total Israelite army but instead dispatched his best troops (the so-called 
mighty men) under the capable leadership of his trusted generals, the brothers Joab 
and Abishai.  The combined armies of the mercenary Syrians and the Ammonites 
were routed and the Israelite expeditionary force returned victorious to Jerusalem.   
 
Together with Abishai, David led an expeditionary force against the Edomites to the 
southwest and fought a decisive battle against them in the ‘Valley of Salt’. 
Traditionally this location is taken to be the plain south-southwest of the Dead Sea 
opposite the oasis of the Zered delta.  This plain of about 6 – 8 miles (approx. 4 – 5 
miles) long would allow for the deployment of reasonably large forces.  The Edomites 
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lost 18 000 warriors and Israelite garrisons were set up to police the territory (1 
Chronicles 18: 12 – 13).      
 
5.12.3. Technological Aspects: Operational Strategy and Tactical Factors 
David’s military leadership skills and his ability to lead Israel’s army through a series 
of successful military campaigns are demonstrated in the events sweepingly recorded 
in 2 Samuel 8.  The Israelite army honed its technical skills and further developed its 
abilities to employ new weapon systems such as chariots and cavalry in larger 
numbers in open terrain.  The terrain of Israel’s traditional enemies, the Canaanites 
and the Philistines, had not hitherto favoured Israel’s battle doctrine which centred 
upon the exploitation of broken terrain with primarily loose formation foot.  Such 
infantry, so well suited to fighting in the broken terrain of Judaea, was now 
supplemented from the spoils of war.  The record alleges that some 60 000 enemy 
troops were destroyed.  Whatever the actual number, the Israelites would have 
amassed huge amounts of armour and armaments from their several victories. 
 
Specifically mentioned in 2 Samuel 8: 4 was the capture of many chariots (the figure 
1000 may be figurative for a division of or a large number of chariots).  Chariotry as 
a weapon system was both the principal shock weapon and the mainstay of mounted 
troops during IA IIa.  The spread of true cavalry was yet in its early stages.  The 
influence of the Indo-Europeans in the territories ascribed to Syria is prominent; the 
large cavalry and chariotry arms encountered by David’s army remind us of the 
Hittites and Hurrian’s leading influence in the development of the horse as a major 
weapon system in ancient warfare (Vermaak, 1996a:22). 
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5.12.4. Logistical Factors: Seasons, Distances, Mustering, and Volumes. 
The logistics for Israel’s campaigning army included a substantial demand for food 
and water supplies.  Seasons, distances and other geographic factors would affect such 
logistical calculations.  What is offered below thus represents a much generalised 
sample of the logistic equation.  The selected case study represents the logistical 
burden that had to be shouldered by the Israelite yeomanry for the many years of the 
campaign.  Israel’s campaign against the Ammonites will serve to illustrate the 
burden.  The logistical model assumes that the Israelites launched their attacks in the 
early summer months when food supplies were approaching peak levels, and that the 
equation is not further complicated by variable factors such as drought, flooding, 
pestilence, or nomadic raiders. 
(a) Food 
1,4 tons of food / 1000 warriors per day. 
Thus, at least one division of the ‘Gibborim’ or royal bodyguard would have been 
deployed together with the militia division of the month.  The deployed divisions 
would have theoretically numbered 600 and 24 000 fighting men. 
1,4 tons of food x 24 600  =  34 440 tons of food each day of the campaign. 
34 440 tons of food x 30 days  = 1 033 200 tons of food each campaign  month 
 
Capable and experienced generals of David and Joab’s calibre would have paid 
due attention to the agricultural calendar and timed their campaigns accordingly to 
afford themselves operational leverage.  The staple crop was wheat, ripening in 
the springtime – the beginning of the Mediterranean World’s campaigning season.  
Sieges that would span several months would bottle the enemy up behind their 
defence works and allow the invaders to provision themselves at the local 
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population’s expense, thus hastening the decision of the defenders to capitulate.  
Iyyar (the beginning of the barley harvest), Sivan (the beginning of the winter-
wheat harvest), Tammuz (the beginning of the grape harvest), Ab (the olive, fig 
and nut harvest), and Elul (the date, summer fig, pomegranate, vegetable, and 
other grains harvest), approximately the equivalent of mid-April to mid-
September.  At the rate of half a ton of ripened wheat per hectare in the dry 
regions of Syro-Palestine, the campaigning army of David and Joab would have 
consumed, on a daily basis, about 17 220 hectares of such cereal grass.  This 
would have been offset by other food stocks such as livestock, dates, grapes, 
olives, dairy products, fruit and vegetable etc.  Small wonder warfare was counted 
as a primary factor for denuding the land and turning it into desert. 
 
(b) Water 
The minimum requirement of one litre per person per day required a provisioning of 
no less than 24 600 litres per day.  As the mounted arm of the campaign army grew, 
including chariotry and the early cavalry arm, an additional eight litres per horse and 
mule was necessary.  The campaigning season was also the dry season so access to 
local streams, brooks, springs, wells, cisterns, lakes and dams had to be carefully 
planned into the operational strategy, the army’s line of march, and continuous local 
re-supply capabilities of the region in the event of siege warfare. 
  
(c) Communications  
The reality of the iron shackles of logistics required that secure communications were 
established to maintain a lifeline between the campaign army and Jerusalem.  The 
several years of campaigning made it unrealistic that King David could be away from 
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the rigours of political leadership at home indefinitely.  Progress reports, replacing 
yeomanry divisions at the front with those on active reserve from home, and 
supplemental provisioning from Israel all counted on secure lines of communication.  
In the hostile environment of Syro-Palestine during IA IIa, David had to plan the 
Israelite campaign objectives in conference with his ‘Thirty’ very judiciously.  
Gradually moving Israel’s sphere of political influence methodically outwards, step 
by step until political control was securely established and maintained.  Both 
diplomacy on the periphery and military statecraft closer to home coloured the picture 
of David’s general strategy and the lines of communication that serviced it in the 
field. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
David’s Campaigns. 
(Map from Douglas, J.D. [ed], 1974: Map 5) 
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5.12.5. Political Aftermath and Strategic Dialectics 
Whatever piety motivated David to transfer the ark from Shiloh to Jerusalem, the 
positive political ramifications were significant.  By this masterstroke all Israel’s 
tribes were jointly and comprehensively united to a new king and a new capital that 
was largely free of the divisive effects of tribalism.  David had not only secured a 
political base among the fickle commoners of all the tribes and their provincial elders, 
but he had also won the allegiance of Israel’s conservative clergy.  
 
With the major political powers of the ancient Near East in a political nadir, Israel 
became an important actor in the regions international politics.  David’s general 
strategy, as pointed out by Miller and Hayes, centred upon three contingencies:  
Firstly, the containment of the still powerful Philistines. Secondly, the expansion of 
the state boundaries beyond what Saul had ruled and the annexation of these 
heretofore independent city-states, and thirdly the successful conduct of frontier wars 
and the establishment of fruitful alliances with surrounding kingdoms (Miller and 
Hayes, 1986:179).  Regarding point three, political consolidation is well served by 
external political exigencies.  David altered Israel’s economic status from a struggling 
emergent state to a fairly powerful regional state on a sound war potential footing 
from which imperial objectives could be successfully pursued. 
 
The most important land trade routes followed a north-south axis through Palestine 
and all such were brought under Israel’s direct control.  Even the prosperous east-west 
trade routes that trafficked from the Eastern Mediterranean across Syria and into 
Mesopotamia now lay within Israel’s sphere of influence.   Iron-hungry Egypt to the 
south was an anxious consumer of the ore which became more accessible as a trade 
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commodity after David’s campaigns in Syria.  After the second successive defeat of 
the Aramaean forces, Damascus was garrisoned and ‘Syria’ was obliged to supply 
tribute.  The balance of power was changed in Syria and the Galilee was now 
undisputedly under Israelite control.  Powerful regional enemies in the north were 
reduced and exploited.  Israel’s southern borders were emphatically demarcated by 
clearing out all the non-Israelite aliens loosely referred to as ‘Edomites’ who had 
filtered into the area west of Edom proper.  Such key trade routes were secured for 
Israel’s own economic interests - the economy being at the heart of nearly all political 
discourse.  By means of diplomatic alliances and military statecraft, David secured for 
Israel an economic base that would sustain her as regional hegemonic leader (New 
Bible Dictionary… 1974, s.v. ‘Trade and Commerce’) 
 
5.13. King David at War in Aram (Syrian Princedoms) 
David’s expansion of Saul’s Israelite kingdom was mainly northward, including the 
important Jezreel Valley and Galilee.  Both these locations added substantially to 
Israel’s food security and ultimately, to her war potential.  Both locations also lay 
along important north – south trade routes.  Securing these locations brought King 
David within range of the lucrative Aramaean bazaars and the east – west trade routes 
that perpetually fed them.  Initial conflagration had already irrupted in the reign of 
King Saul (1 Samuel 14: 47) which lists the kings of Zobah (geographically north of 
Damascus) as amongst the enemies of Saul’s own campaigns of political conquest.  
The lucrative east – west trade routes were not easily yielded and lay at the centre of 
David’s general strategy in the north. 
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The Aramaean petty kingdoms had arisen in the aftermath of the political chaos 
brought on by the Sea Peoples disruptions c.1200 BCE.  The kings of Zobah were 
ardent enemies of Israel during the reign of King Saul, choosing to align themselves 
with Israel’s enemies during David’s campaigns to the north and east.  Hadadezer of 
Aram-Zobah was the strongest Aramaean kingdom during IA IIa, his kingdom 
reaching to the Euphrates (2 Samuel 8:10). 
 
5.13.1. Military Potential of the Israelites 
David’s campaigns in Aram occurred somewhere between 980 and 970 BCE.  For 
more than two decades the Israelite army and its commanders had been in the field.  
There is no evidence in available records that suggests the dual arrangement of 
conscripts from the active reserve and a hard core of regulars had changed.  The 
Israelite army was well-seasoned in IA IIa warfare, with a long standing tradition of 
victory over their Syro-Palestinian enemies.  Israel’s military potential in this 
campaign would have conformed to their proven establishment. 
       
5.13.2. Military Potential of the Aramaeans 
Fearful of David’s northward expansion, some of the Syrian rulers had responded to 
the Ammonite appeal for assistance by sending Syrian mercenaries.  The troops 
supplied by King Hadadezer of Zobah numbered about 12 000 infantry.  2 Samuel 10 
also records a large number of proto-cavalry and a large strike force of chariotry.  
Notwithstanding necessary adjustment for the hyperbole, the presence of these 
weapon systems says much about the economic strength of the Aramaean kingdoms.  
Such a large force of mercenaries with advanced weapon systems of the day 
illustrates their strength.  When David attacked Aram-Zobah, Hadadezer was en route 
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to the Euphrates to restore his political authority there.  2 Samuel 8: 4 lists the war 
material David captured which again points to the war potential enjoyed by this 
principal Aramaean state.  The record lists Hadadezer’s military potential at this 
encounter as 20 000 infantry, 1000 chariots, and 700 proto-cavalry.  Hadadezer also 
enjoyed the political support of other Aramaean kingdoms who supplied allied 
contingents numbering 22 000 additional foot soldiers. 
     
5.13.3. Technological Aspects: Operational Strategy and Tactical Factors 
2 Samuel 8: 4 yields a useful insight into the cultural process of military acquisition of 
new weapon systems for the Israelite military potential.  David’s chariot arm was 
small in comparison to some of his political neighbours but the merits of this weapon 
system were already well proven.  Where captured chariots exceeded the Israelite 
army’s ability to assimilate such, the hamstringing of captured chariot horses ensured 
that the enemy war potential was denied their use as well, i.e. the ancient equivalent 
of spiking guns.  The acquisition of an early chariotry arm that was to become a major 
component of Solomon’s military establishment.  The latter would still feature as a 
key part of the Omride military potential in 9th century BCE. 
 
5.13.4. Logistical Factors: Seasons, Distances, Mustering, and Volumes 
The greater the distance the greater the logistical complications for the army setting 
out on campaign.  The distance between Jerusalem and Damascus was about 220 
km’s as the crow flies, a distance that would have taken approximately two weeks 
steady route marching to cover.  Troop fatigue impacts upon tactical prowess and had 
to be factored into the logistical calculations of the campaign.  Very specific and 
detailed orders had to be worked out and issued to all units moving over long 
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distances in order to preserve the fighting effectiveness of the army.  The absence of 
an extensive all-weather road network further aggravates the logistical situation. 
 
Unlike Clausewitz’s Napoleonic period and the modern era thereafter in which self 
sufficient fighting forces referred to as ‘divisions’ were constituted, early  Iron Age 
armies lacked such organisational sophistication and were considerably more prone to 
debilitating disorder if not properly managed during a march.  Unlike the divisional 
armies of later periods, the ancient army had to be assembled and deployed in its 
entirety before engaging it in battle.  Besides duration, victuals, and routes, even the 
‘order of march’ in ancient times was carefully considered.  This was a tactical 
question rather than a strategic one (Clausewitz in Howard and Paret, 1976: 318).  
The possibility of unexpected and hostile encounters, and which units were engaged 
first by the enemy were important considerations when self sufficient military 
divisions did not yet exist.      
             
The overall size of a marching force determines the logistical time frames for the 
operation.  A large army or campaign force will cover a given distance at a slower 
rate than a smaller force.  The crude roads of the Late Bronze Age and Early Iron Age 
did not promote efficiency.  The Persians and the Romans with the challenges of 
expansive spatial empires were proactive in addressing this specific aspect of 
logistics.  Clausewitz’s Napoleonic divisions provide useful analogous data to 
illustrate the logistics of ‘the march’: 
• Moving head to tail on a single road, a division of 8000 troops with commensurate 
wagon transports takes about an hour to file past a given point along the route.  
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• A second division of the same size, moving in conjunction with the first, will 
arrive at that point an hour after the first and be passed it two hours after the first 
division reached that point.  
• An army of 24 000 troops such as one IA IIa Israelite yeomanry division during 
the reign of King David, would take not less than three hours to file past the said 
point along the route.  This theoretical assessment has not made provision for sick 
troops or troublesome or lame draught animals, or for mechanical failure of the 
crude vehicles, terrain, and weather, human error in navigation or for congestion 
along the limited roads of antiquity.   
 
The experience of the military commander is significant too, and commanders such as 
David, Joab and others of ‘the thirty’ would have been able to draw on many decades 
of individual and collective experience.  Furthermore, the standard distance of the 
march was about 24 kilometres in a day.  This must be reduced to 12 to 16 kilometres 
per day in extensive campaigning to allow for rest and equipment maintenance.  This 
is moderated further by various factors, inter alia;       
• A division of 8000 men takes eight to ten hours to cover the 24 kilometres in flat 
open terrain along satisfactory roads. 
• The same will take ten to twelve hours to cover this distance along satisfactory 
mountain roads. 
Marching for several hours over many days can dissipate an army’s concentration of 
numbers which is as counterproductive to the prospects for operational success as the 
fatigue factor.  Generally, concentration of force at the critical point of contact with 
the enemy is crucial to operational success. 
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With the esoteric eye of one literate in logistics, a reader becomes alert to text 
statements such as David intercepted Hadadezer’s army as the latter were marching 
eastwards to re-establish their political authority in the region of the Euphrates (2 
Samuel 8: 3).  Did David’s army arrive at the point of interception earlier, rest and 
take up outflanking or ambush positions or did David engage his exhausted men with 
the enemy immediately?  The text simply summarizes David’s engagement with an 
assertion that David was victorious and increased his military potential from the 
battle’s spoils.  Clausewitz observes that armies of 40 000 men did not engage each 
other immediately but waited for the next day (Clausewitz in Howard and Paret,1976: 
314). 
 
5.13.5. Political Aftermath and Strategic Dialectics 
Exhausted troops are generally unable to exploit a battlefield victory and convert such 
into a strategic political victory.  Troops that are already worn out before going into 
battle quickly succumb to exhaustion due to the massive exertions demanded just to 
survive the battle.  This leaves little energy and will power to properly exploit the 
tactical battlefield victory.  Thus the logistical factors of total campaign distance, 
season and circumstances of terrain to be traversed, security of lines of 
communication, frequency of engagement, and ferocity of battle all combine as 
logistical factors to challenge the prospects for a strategic victory or to limit it to 
merely a tactical victory.  The political aim is more closely associated with the 
strategic victory.  In terms of strategic dialectics, the more distant the campaign in 
logistical terms, the harder it is to attain a strategic victory and to satisfy the political 
objective.   
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David’s victory over Hadadezer was a political follow-up from his war with the 
Ammonites, who had received military support from Hadadezer.  The king of 
Hamath, named Toi, supported David against their mutual enemy Hadadezer and 
became a northern vassal king to Israel.  Thus by the second half of his reign, David 
had become political overlord of much of IA IIa Syro-Palestine.  He had created a 
small empire, securing trading privileges far to the north, even extending to the 
Euphrates river.  In so doing however, David had over-extended Israel’s war 
potential.  The political fabric could not hold for long and the cracks appeared early in 
Solomon’s reign (Reader’s Digest, Atlas of the Bible, 1981: 98). 
 
5.14. Israelite Civil War: King David and Absalom’s Rebellion 
David’s third son, Absalom, born of a Geshurite wife, returned from a three year exile 
consequential to the killing of his older half-brother Amnon.  The crisis was originally 
precipitated by Amnon’s rape of Absalom’s sister Tamar.  After his return at David’s 
request, Absalom remained banished from the royal court for another two years until 
David relented and restored the royal prerogatives to the young prince.  Absalom 
promptly responded by intriguing to win popular favour and to depose his father. 
 
 David’s political astuteness and Jerusalem’s capacity to withstand a siege was great 
which invites the question; why did David meekly withdraw from Jerusalem, his 
mountain fastness.  His call for the flight from Jerusalem of those still loyal to him is 
sometimes explained as a humane desire to spare the civilian population from the 
horrors of civil war but such is a weak rationale (2 Samuel 15: 14).  This appears out 
of character for the campaign hardened veteran.  His fears are better understood if he 
feared treachery from within the walls of a besieged city.  Moreover, David was 
 204
unsure of his military potential, i.e. to what extent Absalom had corrupted his loyal 
support base.  The text points out that David still enjoyed the resolute support of 600 
faithful Gittites besides his personal retainer divisions of Cherethite and Pelethite 
mercenaries (2 Samuel 15: 18).  David also demonstrated sincere remorse as the 
insurrection came to a head; he interpreted the events as the punishment from the 
hand of God and stoically accepted the humiliation and scorn (2 Samuel 16: 5 – 14).   
 
What transpired over David’s long and celebrated reign that allowed Absalom to raise 
an insurrection against David with such apparent ease? (2 Samuel 15: 12).  
Inefficiencies resulting from David’s advanced age were manifest in the looseness of 
his internal political affairs, particularly the weakness of the administration of justice 
– a common and fundamental royal duty in all oriental monarchies.  Joab as 
commander of the army had overgrown his authority and exploited the king’s long 
standing trust in him.  Along with his brother Abishai, Joab was regarded by many as 
wicked, insolent, and ruthless in their political dealings.  Many believed the king had 
weakened and was afraid to execute the law against these powerful military 
commanders.  There were also still some partisans of the House of Saul such as 
Shimei of Bahurim who still saw David as a usurper of Saul’s throne.  Lastly, David 
had reached an advanced age and the issue of succession was closely tied to 
patronage.  The support for Absalom throughout Israel appeared extensive (Church 
Educational System. Old Testament Student Manual, Religion 301, 2003: 296). 
 
A short note on the redactive nature of the Genesis – 2 Kings account is helpful here.  
The garbled treatment of David’s life by the chroniclers easily confirms that the 
record was written in retrospect from a variety of sources with the premeditated 
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intention to legitimize the Davidic Dynasty.  There are serious limitations regarding 
the authenticity of David’s reign and the event’s surrounding it.  Chronological error, 
subjective bias i.e. where Jonathan the legitimate heir of King Saul defers to David (1 
Samuel 18: 4), hyperbole, use of legendary material in a pro-Davidic manner, 
contradictory statements such as who actually killed Goliath (compare 1 Samuel 17: 
54 with 2 Samuel 21: 19) all combine to challenge the historicity of the Genesis – 2 
Kings account (Miller and Hayes, 1986: 152 – 156).  The redactive veneer 
notwithstanding, the substance of Absalom’s rebellion has heuristic value for 
establishing the foundations of military power during IA IIa. 
        
5.14.1. Military Potential of King David’s Loyalist Force 
Had Absalom heeded his own counsellor Ahithophel’s advice, rather than that of 
King David’s planted mole advisor Hushai, the military potential of David’s civil war 
forces would have been considerably smaller and less organised when the two armies 
clashed.  By ostensibly stalling to muster a decisive force, presumably of northerner 
yeomanry, Absalom lost most of his operational strategic advantages.  The ill-advised 
interval allowed David to also add to and organise his veteran loyalist force.  The 
mustering was large enough to warrant a deployment under three field commanders.  
The first command under the brothers Joab and Abishai, the kings nephews, and the 
third under Ittai the Gittite, another Philistine mercenary commander recently arrived 
from Gath and in David’s service with a force of another 600 mercenaries (2 Samuel 
18: 1 – 3). 
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5.14.2. Military Potential of Absalom’s Rebel Force 
Absalom’s rebel force was larger but less experienced than David’s loyal veterans and 
mercenaries.  The structure of its commands is not given.  It was placed under the 
overall command of Amasa, Absalom’s cousin.  
 
5.14.3. Technological Aspects: Operational Strategy and Tactical Factors 
David had crossed the Jordon and moved to where the threat of encirclement from the 
north and south was negated.  With his rear secured against the Transjordan tableland 
and his flanks safely nestled in the broken terrain of the Jordan River valley, David 
anticipated Absalom’s larger but less experienced force.  David thus opted to fight a 
defensive battle; he would await the attack of the enemy and engage him in terrain 
and circumstances of his own choosing.  The characteristic feature of defensive 
warfare is awaiting the enemy’s blow and then parrying it.  It does not however 
equate to passive warfare.  Experienced practitioners in the art of warfare will readily 
recognise errors in the enemy’s deployment and tactical disposition and then release 
their own forces like coiled springs, to capitalise and exploit the miscalculation of the 
enemy (Clausewitz in Howard and Paret, 1976: 357).  Fighting in woodlands and 
difficult terrain calls upon even greater tactical skill from the commanders and further 
complicates the tactical equation. 
 
Thus defensive warfare in the context of IA IIa and for millennia thereafter was an 
intrinsically stronger form of warfare than offensive warfare.  Defensive positions can 
be strengthened; troops can be rested while they await the arrival of a fatigued enemy, 
and terrain can be selected that adds to the defenders advantages.  Hence the 
defending commander ‘reaps where he did not sow’.  From his advantageous 
 207
defensive position, the defender is able to inflict heavy losses on the enemy at low 
cost to himself.  With a strong front, and terrain assisted defensive flanks, David 
would have been able to keep back a strong reserve which could be released at a later 
stage to take the initiative and renew the conflict on his own terms.  Once the 
defensive measures had been used successfully and a more favourable balance of 
strength had been achieved, the defending troops could then counterattack the 
exposed and weakened enemy.  The decisive victory that David achieved over 
Absalom’s forces could not be achieved if the offensive element was completely 
missing.  David’s tactical acumen born of several campaigns and Absalom’s 
contrasting raw naivety were demonstrated by the deployment of their respective 
armies alone, let alone the subsequent events leading to Absalom’s death. 
 
5.14.4. Logistical Factors: Seasons, Distances, Mustering, and Volumes 
Absalom’s best opportunity for a strategic victory was wasted by David’s mole 
Hushai who advocated inaction.  Rather than wait as he did, had Absalom pressed 
home his initial advantages the political results may have been different.  Only by 
exploiting a local or tactical victory fully can a strategic victory - one that achieves 
the political aim of the war, be achieved.  Having secured Jerusalem from David 
Absalom dithered.  In the fog of war very few are able to think with the required 
clarity and objectiveness.  This ‘fog of war’ includes conflicting and competing inputs 
to the commander, inter alia, the need for food, rest from danger and fatigue, 
processing data into useful intelligence, repairing equipment and so on.  Of this 
situation Clausewitz observes: “Only a few are able to think beyond the present 
moment” (Clausewitz in Howard and Paret, 1976: 264).  Distance and time for 
mustering additional forces and the replenishment of the existing forces was the 
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disguised poisonous counsel of Hushai that afforded David sufficient time to secure 
his defence and organise his own loyalist forces.   
 
5.14.5. Political Aftermath and Strategic Dialectics 
The relative ease with which Absalom was able to raise an insurrection against David 
is noteworthy.  That the insurrection was sparked off in Hebron, a former pro-David 
stronghold, and that the insurrection spread outwards from amongst David’s own 
tribesmen who were prepared to renounce the benefits of patronage with the old king 
speaks volumes of the levels of the internal discontent that was building up in the later 
period of David’s reign.  The light glossing over of the seriousness of the insurrection 
is evidence of the retrospective and redactive nature of the textual record.  Even after 
David’s forces had successfully dealt with the rebel forces and Absalom had been 
dispatched, Sheba, a Benjamite urged the other tribes to renounce their allegiance to 
the House of David rather than reinstall him again to the Israelite throne.  Significant 
numbers present heeded this call, requiring a swift and decisive response from David 
and his inner council.   This adds substantially to the claim that Absalom’s rebellion 
was founded on strong general discontent for the rule of David throughout the 
kingdom (Miller and Hayes, 1986:177).   
 
Yet the power and the glorification of the reign of David, aided by text redaction, still 
bear upon the era.  It is to David rather than Saul that Jews of all dispensations since 
IA IIa look back with pride and affection.  David is still seen as the establisher of their 
kingdom.  David’s rule was not only a glorious political reality by it symbolises an 
ideal as well.  The promised Messiah after the pattern of David would someday 
deliver them from their political foes, whether such enemies are Egyptian, Assyrian, 
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Babylonian, Mede-Persian, Greek, Roman, Moslem, Ottoman, European, or 
Palestinian.      
 
5.15. King Solomon’s Reign, ca. 965 – 928 B.C.E. 
The opening proposition of this chapter declared its intent to delineate the wars and 
conflagrations in and around Israel during IA IIa.  These political irruptions would 
serve as a vehicle for the examination of Israel’s evolution of military force during IA 
IIa.  Proceeding to Solomon, the third of Israel’s kings, the biblical record is again 
problematical.  The texts dealing with Solomon’s reign has all the hallmarks of a 
severely redacted work.  This is aggravated by a dearth of alternate literary sources, 
sacral and profane, by which the editorialised reign of Solomon could be objectively 
moderated.  Material remains - particularly that of military architecture, has shed 
some helpful light on the evolution of Israel’s foundation of military force during 
Solomon’s reign.  Thus what follows for Solomon is more of a survey of intelligible 
cultural remains rather than a chronicle of warfare.     
 
5.15.1. Political Regime of Solomon.   
The Israelite monarch’s grip on the levers of political power was unremittingly 
tightened.  Solomon tolerated no potential rivals within the royal inner circle.  His 
stepbrother, Adonijah, together with his highly placed supporter Joab, David’s 
erstwhile military chief, were both executed and the priest Abiathar exiled to his 
estate in the village of Anathoth on conspiracy charges.  Joab was replaced as army 
chief by the willing Benaiah.  Solomon’s reign more than both his predecessors began 
to take on the appearance of oriental despotism.  Palace intrigue and the beginnings of 
Israel’s first dynasty characterised Solomon’s ascension to the throne.  Solomon’s 
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political goals reflected a more benign foreign policy than David’s.  He had inherited 
a substantial kingdom from his father and was content to maintain rather than expand 
its territory.  Rather than a vigorous foreign policy based upon military conquest, 
Solomon aimed to increase Israel’s political power through trade and related 
economic statecraft.  David had entrenched Israel’s political security and Solomon 
sought to fully exploit Israel’s political dominance in the Syro-Palestinian region 
during IA IIa. His almost 40 year long reign (c.965 – 928 B.C.E.) was largely 
peaceful without any evidence of large military campaigns being conducted or having 
to muster Israel’s substantial military potential to repel any invasions.  This does not 
suggest however that he had no political enemies.  
 
5.15.2. Expanded Bureaucracy.   
Efforts to expand the bureaucracy reflected Solomon’s political aspirations.  Against 
the larger cultural backdrop of the ancient Near East a rare political eclipse of both the 
traditional great powers was still proceeding.  The ancient hydraulic cultures of the 
Nile to the southwest and the Euphrates and Tigres to the east had both declined into 
dormancy at the same time.  This situation afforded IA IIa Israel its unique 
opportunity to exploit with no external impediments or interference, the political 
primacy it had won in Syro-Palestine under Saul and David.    
 
Solomon vastly expanded the bureaucracy; several departments were created with a 
‘high official’ or minister directly answerable to the king over each.  The army which 
had enjoyed primacy in the earlier governments of Saul and David was now relegated 
to the status of one of several departments.  The fierce guardians of the covenant – the 
charismatic priests and prophets which had hitherto never hesitated to preach regicide 
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against impious kings were temporarily daunted and reduced to the status of another 
ministry, not unlike the Mesopotamian or Egyptian models.  This reflected the new 
order of the political landscape that prevailed under Solomon.  The addition of other 
new ministries such as a ‘forced labour ministry’ and the ‘palace ministry’ further 
reduced the prominence of the leading generals and priests who had in earlier days 
been the king’s peers and religious overseers (Miller and Hayes, 1986: 205). 
 
5.15.3. Economic and Diplomatic Statecraft. 
Economic expansion was extensive during the reign of Solomon.  Israel’s economy 
still centred mainly upon agriculture but now the growth of trade and commerce 
began to come into its own.  The campaigns of Saul and David had established the 
relative positions of power among the regions political actors.  A significant degree of 
consensus of political strength had been reached among these international actors thus 
creating conditions of stability favourable to trade and commerce.  The containment 
and in many cases, the break-up of Canaanite enclaves and the Philistine and 
Transjordan political competitors had opened the way for Israel’s economic growth 
during IA IIa.  The dangers of an external political threat had been dealt with by Saul 
and David, permitting the pursuit of a more benign diplomatic policy.  Solomon 
enjoyed the advantages of diplomacy conducted from a politically dominant position 
when dealing with weaker neighbouring political actors.  Such was the legacy 
bequeathed him by his royal predecessors.   
 
The maintenance and further strengthening of Israel’s war potential during Solomon’s 
reign was not motivated by fear of external military threat.  It was the diplomatic 
wisdom of negotiating and entering into trade and commercial agreements and 
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compacts with the backing of the greater war potential – not unlike Rome’s rise to 
regional power with its Italian social allies in the Early Republic Period or Bismark’s 
brand of power politics of the nineteenth century.  Israel’s mature alliance with 
Phoenician Tyre now entered its greatest period of mutual prosperity; a merchant 
marine joint-enterprise, based at Enzion-Geber was entered into, trading up and down 
the Red Sea and along the coast of East Africa and further to the east, bringing a range 
of exotic goods and luxuries to Israel for the first time since their settlement in 
Canaan.  The plundering nomadic tribes such as the Amalakites had already been 
comprehensively dealt with and the erection of a network of small forts kept such 
raiders quelled and allowed for extensive agricultural prospecting in the hitherto 
marginal regions such as the Negev and southern Transjordan.  Pacified Arab’s now 
sought trade at Enzion-Geber and at Israel’s desert settlements.  The lucrative major 
trade and caravan routes such as ‘the Way of the Sea’ and the ‘King’s Highway’ 
could now be closely regulated for taxation purposes. Not only direct trade but 
indirect trade featured in Solomon’s comprehensive economic statecraft.  Under the 
king's entrepreneurial brokerage the wealthy potentates of Aram and Egypt did 
extensive trade.  Egyptian chariots went north and the majestic stallions of Kue went 
southwards, and Israel’s ‘middleman’ services bolstered her coffers.          
 
Within the kingdom Solomon modernised the domestic tax regime.  A new 
arrangement of 12 taxation districts was established within the kingdom.  These tax 
districts were comparatively equal in resources and population.  To achieve this, old 
tribal boundaries were ignored and tribal connections were downplayed.  This aimed 
at further reducing the traditional problems of tribal parochialism and strengthening 
the war potential through greater political unity centred on the personage of the 
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monarch, regardless of tribal differences and genealogies.  A senior administrator 
oversaw the tax affairs of his tax district and each such officer accounted to Azariah.  
Each tax district made payments in kind for the support of the king’s household on an 
assigned month of the year.  The heavy tax burden outlined in 1 Kings 4: 1-25 recalls 
the earlier warning of Samuel (1 Samuel 8: 11-20) on the evils of monarchy (Church 
Educational System. Old Testament Student Manual, Rel. 302, 1981: 4-5).  
 
5.15.4. The Expansion of Israel’s War Potential. 
The increase in despotism did not equate to a decrease in war potential for IA IIa 
Israel.  The expansion of the tax system allowed Solomon to fund projects that related 
to Israel’s war potential.  The conscripted labour force was used to expand Israel’s 
infrastructure.  Such projects included a huge palace complex comprising the 
renowned temple of Solomon and the extension of the Jerusalem’s defensive walls 
northwards to include the ‘Temple Mount’ as well.  Jerusalem’s population swelled 
during Solomon’s reign from the earlier 11 to 12 acres to an urban footprint of some 
32 acres.         
 
Several strategic sites were identified and developed as fortified military bases for the 
defence of the homeland along key invasion routes.  These strategic passive defences 
included Hazor, the huge former Canaanite Bronze Age city-fortress that guarded the 
access routes from the north.  Famous Megiddo guarded the ‘Way of the Sea’ which 
transverses the Jezreel Valley via the Mount Carmel pass, and Gezer which stood 
guard over the most direct route from the Eastern Mediterranean  to Jerusalem and the 
Judean highlands.  The fortified city of Balaath was established to add further strength 
against the Philistines, Israel’s erstwhile powerful antagonists in the west.  Balaath, or 
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Beth-horon as it is also known, guarded the short western approaches to Jerusalem, 
evidence of Israel’s early acknowledgement of her small territory’s strategic 
vulnerability (Miller and Hayes, 1986: 210).  This was clear even before the onset of 
modern mechanised armies.  In the southeast Tamar was established to affirm Israel’s 
political control in that region of bitter hostility and to ensure that Israel retained her 
grip on the lucrative trade routes that traversed it.  In addition to the fortified cities, 
Solomon established several strategically sited magazines or ‘store-cities’.  These 
cities, some named and several others not named, were established to ameliorate the 
challenges of logistics during times of war.  Logistics is an unrelenting dictator to all 
field commanders alike. That all operational strategy is shackled to constraints of hard 
realities of logistics was not lost on Solomon as supreme commander of Israel’s war 
potential. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jezreel Valley, One of the Strategic Routes Fortified by Solomon  
(photograph from Bible Lands, 1986: Jezreel Valley, D1-1) 
 
Another variance from the military statecraft of Saul and David was Solomon’s 
employment of diplomatic marriages. The many marriages with ‘gentile’ princesses 
outside the covenant colours the work of the later redactionists.  Had the latter done 
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their work in more pious times Solomon’s diplomacy would have been denigrated as 
wholesale apostasy.  Prophets of the ilk of Samuel would have denounced him and 
had Solomon been a contemporary of Elijah regicide would have been the prophetic 
homily of the day instead of the rose coloured redacted text by which we view 
Solomon now.  Solomon’s goals were emphatically secular.  The great temple of 
Jerusalem is reminiscent of the religious splendours of Babylon’s ziggurats and of 
Egypt’s pyramid to their gods incarnate, all integral aspects of typical Near Eastern 
despotism.  Later redaction aimed at establishing the piety of the House of David to 
underscore legitimacy.  Even the references to stalls for 40 000 horses for the chariot 
corps with an equally unbelievable expansion of the proto-cavalry arm to some 12 
000 horsemen lend weight to the sceptics arguments that hyperbole is again being 
employed for placing Solomon’s career in a particular light (Miller and Hayes, 1986: 
190).  Diplomatic marriages occurred thick and fast over Solomon’s long reign, each 
one a flagrant violation of the Law of Moses (Deuteronomy 7: 1-4).  Each such union 
aimed at cementing a political compact and gaining some secular increase.  
Solomon’s lifelong political priorities were greater than his religious ones and the text 
records that his eventual later political decline traced its roots back to his having 
strayed from the precepts of Israel’s definitive covenant (1 Kings 11: 1 – 11). 
 
5.15.5. Political Aftermath and Strategic Dialectics 
Behind the material façade of prosperity there was a groundswell of internal political 
discontent which intensified with the passing years during Solomon’s long reign.  The 
authoritative allocation of resources from internal revenue did little to benefit the 
common man.  In fact, when Solomon developed cash-flow problems he viewed his 
fellow covenant Israelites will the same disregard as a despot; they had become 
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trading assets – twenty villages and all within them were simply handed over to King 
Hiram of Tyre (1 Kings 5: 1-12) to assuage a financial problem.  Internal revenue 
became Solomon’s personal property in the same manner as all oriental monarchs.  
The grandeur of the king and his expanded retinue took precedence in state 
expenditure.  The Israelite king, originally a fellow of the Abrahamic Covenant with a 
political stewardship for the common man, had begun to take on the social form of the 
oriental ‘great king’.  The tenets of the Abrahamic Covenant were no longer a 
constitutional restraint and political discontent, coupled with no evident external 
threats to mobilise against, began to eat away at the moorings of political stability. 
 
Another factor in the strategic dialectics that militated against ongoing political 
stability and the growth of the Solomonic regime’s war potential in its closing 
decades was the cumulative result of corvee labour.  Neither Saul nor David had 
engaged in the schemes of architectural grandeur that Solomon did.  They had little 
use for large numbers of slave labourers, though their military statecraft created a 
ready supply of foreign prisoners and slaves.  Ironically during Solomon’s reign 
hardly any large campaigns were undertaken but a large labour force was critically 
needed.  Thus the flow of enemy captives dried up and with it the prisoner slave 
gangs needed began to diminish over the many years of Solomon’s reign.  Israelites 
were initially used as a stop gap measure, but soon it became a necessity to regulate 
such arrangements and place them onto a more permanent footing.  Enforced labour 
hearkened back to Israel’s worst political memories, where their forefathers toiled 
under the taskmasters lash as slave labourers for the Pharaoh.  Solomon’s forced 
labour program accelerated the seeds of dissent and began to foster attitudes of 
rebellion.  A senior officer over such forced labour in the northern area, from the 
 217
unsympathetic tribe of Ephraim named Jeraboam became an instigator against these 
royal building measures and was forced to flee to Egypt for his safety (1 Kings 11: 26 
– 40).  The building program with its attendant forced labour produced dissent enough 
to split the kingdom.  The occasion of the king’s death provided the opportunity to 
act.  Notwithstanding the best efforts of the compilers of Genesis – II kings to lay the 
crises at Solomon’s successor’s door the inescapable cause of the crises rested with 
the political foolishness of Solomon himself (Miller and Hayes, 1986: 217).  
 
Jeraboam received ecclesiastical support in his challenge to Solomon from the 
prophet Ahijah, a shadow of the Samuel – Saul fallout suggesting the reign of 
Solomon was rendered idealistic in the biblical text.  The loss of ecclesiastical support 
is also linked to Solomon’s choice of diplomatic statecraft – another mimic of foreign 
methods of governance.  His marriage to so many non-Israelite women, the resulting 
massive royal harem and its expensive upkeep alienated Solomon from the priesthood 
and the pious commoner who had to foot the bill.  Like Saul, it was divined that the 
kingdom would now also be wrested from Solomon’s family and its war potential 
divided and permanently compromised.  The upshot of which would not be lost on 
opportunistic political adventurers such as Pharaoh Shishak (Sheshonk I).   
 
Disgruntled, bitter and subjugated restless neighbours saw the steady erosion of 
political solidarity in the kingdom and the concomitant loss of war potential and took 
courage in planning their breakaway to independence while Israel struggled 
internally.  Hadad returned from exile in Egypt to lead Edom’s unremitting political 
struggle against Israel.  Rezon of Damascus measured the currents of Israel’s war 
potential against his own political aspirations and found the opportunity ripe to break 
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free.  Soon after Solomon’s death Ammon and Moab followed suit and even the 
reduced Philistines in the enclave Gibbethon, west of Jerusalem, reasserted 
themselves politically (Readers Digest …1981, s.v. ‘Divided Monarchy’).  The final 
blow that broke the back of the United Monarchy was when Jeroboam returned from 
refuge in Egypt to lead the succession of the northern tribes after Solomon’s death.  
The war potential of the United Monarchy of Israel, wrought to its peak over a 
century of gruelling political struggle, was irretrievably diminished. With it the period 
IA IIa or the Early Iron age of Israel’s history passed, and the Middle Iron age or IA 
IIb in the parlance of Syro-Palestinian archaeology began (Bimson et al. 1992: 24). 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Divided Kingdoms of Israel and Judah   
(Map from Bimson et al, 1992:45)  
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CHAPTER 6.  ARTEFACTS OF WAR FROM SYRO-PALESTINE DURING                        
       IRON AGE IIa 
Artefacts of war are to some degree the reification of the doctrines and associated 
principles regarding war and its conduct as it obtained in that given period.  Though 
cultures of any dispensation appear to be stable they are indeed constantly undergoing 
changes.  The rate and scope of change depends upon several factors such as 
frequency of contact between two societies and the intensity of contact.  Agents of 
cultural change include innovation, diffusion, cultural loss, and acculturation.  In situ 
material remains reflect the cultural values of that society who occupied that place at a 
given time period.  Cultural values, and how they ‘metamorphosis’ over time, tells 
much of a given society, its weltansschuung (worldview), and the cultural universe to 
which such a society belonged.   
 
Innovation takes place when someone discovers something new which is then 
accepted by others in that society.  Other agents of cultural change include diffusion -
the borrowing of something from an outside group.  For instance, the technical know-
how of working iron from the Philistines to the Israelites.  This did not merely change 
the weapons used by Israel superficially from bronze to iron, but led to significant 
changes in military values, military doctrine, and operational strategy such as the 
employment of a large chariot arm by Solomon’s time in the latter part of IA IIa.  
Cultural loss and acculturation, namely, the abandonment of an existing practices or 
trait, with or without replacement, is another mechanism for cultural change 
(Vermaak, 1996 b:13).  The introduction and development of true cavalry changed the 
nature of warfare in the ancient world.  This is evidenced by the eventual loss and 
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replacement of chariotry by cavalry as the principal mounted arm and ‘shock weapon’ 
of antiquity.   
 
Commenting on the technological aspects of war potential which in fact delineate the 
context for artefacts of war, Dupuy asserts: “Mobility, or the lack of it, played an 
important role in the composition of early armies, in the use of their weapons, and in 
the tactics they employed” (Dupuy, 1984:6).  Arguably then, military doctrine for 
operational strategy in particular, and to a lessor extent general and total strategy, is 
heavily informed by technical innovation.  Technical sophistry in antiquity and the 
ensuing innovations that followed are traceable in the material remains of that given 
society.  The material remains inform us not only of the technological aspects of the 
weapons systems employed but of organisational developments necessary for the 
effective employment of such weapons also.  In the same way that pottery can 
esoterically comment on a society’s economy, trade patterns, economic strengths etc., 
so too, for the esoterically trained eye of the military archaeologist, do military 
artefacts comment on the technological and social sophistication of the ancient society 
from which the artefact originates.  By extrapolation, such artefacts also comment on 
the cultural dynamics of the society that possessed such artefacts.  The principal 
theme of Dupuy’s quoted book is that warfare, i.e. the methods and means for waging 
war, is evolutionary by nature.  This theme is consistent with the evolutionary nature 
of cultures.   
 
From a holistic perspective Dupuy observes that modern warfare traces a discernible 
evolutionary path from past to present warfare.  Some aspects of war and indeed, even 
some aspects of warfare, never change.  For anthropologists some interesting aspects 
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of culture arise at this juncture.  Innovation is much lauded for the technical 
advantages it can afford the innovators.  It is recognised as a key agent for cultural 
change in general.  Cultural change is a matter of great importance to anthropologists, 
including the derived discipline of archaeology.  For archaeology’s purposes however, 
the nature of cultural change is characterised more by the gradual and incremental 
technical evolution than by radical and revolutionary invention.  The latter type of 
change, while dramatic from an anachronistic viewpoint, is exceptional and 
uncommon.  Ironically it is often these radical changes rather than the normal course 
of evolutionary change that receives attention and emphasis among scholars.  New 
Archaeology requires, in a review of military artefacts belonging to IA IIa, that the 
commonplace and the standard be given priority rather than the exceptional, the rare, 
and that which was experimental in the arsenals of this period.  The unusual artefact 
should be duly noted but care must be taken against inductive assertions that would 
distort the emerging picture of the ancient world in which the military encounters and 
wars occurred.  This perspective will serve as the point of departure for a review of 
the artefacts common to Syro-Palestine during IA IIa. 
 
6.1. Lethality of Weapon Factors 
The degree of a weapon’s lethality rests primarily on two general aspects: the 
technical qualities of the weapon and the proficiency of its employment.  Thus 
lethality is a comparative thing and inherently dynamic – a valuable window for 
anthropologic insight. Weapon lethality’s comparative nature is contextually 
circumscribed by factors of time, range, and cultural background.  Outside of this 
contextual ring-fence we end up with science fiction rather than scientific insight such 
as King David’s proto-type cavalry being compared with Napoleon’s dragoons and 
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chasseurs.  The simplest yardstick for lethality, which invites the establishment of a 
lethality index, is the matrix of total deaths caused within the shortest time span 
possible.  Dupuy represents the evolution of weapon lethality in the table below.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weapon Lethality Table (Dupuy, T. 1984: 288 – 289).  
 
Over the millennia of history Dupuy claims three great periods over which weapon 
lethality evolved: the Age of the Muscle, the Age of Gunpowder, and the Age of 
Technological Innovation.  This heuristic timeline of weapon evolution allows for 
some interesting insights.  Firstly, the huge time block of the first four millennia of 
world history, into which IA IIa fits, falls into the so-called Age of Muscle.  This 
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period reflects the slightest degree of technological change in military application.  
General technological innovations throughout this time period were continuous if not 
radical and time was needed to find their application in the sphere of weapon systems 
and battle doctrine. 
 
Secondly, the graph tracing weapon lethality over these first four millennia is 
remarkably flat.  No major advance in weapon lethality occurred in the age of muscle.  
A major advance is explained by Dupuy “as a new development that changes the 
nature of warfare” (1984: 287).  Ballistic weapons and melee weapons from Neolithic 
times underwent evolutionary change rather than revolutionary change.  For example, 
King David and Solomon’s prototype cavalry began to feature alongside the chariotry 
arm of the army, but this was evolutionary change of the mounted weapon system, not 
a revolutionary change in warfare.  It was the result of bigger and stronger mounts 
capable of bearing a fighting cavalryman rather than the earlier horses of smaller and 
weaker physiology.   
 
Thirdly, a clear cultural link exists between weapon evolution and the cultural 
backdrop of the period being studied.  Finally, in his role as a military historian, 
Dupuy lists 18 revolutionary technological changes which qualify as major advances 
in warfare (1984:287-294).  Warfare would never be conducted in the same manner 
once these innovations became manifest to a significant degree.  Of the 18 major 
advances, four occurred in the Age of Muscle, four in the Age of Gunpowder, and no 
less than ten (more than double both the previous dispensations combined) in the Age 
of Technological Innovation.  With regard to the four major advances that occurred in 
the Age of Muscle, all of them fall outside of IA IIa.  The latter began with Phillip of 
 224
Macedon’s development of the sarissa (lengthened pike) in c.359 B.C.E.  The Roman 
gladius (heavy short sword) introduced c.250 B.C.E., the English longbow and the 
Mongol composite bow of the 13th century were the other three significant 
developments in weapons and their lethality in the Age of Muscle.      
 
There are several additional factors that ought to be closely examined to preclude the 
accusation that this retroactive study of polemology is subjective and highly artificial, 
thus lacking in relevance.  Time and the scope of this dissertation obligate selectivity.  
Accordingly, the final aspect of weapon lethality that is crucial to the relevance in this 
survey is that of battlefield density or ‘dispersion’.  This is a product of weapon 
lethality.  Density is the result of the lethality of weapon systems, the battle doctrine, 
including organisation and deployment, to maximise the efficiency of such weapon 
systems offensively.  Defensively, its density comprises the counter tactics (again 
including organisation and deployment) to minimise the effects of the enemy’s 
offensive capacities.  Even though weapon lethality has increased over time, counter 
tactics and organisation to optimise security has likewise increased to offset 
battlefield casualties.  Greater dispersion on the battlefield has served as the primary 
off-setter to the ever increasing weapon lethality index.  The table given at the top of  
page 225 treats this phenomenon on the large scale of an army or a corps, numbering 
about 100 000 troops.  The trends and principle holds true notwithstanding the rarity 
of such huge troop mustering in antiquity.   
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Dispersion Pattern Table. (Dupuy, T.  1984: 312)      
6.2. Arms, Armour and Mobility in Iron Age IIa 
Warfare in terms of its operations is conducted either offensively or defensively.  
Military equipment may be categorised according to its operational function.  Such 
classifications are helpful but artificial.  It captures however the essence of warfare - 
particularly at the levels of operational strategy and tactics, viz. “... the ability to move 
troops to engage and injure the enemy without serious injury to oneself” (Yadin, 
1963: 3).  Thus arms, armour and mobility are the key elements of warfare for the 
common man in all dispensations of warfare and will serve as the principal points of 
departure for the review of military artefacts that obtained during IA IIa.  
      
6.3. Personal Ballistic Weapons 
Offensive capacity over a distance increases the operational and tactical options open 
to a commander.  Ballistic weapons place the enemy at a disadvantage; such weapons 
threaten the security of the enemy while denying the enemy not armed with such 
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weaponry the opportunity to threaten harm in return.  Ballistic weaponry also 
promotes the prospects for tactical surprise such as ambush, adding a psychological 
dimension to their scope.  Ballistic weapons are grouped according to a wide variety 
of characteristics.  For the purposes of ballistic weaponry in IA IIa the power of 
propulsion and the distinction by function will serve as the characteristics by which 
this category of weaponry is reviewed.  
       
6.3.1. Hand-Thrown Missiles. 
The stick or the stone are the simplest weapons of aggression.  Sophisticated ballistic 
weaponry of the nuclear age all derived from these primitive weapons.  During the 
temporal time frame of IA IIa hand-hurled rocks, stones from slings, and light spears 
are the main examples of this category of ballistic weaponry.  While simple in 
concept most of these weapons required great skill and strength to be used effectively.   
In order to realise the tactical advantage inherent in such weaponry on the battlefield, 
the power and effective range of the weapon (the missile itself) had to be extended 
beyond the normal capacities of the human arm.  The lethality index had to be 
increased for military purposes to be served.  To this end a number of simple throwing 
devices were devised to assist the throwers arm.  Unlike the bow, the power and range 
of the sling and the throwing-spear (javelin) were directly commensurate with the 
strength of the thrower’s arm.  In terms of these weapons destructive function, neither 
the sling-stone nor the light spear stored any energy useful to the lethality index 
(Weapons: An International Encyclopedia... 1982, s.v. ‘Hand-Thrown Missiles’).  
Devices to assist throwing the missile are distinguished by either being an integral 
part of the missile or by being a separate item that can be reused.   
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6.3.1.1. The Sling.  The sling is the prime example of a reusable throwing device for 
IA IIa.  The illustrations below are slings from various times and places of the ancient 
world.  Of particular interest to this dissertation is artefact number one in the picture 
below which derives from ancient Egypt.  It is a cord sling (with one missing cord) 
that was probably carried into Egypt either by invaders or mercenaries, the belief 
currently held among weapon specialists that the Egyptians did not use the sling. 
 
 
 
 
 (place picture of slings here,  
illustration in Weapons Encyclopedia, p.77). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Picture from Weapons: An International Encyclopedia ... 1982, s.v. ‘slings’) 
 
The sling-bullet illustrations shown below are all at twice their actual size.  Bullets ‘a’ 
and ‘b’ were recovered from Memphis, ancient Egypt.  The etched devices on them 
show an anchor and a star.  It is surmised that these bullets date to the period of the 
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Seleucid – Ptolemaic wars and may be relics from a Syrian siege, c. 171 B.C.E.  The 
lead sling bullet ‘c’ has the ancient Greek inscription “take that” etched on it.  Stone 
sling-bullet ‘d’ is from Maiden Castle, Dorset England and says something of how far 
the sling had been diffused throughout antiquity.  While these examples originate 
from times and places outside of the temporal framework of this study, they are 
evidence of the tactical material that permeated the ancient world.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Picture from Weapons: An International Encyclopedia...1982, s.v. ‘slings’) 
 
6.3.1.2. Throwing-spears.  Spears are the enduring and universal weapons found  
among all peoples of antiquity because of their great utility value.  The ease and 
cheapness of construction from universally available materials established the spear as 
the staple weapon of ancient armies and the benchmark against which the lethality 
index of all ancient weaponry was determined.  The throwing variant is the relevant 
weapon here.  Its form and function was simple.  The long shaft ensures that the sharp 
tip is delivered point first, and its added weight increases the kinetic energy behind 
the blow.  The disadvantage of throwing-spears is that not many can be carried, as 
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compared to slingshot for instance, and once thrown they are lost to the combatant 
(Weapons: An International Encyclopedia... 1982, s.v. ‘throwing-spears’).  While 
throwing-spears made good shock weapons they had to be supplemented with a 
secondary personal weapon for subsequent fighting.  The wide variety of throwing-
spears shown below tell something of the universal value of the spear to a wide cross 
section of ancient and later cultures. 
 
                                                                       
 
 
 
 
(Place picture of throwing-spears here, p.82) 
 
 
(Picture from Weapons: An International Encyclopedia... 1982, s.v. ‘throwing-
spears’)  
Various materials were used to make spear points, including hammered copper, cast 
bronze, or worked stone, flint or bone.  Iron was a scarce and an expensive 
commodity during IA IIa.  Artefacts 4 and 5 in the illustration below are of particular 
interest to the ancient Near East, IA IIa.  These spear points were fastened to the shaft 
by means of a socket or tang that projected from the spear point. 
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(place picture of spear points here) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Picture from Weapons: An International Encyclopedia ... 1982, s.v. ‘spear points’) 
The size range of throwing-spears is great.  The greater majority was in excess of the 
height of the thrower.  Shorter varieties came into existence over the years, sometimes 
called javelins.  Darts were about 30 centimetres long but have no relevance to Syro-
Palestine’s IA IIa period.  
 
 
 
 
6.3.2. Hand-Held Missile Throwers 
Such weapons essentially all follow the same technical concept.  They are hand-fired 
weapons of two parts; the propelled component and the device for discharging the 
propelled component.  Amongst all the many examples, the bow and arrow is relevant 
to this study.  The technical principle here is that the destructive energy of the firer is 
indirectly transferred from the firer via the bow into the propelled component, namely 
the arrow.  This contrasts the throwing-spear in that the transfer of destructive energy 
in the case of the latter is directly to the weapon.  In the case of the hand-held missile 
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thrower, be it modern small arms or the IA IIa bow, destructive energy is significantly 
increased by the discharging device and produces a significant increase in the lethality 
index.  The bow had been “in fairly general use certainly since the end of the fourth 
millennium” (Heath, 1980: p.14).  Many technical developments in bowyery had 
already taken place by the time of IA IIa.  The conquering Sumerian armies of 
Naram-Sin utilised the full potential of the composite bow as a warlike weapon, their 
military footprints reaching as far as the Mediterranean Sea, diffusing their military 
innovations and technical superiority amongst peoples far beyond Sumer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Picture from Weapons: An International Encyclopedia... 1982, s.v. ‘Bows’) 
The spring of the bow became the multiplying factor for the lethality index.  Thus the 
bow, technically speaking, is a spring that stores and multiplies energy.  The slow 
strength of the archer, as he draws the bowstring and bends the bow, is rapidly 
transferred to the arrow, propelling it farther and at a much higher velocity than it 
could be thrown by hand.  This simple device had the advantage in range and 
accuracy over all hand held throwing weapons.  It added tactical complexity to both 
defensive and offensive operational strategy.  For military archaeologists, “the bow, 
and more particularly the composite bow, is technically one of the most complicated 
 232
and most advanced artefacts among those of perishable materials” (Rausing in Heath, 
1980, p.8).  
 
Bows became increasingly sophisticated as the technical innovations followed one 
after the other, varying in overall size and complexity of construction.  
Notwithstanding the many profiles and sizes of bows, it is the manner of construction 
that serves to distinguish among bows.  From the details of the Egyptian stele and 
other evidence commemorating the Battle of Kadesh, in 1286 B.C.E., between the 
Neo-Hittites and the Egyptians under pharaoh Rameses II, there is evidence among 
the Egyptian forces of both the simple recurved bow (double convex) and the more 
sophisticated and longer ranged composite bow being used in the same time period 
and region.  Simple bows are shown carried by Nubian mercenary archers while 
compound bows are shown as the principal weapon of the Egyptian’s elite chariotry 
force.  
 
   
 
 
 
(place picture of bow profiles here) 
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(Picture from Yadin,Y.1982, The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands: 235) 
6.3.2.1.  Simple Bows.  Also named ‘self bows’, such a hand held missile thrower is 
made from a single material, usually wood.  It predates the composite bow, being part 
of the technical apparatus common to most early civilisations and man was found 
possessed of it at the dawn of history, c. 3000 B.C.E.  The simple bow continued to be 
employed in the armies of the ancient Near East, even long after the composite bow 
made its earliest documented appearance in Sumer. 
 
6.3.2.2.  Compound Bows.  Such bows differ mainly in the construction when 
compared to the simple bow.  The upper and lower limbs are ‘backed’ with a layer of 
resilient materials.  Horn, animal sinew, or another kind of wood served to strengthen 
the bow stave.  Weapons specialists distinguish between ‘laminated bows’ (layers of 
similar materials), ‘backed bows’ (backed with resilient materials), and ‘composite 
bows’.  The key factor in recognising a composite bow is that a composite bow was 
made up from at least three different materials.  The aim was being to maximise 
effective range and penetration power. 
 
 
 
 
(Place picture here of ‘types of bow construction’) 
 
 
 234
1) Simple bow  2) Backed bow 3) Laminated bow 4) Composite bow 
(Picture from Weapons: An International Encyclopedia…1982, s.v. ‘Bows’) 
 
6.3.2.3. Accessories.  The archer was a technical specialist and carried with him 
various paraphernalia necessary for the proper employment of his ballistic weapon.  
The bowstring, a key component, was made from flax, hemp, animal sinew, cotton, 
and ramie, also known as rhea fibre; a valuable Eastern fibre, the product of a species 
of nettle used for textile purposes (Consolidated – Webster ... 1962, s.v. ‘Rhea fibre).  
Such were the materials most used.  Their key qualities were elasticity and toughness.  
Arrow cases, also named quivers, were common to archers the world over.  Evidence 
of this is given in the pictures on page 235.  Detail from the Egyptian relief on the 
temple of Rameses III at Medinet Habu show early light chariots in action in their role 
as a ballistics weapon platform.  Noteworthy are the rearward positioning of the 
wheels on the chariot car and the various ballistic equipment such as the quiver 
fastened to the side of the chariot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Place Medinet Habu picture of Egyptian Chariot here) 
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(Picture from Heath’s Archery, A Military History, 1980:18) 
The bow case was essential in the fluctuating seasonal temperatures of the Near East.  
Besides efficient portage, it also served to prevent the bow from warping when not in 
use.  It was standard equipment to soldiers trained in archery.  In the ensuing Late 
Iron period the Persian Immortals are depicted in typical Asiatic infantry apparel.  The 
reliance on archery is in evidenced by the bow case, as depicted in a frieze 
representing the Royal Guards of the Persian great King – the renowned ‘Immortals’.  
The ornate clothing says much about the social status of the Royal Guard.  Their 
employment of the bow indicates this was not a weapon system condescendingly 
relegated to the ‘common man’ as was the case in the West European armies of the 
medieval period.  In the east, the bow was highly regarded for several millennia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Place picture here; Persian Immortal) 
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(Picture from Reader’s Digest Atlas of the Bible, 1981:15). 
 
Other accessories that aimed to sustain the archer and increase his efficiency in the 
field included a ‘bracer’, a pad worn on the left-wrist to protect it from the strike of 
the released bowstring.  Another accessory was the thumb-ring.  The drawing power 
of the bowstring placed a great load on the archer’s right-hand thumb.  The repeated 
draw and release action in the heat of battle could rub the archers thumb raw; thus the 
use of such an accessory.  Wrist-bracers were generally made of tough materials such 
as leather or of more expensive materials such as ivory in the case of nobles.  Thumb-
rings were produced from common materials such as bronze or bone, or the more 
exotic ones from material such as jade. 
 
     
 
 
 
Place picture here;  
Drawing ‘d’ of thumb-ring 
 
(Picture from Weapons: An International Encyclopedia ... 1982, s.v. ‘Bows’) 
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6.4.  Personal Melee Weapons 
Weapons wielded by hand and not relinquished, and as were generally common to IA 
IIa period is the subject of this subsection.  There was a great variety of such 
weaponry and an even greater variety of ways for employing them effectively against 
diversely armed and armoured opponents.  Melee weapons as defined above had been 
evolving in terms of a lethality index since before the onset of history proper.  
Tactical doctrine for their effective employment was and still is as relevant as the 
purpose-made hand weapon itself.  Technical developments in metallurgy and the 
impact of cultural diffusion often provided the stimulus for tactical doctrine and vice 
versa in all periods.  It warrants emphases however, that tactical doctrine was securely 
shackled to technical developments.  Inertia arising from conservative values and 
technical limitations ensured that melee weaponry from earlier archaeological periods 
were still used during IA IIa as well.  Melee weapons (including improvised weapons 
such as peasant’s farming implements etc.) that obtained during IA IIa can be broadly 
grouped as concussive weapons, edged weapons, and pole-arms.   
6.4.1. Concussive Weapons 
To appreciate the club as the first purpose-made hand weapon it is necessary to 
understand the dynamics that govern its lethality index.  The heavy weight held in the 
hand (a), or the stick (b), can both be used to strike the enemy with greater impact 
than the hand alone.  But when the weight is mounted to the end of the stick (c) 
momentum is significantly increased and the lethality index rises greatly.  The ever 
increasing number of armour bearing troops on the battlefields of the ancient Near 
East and the constantly improving efficiency of personal armour stimulated 
modifications in weaponry to offset such accruing advantages in security.   
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Simple wooden clubs changed to become composite material clubs, made of stone 
initially and later with metal heads.  The design of the club head changed to meet the 
contingencies of the day.  The introduction of armour among more and more common 
troops by IA IIa undermined the original concussive function of the simple club.  It 
now evolved to include a spike or a sharpened edge by which helmets and body 
armour could be pierced.  The weight of the device still sufficed to smash bones or to 
neutralise enemy by sheer brute force.  Along with the bow, it was a weapon often 
shown in the hand of god-kings like the pharaoh’s of Early Bronze-Age Egypt and 
elsewhere, suggesting to a largely illiterate world the dire and terminal consequences 
of defiance and political dissidence.  Fighting picks and war-hammers did not belong 
to the IA IIa period.  These weapons evolved from clubs and came into being in 
response to the increasing quantity and quality of mail, and later, the more articulated 
plate-armour of the late medieval period.  Accordingly they do not merit further 
mention in this dissertation (Weapons: An International Encyclopaedia…1982, s.v. 
‘Clubs’).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Place picture of Egyptian stone mace here) 
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(Picture from Weapons: An International Encyclopedia ...1982, s.v. ‘Ceremonial 
maces’) 
6.4.2. Edged Weapons 
This category of hand-weapon is further subdivided into fighting-axes, daggers, and 
swords.  The key difference between concussive and edged weapons was the former’s 
function to smash and beat while the latter’s was to cut or pierce.   
 
6.4.2.1.  The Axe.  The axe was more problematical to produce than the mace owing 
to its function.  The increased incidence of armour on the battlefield led to different 
solutions at different times.  Axes harkened back to the Neolithic period and even 
earlier during which they were made from flint which offered a natural sharp, hard 
edge.  It was mainly technological methods of production that distinguished the 
historical-periods axe from earlier versions.  Rather than by process of chipping and 
polishing, the Bronze-Age axe that continued into the Iron Age was cast in open 
moulds.  A hammering process then hardened the cutting edge.   
 
 
 
 
(picture of shaping / moulding an axe-head, p. 23) 
 
(Picture from Weapons: An International Encyclopedia ... 1982, s.v. ‘Axes 1’) 
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The techniques of casting the complex shape of a socketed axe were mastered in time.  
This was an enduring problem that pre- and post-dated IA IIa.  The method of 
fastening the axe-head to the handle was already resolved in pre-historic times.  The 
illustration and captions below provide something of a technological chronology table 
of securing the axe head to a shaft. 
 
 
 
(picture with captions of fasting methods of an axe-head to a shaft) 
page 22 
 
 
 
(Picture from Weapons: An International Encyclopedia ... 1982, s.v. ‘Axes 1’) 
The conception of the axe as a melee weapon for military purposes influenced its 
development.  In much the same way as the sword that followed it, axes were 
developed for the alternate functions of cutting and piercing.  Broad scalloped axe 
blades, such as the ‘epsilon’ (figure ‘e’ on page 240) were designed for cutting and 
not for piercing, which considering the belated appearance of efficient body armour, 
makes the cutting and slashing function of such weapons more understandable.  Such 
bladed axes were very effective melee weapons during the Bronze-Age periods prior 
to the proliferation of body armour.  Axe-heads that were long, ending in a narrow 
sharp edged blade, were developed to penetrate body armour.  These axes were 
however a secondary development.  The broad bladed cutting axe was largely 
obsolete by the onset of the Iron Age owing to the increasing proportions of helmeted 
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and armoured soldiers.  Existing armouries and the continued individual use of cutting 
axes account for their inertia or occurrence into the Iron Age.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Place picture of tang-type axe with wide edge here p.180) 
 
 
 
The straight left edge of the axe above fitted into a recessed haft.  In time narrowing 
the cutting edge further increased the efficiency of the penetrative function of this axe.  
Later piercing axes as on page 242 have narrower cutting edges. 
(Picture from Yadin’s Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands, 1963:180)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Picture from Yadin’s Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands, 1963:180) 
 Various socket-type axes were cast as metalworking techniques began to extend 
across the breadth of the Ancient Near East during the Late Bronze Age, particularly 
in the lands of Mesopotamia.  The conservative nature of the ancient Egyptians was 
manifest by their consistent preference for the tang-type fitted axe, which ensured that 
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such axes also continued into Iron Age.  The tendency to increase the penetrative 
function is also in evidence in the socketed axe heads, such as artefact # 6 in the 
examples given below and on page 243.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.    2.   3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.       5. 
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6.                    7. 
 
1.  Sample hand-axe from the Pleistocene period.  
2. Egyptian bronze battle-axe for piercing armour,  
  bearing name of Pharaoh Sanusert I.  (Note the  
  axe-head’s splayed back which would be lashed into  
  a recessed shaft). 
3.  Broad scalloped cutting function axe from 12th Dynasty ancient Egypt   
4.  Egyptian axe-head from the Coptic period             5.  Bronze axe-head from Luristan (Iran), an area   
for slashing unarmoured enemy.                                       that excelled in bronze fine casting technique. 
6.  Cast bronze axe-head with a crouching lion  
on the socket,  from Luristan, c.2400 – 1200 B.C.E.    7.  A composite battle-axe from Syria with a                  
 Mesopotamia was more progressive than Egypt              dedicated piercing function.  It comprises  
 During the Bronze Age in metal casting .                         an iron blade set in a socket of bronze.  
(Pictures from Weapons: An International Encyclopedia ...1982, s.v. ‘Axes 1’) 
6.4.2.2.  The Dagger.  The dagger is older than the sword, dating back to the Stone 
Age when they were made from chipped and polished material such as flint, quartz, or 
obsidian.  While the hardness of such stone allows for a sharp edge to be fashioned, it 
lacked toughness and temperance.  Longer bladed weapons made from these stone 
materials would have shattered when employed as swords.  The onset of the Bronze 
Age c.3150 B.C.E. precipitated a technological revolution that in turn affected the 
manufacture of blades.  Consequently daggers increased in length.  When the blade 
was at least as long as the hilt it is accepted that short swords had come into being.  
By 2500 B.C.E daggers and short swords were being made throughout the ancient 
Near East and Europe (Merit Student Encyclopedia ... 1973, s.v. ‘Swords and 
Daggers’).  
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6.4.2.3.The Sword.  Daggers, like the axe and the mace before it, predate the sword 
due to technological limitations in metallurgy.  These earlier weapons, together with 
spears and javelins, had comparatively small metal components whereas the sword 
required a longer metal blade to make it effective.  The earliest Bronze Age swords 
are called rapiers.  Scholars specialising in military archaeology point to the strikingly 
similar appearance these early Bronze Age swords have to rapiers of the 16th and 17th 
centuries C.E.  A rapier is a thrusting sword, rather than a slashing or a cutting 
weapon.  Examples of Bronze Age rapiers, such as the artefacts shown below, were 
typically made of bronze in the regions of Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Anatolia.  
These earliest swords date to the Third Millennium B.C.E.  Interesting for the Bronze 
Age context were these rare iron swords, the first known purpose built iron artefacts -
exceptional artefacts for the Bronze Age.  Both these swords were found in Anatolia, 
the region regarded as the earliest for iron working technology in the ancient Near 
East.  
 
The main technical drawback of these early rapiers was the weakness of the 
artificially attached handle to the sword blade.  The haft was not an extension of the 
blade as in later period swords and daggers.  Instead the handle was made from a 
variety of materials and was riveted onto the end of the sword.  It could not sustain the 
impact stress of a slashing or swing action; it thus functioned as an elongated dagger 
for fear of breaking on contact if swung.  Third Millennium swords were limited to a 
thrusting or piercing action.  
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(Picture from Yadin’s The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands, 1963:145). 
The development of the curved sword, also referred to adjectivally as the ‘sickle 
sword’ was a logical step toward producing a sword that was sufficiently robust to 
function as a cutting sword without breaking on impact.  For the purpose of artefact 
identification, sickle swords of the Middle Bronze Age closely resembled a modified 
cutting axe; they had long hilts and a short blade.  The increasing proliferation of 
helmets and body armour accounted for the disappearance of the cutting axe from 
ancient Western Asia, and the sickle sword itself accordingly changed during the Late 
Bronze Age to a progressively longer blade and a shorter handle (a useful observation 
when analysing artwork or such artefacts).  By the time of the Iron Age, curved 
swords were common to all the ancient Near Eastern armies, as the artefacts below 
confirm.  Egyptian conservatism allowed for the sickle sword, or the Khopesh as they 
called it, to continue even after straight swords replaced it elsewhere.  
 (a)              (b)               (c)   (d)
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Dates and excavation sites of sickle sword: 
(a) From Gezer, early 14th century BCE (c) From Egypt, tomb of Tutankhamen 
(c. 1350 BCE).   (c) From Ugarit, 14th century BCE     (d) From Assyria, sword of 
King Adad-Nirari (1310 – 1280 BCE)  
(Picture from Yadin’s The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands, 1963:207) 
 
Toward the end of the Bronze Age, c.1200 B.C.E., incremental technical progress in 
metalworking also brought improvements in sword making.  Rather than a separately 
cast sword and hilt, sword -blades cast during IA IIa were cast with a rearward-
protruding tang to which a handle could be reliably secured.  Similarly, some Early 
Iron Age sword-blades narrowed into a shank onto which the handle was fitted.  
Sword shapes varied throughout the region; leaf-shaped blades, sickle-swords, short 
and stocky blades or longer heavier blades of both bronze and others of crude 
hammered iron obtained (Yadin, 1963:140). 
 
The early steel swords date to about 1500 B.C.E.  It was mainly in Urartu, north of the 
Assyrian homelands that the technique for producing carbonised iron, or steel, was 
developed.  These smiths repeatedly heated the iron in charcoal fires and then 
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hammered it.  In this way the iron picked up enough carbon to become low-grade 
crude steel.  This was significantly harder, tougher and more durable than pig iron and 
the alloy bronze.  Such technical skills were soon translated into an increased war 
potential and in due time into an increased military potential for those peoples and 
states possessed of such superior technical literacy.  To illustrate, superior steel 
weaponry afforded the Philistines a greater military potential than the Israelites.   
 
It bears mentioning that the early sword hilts also improved over time.  Originally 
(and this remained largely the case during IA IIa) there was no protective device for 
the wielder’s hand.  The base of the sword blade swelled out, offering some protection 
to the hand, but it was largely inefficient as a defence.  Larger structures were placed 
between the handgrips and the blade.  As the technical efficiency of swords increased 
there was a corresponding general decrease in the importance of the dagger as a 
military weapon.   Swords continued to evolve throughout all the historical periods 
and on into the modern era.      
 
 
 
 
 
1. Sickle sword, early bronze sword from Babylon. (Weapons: An International 
Encyclopedia… 1982:35) 
 
 
 
 248
 
2.  Nordic bronze short sword, one piece casting.  (Weapons: An International 
Encyclopedia…1982:44) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Roman steel gladius, with missing hilt.  (Weapons: An International 
Encyclopedia… 1982:45).  
The Nordic Bronze Age sword and the Roman gladius are included here as 
illustrations of the sword’s technical developments rather than as potential Near 
Eastern in situ artefacts from the period IA IIa.  
 
6.4.3. Pole-arms 
Adding a long haft to weapons originally designed for cutting, thrusting, or clubbing 
bestowed the significant advantage of reach in the tactical melee. Such a tactical 
innovation also affected the initiative in the fight.  Pole-arms represent a large 
grouping of weapons that evolved over the centuries for both infantry and soldiers on 
mounts of various kinds.  Pole-arms became very diversified in the medieval period 
(glaives, halberds, partisans, military forks and tridents, etc) but that subject in its 
entirety does not concern this period.  It is primarily the spear that concerns us here. 
The spear predates history, reaching back into the Palaeolithic period, where it began 
as a long shaft with a sharpened end, the point being hardened in a fire.  By the Upper 
Palaeolithic period, ivory barbs were being added to the spear’s foreshaft.  In time, 
spearheads of greater penetrative efficiency were being produced from materials such 
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as stone or bone.  Gradually, bronze and then iron spearheads by the onset on IA IIa  
were being fashioned.  Such spearheads were by then more specialised.  Several 
derivatives followed.  Light throwing spears such as javelins and heavy throwing 
spears such as the Roman pilum, together with the long-thrusting spears typical of the 
Classical Greek period armies and the pike or sarissa of the Macedonian phalanxes all 
stem from the ubiquitous spear of antiquity.  Other specialised derivatives include the 
use of the spear by mounted troops and the eventual development of the spear into the 
lance, the principal shock weapon of armoured cavalry (Merit Students Encylopedia 
.... 1973 s.v. ‘spears’).  
 
6.5. Personal Armour 
Personal armour or security on the battlefield is the passive element of the three 
constituents that comprise basic warfare at the tactical level.  In retrospect it is evident 
that there has been a dynamic struggle for priority between mobility, firepower and 
security.  The dynamics between these three elements of warfare primarily constitute 
the art of battle at the tactical and operational levels of strategy. 
 
Yadin observes that a large and heavy shield could give excellent security, but it 
would do so at the cost of mobility and interfere with firepower (1963:13-14).  
Moreover, a coat of mail may free up both hands but mobility would still be 
compromised.  Such considerations are only meaningful when viewed against the 
cultural backdrop of the peoples and nations under review and in their temporal 
framework.  
 
6.6. Mobility 
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Momentarily setting aside the common foot soldier which remained by and large the 
principal soldier type of IA IIa, the slow development and diversification of more 
mobile tactical arms was being manifest.  The horse and the camel had already been 
domesticated during the Early Bronze Age, c.4th Millennia B.C.E.  Around 2000 – 
1500 B.C.E. the potential of the horse as a draught animal had been realised.  The 
chariot as a weapon system is dated to the Late Bronze Age and cavalry prototypes to 
the ensuing Late Bronze Age.  The primary function of these early IA IIa chariots was 
that of weapons system platform on the battlefield. From this specialised weapons 
platform ballistic weaponry could be brought to bear on decisive spots in the midst of 
the fighting.  These Late Bronze Age chariots were highly sophisticated weapon 
systems in their day.  From the vantage point of modern scholars, these chariots were 
light chariots relying on their speed and manoeuvrability for their battlefield 
advantage.  The heavy impact chariots were yet to follow in a later period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Place picture of Late Canaanite Chariot here 
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The long axle, 1.53 meters, gave such light chariots great stability even on sharp 
turns. 
(Picture of Canaanite chariot from Late Bronze II period.  Picture from Wise’s 
Ancient Armies of the Middle East, 1981:31) 
  
In time the horses would be selectively bred to produce bigger and more powerful 
animals.  These genetically modified horses would eventually come to have the 
physical power necessary to draw the heavier crew loads and heavier chariots of later 
periods that were better suited for the shock role.  The chariots full evolution to 
optimum efficiency as a shock weapon system reached into the period of the New 
Assyrian Empire, c. 9th century B.C.E., at which time the chariot body had changed 
from a light weight, manoeuvrable vehicle to a heavy, shock weapon proper.   These 
later chariots relied on destructive impact rather than as a ballistic weapons system 
platform.  Such heavy chariots were drawn by three to four horses and were deemed 
to be expendable. 
 
The mobility under discussion here is tactical mobility – chariots were not intended to 
serve as transportation for logistical purposes such as transporting troops to a distant 
battlefield.  In its principal function during IA IIa as a mobile platform weapons 
system the chariot had to be stable, fast and manoeuvrable.  For the purposes of 
military archaeology the chariot comprised the following parts; body, wheels, axle, 
chariot car pole, yoke, and various weapons fittings.  Technical developments that 
were spurred on from field experience saw the repositioning of the axle to the rear of 
the chariot car for improved manoeuvrability and stability in its role as a stable 
weapons platform.  The development of the spoked-wheel added significantly to the 
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speed of these early light chariots.  The weapons fittings were mountings for such 
things as quivers, bow-cases, and sheaths and stands for axes and spears.  For speed, 
and to offset the significant cost of metal and artificers fees as much as was possible, 
the IA IIa chariot was made from various suitable woods and leather.  Where loads, 
stress and wear were greatest, some parts were made of bronze.  This was ‘cutting 
edge’ military technology and its employment would have been restricted to the 
traditional great powers of the day such as Egypt, Early Assyrian Empire, and the 
Hittites of Anatolia.  In Canaan itself the wealthier and long established princedoms 
may also have had sufficient means and political capacity to employ chariots.  The 
same situation existed among the confederate Philistine cities.  It was the weapon 
system of the nobles and the upper-classes, the royal retainers, such as evidenced by 
the Mariannu of the Hurrians (Knapp, 1988:184).  Nations rich in resources and 
technological capacity, often born of a long established sedentary lifestyle with 
agricultural surpluses, tended to posses these sophisticated weapon systems. 
 
True cavalry evolved as horses increased in size and strength.  It is generally easier to 
pull something than to carry it.  The horse had been domesticated sometime during 
the Middle Bronze Period (2000 – 1500 B.C.E.) but the development of cavalry took 
a further millennium to unfold, c.1000 – 750 B.C.E.  It was the Hurrians who are 
again credited with the innovations associated with the progress toward true cavalry.  
The diffusion of cavalry throughout the ancient Near East took time and extended 
beyond the IA IIa period.  Such cavalry units as existed in IA IIa were rare and 
generally limited to technologically more advanced peoples.  Here horses were 
custom bred to bear the armed rider directly into battle rather serve as draught animal 
for the chariots which had certain tactical limitations. 
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The several advantages of the horse over the chariot included its capacity to negotiate 
difficult terrain that was unsuitable to chariotry.  The horse born warrior had greater 
utility value on the battlefield.  It followed a similar development path as the chariot, 
first as a mobile firing platform for hand-ported ballistic weapons, gradually 
progressing through centuries of selective breeding until cavalry could be employed 
in the shock weapon role of carrying an armoured rider at speed into the fray.   
Several centuries passed before the mounted soldier gained ascendancy over the foot 
soldier on the battlefield.  In the Western Mediterranean this happened only during the 
late Imperial Roman period of history.  In the East it occurred a lot earlier as 
evidenced in the empires of Cyrus the Mede and the Skythians and their successors 
such as Sarmatian peoples around the northern steppes of the Black Sea. 
 
During IA IIa the effectiveness of cavalry was very limited.  Like the development of 
modern weapon systems such as artillery, tanks, aircraft, and rocketry, the early stages 
of equestrian soldiery also evidenced crude and slow progress.  Modern scholars 
using examples of their day must be vigilant in guarding against technological 
anachronisms.  However, the military doctrine in the effective employment of such a 
troop type in combat was closely tied to further technical developments.  The late 
introduction of improved saddles rather than horse blankets, and reins, and even later 
stirrups and spurs all contributed to the better control of the horse and its increased 
utility as a mobile weapons platform.  The cavalryman could use his thighs, knees, 
and spurred feet to control the horse leaving both hands free for spear and shield or 
for bow and arrow.  In time the horse and the armed rider developed into a combined, 
articulate weapon system in its own right, its zenith being the West-European plate-
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armoured knight of the High Middle Ages some two millennia later.   Yadin observes 
that it was little wonder that the horse only made a meaningful contribution to the 
armies and raiding parties of antiquity some one and a half millennia after the chariot 
(Yadin, 1963: 5). 
 
6.7. Military Architecture    
This section refers to architecture as a branch of warfare by means of which 
advantage often accrues to the defenders because of enhanced static defences.  Static 
defences may include field fortifications of a temporary or a permanent nature.  It 
may involve strategic sites, including cities and villages along suitable invasion 
routes.  Such sites may be purpose-built walls (i.e. Hadrian’s Wall), towers, and 
fortresses such as the Roman mile-castles in ancient Britain or fortified cities and 
villages with gates and in time gate complexes located at strategic sites such as 
Jericho and Lachish.  By means of military architecture, whether such structures are 
temporary or permanent, defence values are increased.  This in turn affects the overall 
political cost – benefit equation when political actors are choosing means to political 
ends such as between military statecraft and more passive forms such as diplomacy or 
economic statecraft.  Such a rubric invites a more careful evaluation of military 
statecraft as a viable alternative to political ends over other forms of political 
dialogue.  Just as there existed an esoteric dynamic between the components of 
warfare at the tactical level (viz. mobility, security, and firepower), so likewise there 
is an esoteric dynamic at work when military architecture is investigated.     
 
Yadin gives the aim of military architecture as denying the enemy two important 
advantages in assault; mobility and firepower (1963: 16).  Moreover, military 
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architecture adds security to those who exploit it effectively.  This is the point of 
departure for a study of military architecture in its proper cultural context.  Once the 
basic dynamics have been outlined, the material remains of military architecture and 
its components such as gates, walls, and towers, for the period IA IIa can be 
intelligibly discussed.  
     
6.7.1. Dynamics of Military Architecture 
Developments in the methods of attack and defence were reciprocal.  Successful 
attacks resulted in penetration of the fortification or exhaustion of the morale and 
logistical resources of its defenders while successful defences denied the attackers 
penetration until such time as the attackers resolve or logistical resources were 
exhausted. 
6.7.2. Attacking Fortifications.   
In the offensive five possible methods of penetrating a fortification may be listed.  
Military architecture is a dynamic science and its innovations were counteractive 
responses to the threat of offensive penetration.  The changes in fortification design 
and methods of construction say something about the progress of engineering science, 
available resources, regional trading patterns, and the extent and range of cultural 
exchange.  Fortifications were the reified response to all such material and intellectual 
factors.       
 
6.7.2.1.  Penetration by force from above.  This was achieved by scaling the walls, 
mainly by means of ladders as illustrated below.  The strategic dialectics thus 
produced taller walls, large revetments at the foot of exterior walls that frustrated the 
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purchase of a ladder at the base of the wall, and crenulations and embrasures to 
protect the defenders as they kept the enemy storming parties at bay. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1        2 
 
(left) Drawing of the relief in the Ramesseum at Thebes.  It illustrates an Egyptian assault on a strongly 
fortified city from above in 13th century Syria.  
(right) Drawing of the relief in the Egyptian temple of Karnak (1290 – 1223 B.C.E) showing 
penetration of fortifications from above.  The depicted assault was Rameses II’s attack on the city of 
Ashkelon. 
(Picture from Yadin’s The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands. 1963: 228 – 229) 
 
6.7.2.2.  Penetration through the barrier.  Direct penetration of the fortifications could 
be achieved with hand weapons and other implements if the scale of the fortification 
was modest. Incrementally progressive technological sophistry stimulated the creation 
of dedicated and purpose-built devices and machinery wherewith the attackers could 
bring ever increasing destructive power to bear on the fortifications and prepared 
defences.  Sophisticated gate complexes were the strategic dialectic relevant to   
penetration, with its purpose-build devices such as the ever more powerful rams. 
 
The battering ram to the untrained mind initially appears crude but it was in fact 
technically complicated to manufacture.  It also required both brain and brawn to 
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operate effectively.  Engineering skills were needed to know where to thrust the 
metal-tipped pointed or wedged head into the wall, seeking the cracks or crevices 
between the wall’s stone- and brickwork.  Once securely lodged into a fissure, the ram 
was levered from side to side, dislodging stones and collapsing a section of the wall.   
 
The defenders were not passive onlookers.  They engaged the battering ram and its 
operating crew from the walls above with ballistic weaponry and by dropping rocks, 
beams, and other weights onto the ram and its crew.  In response to the defenders 
strategic dialectic, the attackers would deploy slingers and archers nearby to suppress 
the defender’s missile fire.  From very early periods the attackers sought protection by 
providing cover for the ram operators from the defenders missiles.  Crude affairs to 
begin with, as illustrated by the Beni-hasan 20th century B.C.E. wall painting, these 
devices incrementally grew in size, sophistication and power over several millennia as 
the pictures demonstrate.        
 
 TECHNICAL EVOLUTION OF THE BATTERING RAM 
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The crude hand-held Egyptian ram as employed c.1900 B.C.E. with a protective 
portable hut.  The screen of protective missile-armed troops in the upper register 
engages enemy defenders on the walls. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Drawing of the relief from Sargon II’s royal palace at Khorsabad (721 – 705 B.C.E.) 
depicting the Assyrian attack on the fortified city of Pazashi.  Note the Assyrian 
wheeled and towered rams.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Three centuries later, a cross-sectioned depiction of a huge battering ram employed in 
the post-Peloponnesian War era.  Noteworthy are the wheels, the chain suspended 
massive ram with its metal-covered chisel-end, and the protective housing with its 
fire-resistant covering of layers of animal skin with dried seaweed between each layer  
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(Pictures on page 258 taken from Yadin’s The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands. 1963: 
159 and 425 respectively.  Picture of a fourth century ram taken from Warry’s 
Warfare in the Classical World, 1980:63.) 
 
6.7.2.3.  Penetration from below.  This was less dangerous for the assault team but it 
demanded engineering and other such technical skills.  It was also very time 
consuming which compounded logistical factors.  Such an approach was best carried 
out in secrecy so that the element of surprise could be properly exploited.  Walls and 
towers could be undermined and collapsed by tunnelling.  When the tunnel reached 
the position of the fortifications faggots were packed against the wooden supports of 
the tunnel at that measured point.  When the supports were burned the tunnel would 
collapse, bringing down the fortification on the surface above the tunnel. 
      
To avoid the defenders taking countermeasures such as erecting inner blocking walls 
behind the outer wall, or counter tunnelling to attack the tunnel builders at work, 
efforts where often made to keep the tunnelling operation a secret.  Oversized 
foundations, traps built below the walls, and various other measures were taken to 
obstruct and detect tunnelling such as placing bowls of water on the floor of the 
fortification and watching for ripples and other disturbances on the water’s surface.     
 
6.7.2.4.  Penetration by siege.  Such an attack took the most time to bear fruit for the 
attacker.  Its value was that it minimised the attacker’s losses, which tended to be 
severe when attempting to break through the fortifications or to scale them.  The task 
of the attacking besiegers was to cut the defenders lines of communications, ensuring 
no logistical support reached the enemy and that their morale and physical ability to 
resist was reduced to where further resistance was deemed pointless.  To effect a 
proper siege the attacking force had to be able to resist enemy attempts to break 
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through the siege to assist the besieged.  Sometimes such attempts were made by the 
besieged troops as they sallied forth from the besieged fortification and attacked a 
portion of the besieging forces.  Alternately, an enemy relief force attempted to lift the 
siege by attacking and defeating the besieging force such as King Saul at the siege of 
Jabash – Gilead (see 5.3. page 141).  To meet such threats the besieging force 
established various fieldwork defences around the besieged place and concentrated 
the bulk of his strength into fortified camps.  These camps were strategically sited to 
block the approach and the escape routes and ideally, allow the besieging force to 
respond quickly when required to.  The illustration on page 261 shows the Roman 
siege of Jerusalem undertaken by the armies of Vespasian and Titus, 68 – 70 CE.   
 
 
 
. 
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Vespasian’s Siege of Jerusalem, AD 68 – 70 
(Picture from Connolly’s The Roman Army, 1975: 62.) 
 
Although the time frame is different the siege principles are much in evidence.  
Noteworthy are the fortified Roman camps located on the northern approaches of 
Jerusalem, including Mount Scopus which, for tactical considerations, was the high 
ground, and the northern section of the Mount of Olives.  On the opposite side of 
Jerusalem, on the high ground above the Himnon Valley was the third Roman camp.  
The picture also shows the Roman circumvallations (siege lines) all along Jerusalem’s 
surrounding hills to where they butt against the fortified Roman camps.  Some sieges 
took years to run their course.  In the case below the siege began in AD 68 and ended 
in AD 70, which was, by the standards of antiquity, not a particularly long siege. 
 
6.7.2.5.  Penetration by ruse.  Such an attack sought to offset the political cost of 
potentially heavy losses that usually resulted from assaulting fortifications from 
above, below, and through the barriers.  It aimed to bring success more speedily than 
the assault by siege.  Yadin observes: “Men of a hostile army would seek to infiltrate 
into the city by cunning, using some ruse to gain the confidence of the defenders.  
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Once inside, they would overpower the guards and open the city gates to the awaiting 
attackers” (1963: 18).  The celebrated story of the ‘Trojan Horse’ may be cited as an 
illustration of this.  A more relevant example for IA IIa is David and Joab’s 
investment of Jebus (see 5.10. page 181). 
 
6.7.3.  Defending Fortifications.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                      
When a site was found that satisfied the basic overriding factors, then the business of 
fortification according to established defensive principles could begin.  Reconciling 
the above-named key factors with the given defensive principles was not easily 
accomplished because natural conditions in the Near East worked contrary to any 
such arrangement.  Siting a city on high ground (tactically advantageous) often 
removed it and its people from their water sources (logistically disastrous).  This was 
because such water sources, including wells, springs, streams and lakes, were mostly 
found in the low-lying areas.  Thus novel and sophisticated engineering entered the 
picture in order to secure water features within the city’s fortifications, such as the 
river passing under the walls of Babylon, or alternatively, to make ingenious tunnels 
that could reach subterranean water sources.  The magnificent tunnel commissioned 
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by Hezekiah (716 - 687 B.C.E), who feared an Assyrian attack and siege at Jerusalem 
in the light of Samaria’s recent capitulation to the Assyrian juggernaut (722 B.C.E) is 
an excellent example.  Hezekiah’s tunnel extends downwards from the fortified Old 
City to the Gihon Spring in the Kidron Valley.    
 
The rarity of finding sites that approximated the strategic conditions and the tactical 
principles resulted in these much sought-after topographical sites being continuously 
settled throughout the several political dispensations of the Near East.  The great 
value of historical records and material remains derive from this phenomenon of 
continuous settlement at selected key sites is self-evident to anthropology and its 
several sub-disciplines, including military archaeology.  Such settlement patterns 
produced the celebrated ‘tell’.  In antiquity such a rising mound accorded the site the 
tactical advantage of height over its immediate surroundings. 
 
However, over time, hundreds and in select cases, even thousands of years of building 
and rebuilding at a given site, the advantage of height was offset by two serious 
defects that undermined the defence value of the site.  These two problems – which 
when understood bring an expanded and better understanding to the cultural world of 
the ancient Near East, also go some way to giving a clear understanding of the 
dynamics that led to cities developing in the manner they did.  Firstly, as Yadin points 
out, the higher the tell got the softer its slopes became.  No longer were the slopes of 
natural rock but rather they were artificial composites, including mud bricks, loose 
rocks, and general earth-fill.  They were more easily eroded and more easily 
undermined by assaults from below.  Secondly, the higher the tell grew, the smaller 
the flat surface area became at the top of this artificial hill.  This had the drawback of 
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a reduced population and consequently, fewer defenders to defend the city from 
enemy attacks.  The ebb and flow of political realities in the world of the ancients 
often forced such evolving hilltop cities into a radical choice.  Either they had to 
abandon the city and begin again elsewhere because the defence value had finally 
been compromised and the limited number of defenders was now a untenable liability, 
or they had to build an extension of the city at the base of the tell.  Scarcity of suitable 
sites, sentimental attachment, developed agricultural holdings and an established local 
agrarian or mercantile economy, or the strategic value of the site all combined to 
decide in favour of the extended ‘lower –city’ option.  The loss of the tactical 
advantage of height amplified the need for fortifications around the lower city.  Walls, 
gates, moats, glaciers, towers and so forth were frequently included into the lower city 
defences, affecting the overall character of the now greatly enlarged city. 
 
The demographics of the Late Bronze and Early Iron Age, as it relates to city 
building, needs some attention in order to bring greater focus to the rubric of attack 
and defence of urban fortifications in the ancient world.  If one accepts Yadin’s 
assertion that there were approximately 240 inhabitants to an urban acre (4050 sq. 
meters in metric terms), the occupational density reached an index of 16.8, say 17 sq. 
meters per inhabitant– a tight squeeze in anybody’s language.  Thus, if the surface 
area is known the demographics of the cities can be guessed at with some degree of 
confidence.  Yadin further states (1963: 19) the average city area for cities in 
Palestine, Syria, Anatolia, and Mesopotamia ranged from five to ten acres.  
Accordingly, the population of these average-sized cities ranged between 1000 to 
3000 inhabitants.  The few larger cities totalled from 5000 to 10 000 persons.  
Anything larger was exceptional and needs to be studied apart in the light of its own 
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extraordinary circumstances.  Scholarly consensus suggests that about 25% of an 
ancient city’s population was available for military service which by extrapolation 
suggests that the average-sized cities could muster about 300 to 500 fighting men 
while the few larger ones had about 1000 to 3000.  The exceptionally large cities 
probably had several thousand soldiers to man the defences of the large city.  The 
benefit of a fortified lower city was a significant increase in the number of defenders 
for the city, with the original upper city becoming a citadel.  The citadel became a 
final point of defence in the event of the lower city walls being breached, scaled, 
undermined or otherwise overcome by the attackers.   With a better grasp of warfare 
involving fortified defences and the cultural backdrop in which such warfare 
occurred, a closer study of the principle components of fortification can be undertaken 
with greater prospects for the transmission of more reliable data and more intelligible 
interpretation thereof. 
6.7.4. Defensive Walls and Towers 
The principal aim of defensive walls must be sought within the context and scope of 
ancient warfare.  Walls obstructed movement and gave security to the defenders.  A 
defensive wall’s functional value lay in its capacity to resist breaching by scaling; 
thus it had to be high.  It had to resist breaching by penetration; thus it had to be thick.  
It had to resist breaching by undermining and thus the foundation of the wall had to be 
deep and broadly based (Yadin, 1963: 20).  Adding certain features to it could 
increase the strength and overall defence value of a wall.  By buttressing the wall at 
regular intervals, strength could be added.  The best form of buttressing was to in fact 
build towers and bastions that projected forward beyond the outer surface of the wall.  
This increased the arc of fire of the defenders and reduced the ‘blind spots’, also 
referred to as dead ground.  These blind spots were flaws in the fortification design 
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that lay outside the defenders field of vision or arc of fire.  Towers and balconies went 
far in correcting such fortification deficiencies.  The towers were carefully spaced 
taking the range of the bow into account.  By spacing the towers no more than twice 
the range of a bow, all such dead ground at the base of the wall could be covered by 
archers on the flanking towers.  Overhanging balconies were built onto the towers to 
further reduce the danger of dead ground along the base of the wall.  Through 
openings in the balcony floor objects could be dropped onto the attackers below, or 
the defenders could direct fire upon them from directly above.   
 
Excavations in Palestine have revealed the standard fortification wall for the period 
IA IIa was the casemate wall.  The casemate wall had its origins among the Hittites of 
Anatolia.  The Hittite capital Hattush (modern Boghazkoy) was protected by one of 
the finest examples of a casemate wall in the ancient Near East.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture of Hattush, p.112 
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(Picture from Cotterell’s The Encyclopedia of Ancient Civilisations, 1980:112).   
This type of fortification wall dates back to the Middle Bronze Age.  The Hittites are 
credited with their development and dissemination into Syria and Israel during the 
Neo-Hittite period.  Such a wall comprised an outer and an inner skin and a rubble or 
earthen-filled centre.  Sometimes as the derived Latin name suggests the area between 
the outer and inner walls was utilised as storage or living space.  Rooms (or in Latin 
‘casa’, meaning house) were built into the space between the walls, hence, ‘a wall 
with rooms’.  With no proper windows to let light in these rooms in the casemate 
walls must have been poorly lit, dark and dingy affairs.  Hence the Latin ‘motto’ from 
which the syllable mate comes, which means dim or dark.  Thus casemate walls were 
originally designed to include in their size the width of or space sufficient for a room.  
Security for the defenders was provided by an arrangement of crenellations or 
openings on the breastwork of the wall.  From between the merlons (as the ‘teeth’ 
were called) the defenders engaged the attackers with their ballistic weapons.  A 
closer look at Hattush’s casemate wall reveals both the towers and the crenellations 
(spaces between the merlons) along its breastwork.  
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The fortification wall was further strengthened and the approach to it made more 
difficult by digging a moat in front of it.  By packing the excavated earth from the 
moat against the base of the wall in a sloping fashion a glacis was formed.  Plastering 
its surface and in some instances also lining its surface with bricks or stone increased 
the durability of the glacis. These were important additions to military architecture in 
countering attempts to scale, penetrate, or undermine fortifications.  All the above 
fortification features already existed in the Middle Bronze Age as evidenced in the 
Beni-hasan wall painting (c.1900 BCE) and the fortifications of Buhen in Nubia (also 
c.1900 BCE).  Thus the question is begged – how come military architecture is so low 
key during IA IIa in terms of progress in scope, scale, and technical innovation 
standards as compared to the Middle and Late Bronze Age archaeological periods that 
preceded it?  Further thereto, why did progress in military architecture resume again 
so abruptly after the close of the IA IIa period?  A corollary question is what jump-
started the process following King Solomon’s reign?   
 
The political history aside, it is evident from the material remains of fortifications 
from IA IIb onwards that there were radical departures from some long-serving 
fortification features of IA IIa and earlier.  The most notable was the abandonment of 
the ubiquitous casemate wall, so characteristic of the IA IIa and the Bronze Age 
periods.  In its place from c.920 BCE came massive solid walls with salients and 
recesses.  These material remains witness the local response to the advent of ‘full-
blown imperialism’ (Knapp, 1988: 219).  Aggressive imperialism was a defining 
characteristic of the resurgent traditional great powers of the ancient Near East, viz. 
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Egypt and Mesopotamia, first in the guise of the mighty Neo-Assyrian Empire, and 
then the Neo-Babylonians and Persians one after the other. 
 
During IA IIa military architecture was designed to cope with the incursions of large 
militant migrations, the likes of the Sea Peoples, the tribes of Israel, or Midianite 
nomadic warriors, all of whom had no more than a regional war potential at best with 
a commensurate limited military potential.  Most military potentials of IA IIa did not 
include significant siege warfare doctrine or equipment in their establishment.  Thus 
casemate walls and other enduring fortification features from the Bronze Age were 
sufficient to the circumstances of warfare during IA IIa.  Such walls were however 
rendered obsolete very quickly once the great powers revived, bringing with them an 
array of siege equipment, the military doctrine for the effective employment of such, 
and the war potential to sustain siege operations.  The reappearance of battering rams, 
now even more powerful in the Iron Age, promptly exposed the limitations of the 
casemate wall still prevalent during IA IIa.  Beginning with Pharaoh Sheshonq 1 
(alternatively Shishak) in 925 BCE, the evolution of technology once more rendered 
obsolete what had been to-date a key security feature of people living within the 
expanse of the ancient Near East.    
 
6.7.5. Gates and Towers 
Typically the gate was the weak point of the city’s walled defences.  Its function was 
to facilitate controlled access to the city.  Thus it was a prime target for enemy attack.  
By the onset of IA IIa city gates had already evolved into sophisticated pieces of 
military architecture. So imposing were the gate defences over the course of time that 
modern archaeologists have come to speak of gate complexes.  Yadin traces the 
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evolution of the gate as a key element of military architecture (1963:21-22).  Early 
Iron Age military architecture was clearly a slow continuance of military architectural 
standards from the preceding Late-Bronze Age.  The process served as a mirror of the 
war potential at large in a given period and place.  Saul and David only slowly 
transformed the war potential of Israel from a tribal confederacy to a centralised 
nation-state.   
 
There is a profound contrast between the standards of Saul and David’s 
predominantly Bronze-Age technology and standard of fortifications, and the 
significantly larger and more complex military architecture of Solomon’s 
fortifications.  This was in consequence to the greater diffusion of iron working 
knowledge and technology.  Solomonic era fortifications are a clear indicator of 
changes in war potential between the Solomonic era and the preceding Israelite 
monarchs.  This assertion is born out by a comparison of the Late Bronze Age fortress 
at Haruvit along a key trade highway and line of communication between Egypt and 
Canaan.  The fort plan shows a strong but simplistic elongated gate complex.  Gate 
complexes in particular are a useful indicator of the levels of sophistication in military 
architecture.  Tracing the evolutionary changes in gate complexes from the sketch 
below to the end of IA IIa will amplify this assertion. 
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(Picture from Mazar’s Archaeology and the Land of the Bible, 1990:280) 
 
Typically in IA IIa, cities were located atop their natural or artificial hills and the gate 
complex was reached from ground level by an approach road. The art of warfare had 
made clear to military architects since the Bronze Age that the approach to a city’s 
gate was not an incidental matter. When facing the city, the approach road led up to 
the gate complex in a way that obliged enemy troops to expose their unshielded right 
side to hostile fire. Topography permitting, it ran from left to right across the front 
walls of the city.   
 
The gate complex sought to minimize the vulnerability of the gate in the city’s 
fortifications.  In time a second or lower gate structure was erected forward of the 
main gate along the approach road, preferably located to the right of the main gate.  
High walls flanked the road between the gates, creating an enclosed courtyard.  
Should the attackers penetrate this first gate, their advance would be arrested at the 
main gate.  Between these gates they would be boxed together in a tight mass 
presenting themselves as an easy target to the defenders of the gate complex.  The 
right-angled arrangement between the two complementary gates worked against any 
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attempt by the attacking force to opportunistically charge through the gate with 
mounted troops should it be opened to them.  It also resisted efforts to employ siege 
engines, including battering rams, directly against the main gates.    
 
It was mainly during King Solomon’s reign that a chariotry arm was added to the 
Israelite army which to that point had been predominantly an infantry force.  It is in 
the Solomonic era that Israel’s military architecture began to make provision for 
chariotry in its establishment.  The gate itself, usually a double door to allow for the 
size of chariots, was made of large timber beams.  As iron became more 
commonplace iron studs were fixed into the wooden surfaces of the doors to add 
strength and hardness to them and to make such doors more resistant to axe strokes.  
In time metal plates were affixed to front of the doors to reduce the possibility of 
destroying the doors by fire.  To strengthen the weak centre-line of the double-doors, 
a sliding heavy beam was employed to brace the closed doors from behind.  The walls 
on either side of the doors had customised recesses in them.  The heavy beam slid out 
from the one particularly deep wall recess, across the back of the door, and into its 
corresponding recess-mate on the other side of the heavy double-door.  The large, 
heavy doors of the gate swung open on posts “recessed into a wood lintel at the top 
  and set into stone sockets at the bottom” (Wright, 1974: 109). 
 
With his hugely increased war potential Solomon invested heavily into the 
fortification of key strategic sites, including Gezer, Megiddo, and Hazor.  The 
strategic value of these particular sites was already long established back in the Early 
Bronze Age.  Spectacular fortification works of optimum defence value for their 
period were further developed at the above named cities.  To increase efficiency in 
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design and cost effectiveness of construction, the same excellent architectural plans 
were used at the three strategic cities.  The top view of the gate complex at Megiddo 
shows the approaches to the first gate firstly from a left to right orientation that would 
expose the shieldless side of troops advancing on the gate complex.  Secondly, a 
smaller outer gate structure creates a courtyard between it and the main gate structure, 
all surrounded by high strong walls.  Thirdly, the main gate is located at right angles 
to the axis of approach, precluding the employment of battering rams against the main 
gate structure itself.  Fourth, the outer and the main gate structure channel foot and 
other traffic through doorways narrower than the passages leading to and from them.  
This would limit any numerical advantages the attackers may have in the melee, 
affording the defenders the advantage of greater numbers in the fight at the critical 
points of entry and exit.  The narrow portals would also deny large siege equipment 
access to the main gate structure’s doors.  Fifth, the offset angle will reduce the 
impetus and the impact of the charge, again minimising the advantages attackers 
would typically have if fighting in the open.  The additional interconnected towers 
that supported large roof platforms clearly illustrate the defence value of this structure 
and how extremely challenging it must have been for attacking enemy forces to get 
within striking distance of the main gate.  Not shown in the top views are the glacis 
and the revetment walls which were intended to frustrate scaling equipment, 
undermining efforts, and kept mobile rams at a safe distance from the walls.    
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(Picture from Mazar’s Archaeology and the Land of the Bible, 1990:384).  
The top view of the same gate complex at Gezer, Hazor, and Megiddo identifies 
dressed stone pilasters that served multiple functions.  Foremost, they were the 
primary supports for the roof structure above the gate.  The spaces between the 
pilasters also could serve as defence bays in which the defending soldiers could take 
up defensive positions, or as excavations showed at various sites, these bays were 
walled in to make storerooms or guardrooms.  The pilasters could support multiple 
interior doors making a forced entry through the gate complex very difficult indeed. 
 
 
 
 
 275
 
 
 
 
 
Gezer        Hazor 
(Pictures from Mazar’s Archaeology and the Land of the Bible, 1990: 384). 
 
The final observation for this chapter on military architecture rests with the 
proposition that all fortifications, regardless of spatial, temporal, geographic or 
cultural parameters, rely on two principal themes for their optimal efficiency as 
defence works; elevation is the first and enclosure is the second.  Through these two 
themes archaeologists may access the merits of all military architecture before them.   
 
CHAPTER 7.  CONCLUSION 
Syro-Palestine, the land bridge between the three continents that makes a world – 
island comprising Africa, Europe and Asia is the spatial stage for the study of Israel’s 
development and its employment of military statecraft during the period Iron Age IIa.  
This temporal window was one of a few rare and peculiar periods when the 
gatekeepers of the land-bridge became a regional power in the ancient Near East.  
This dissertation has outlined a matrix of prevailing IA IIa cultural circumstances set 
against the polemological factors constituting the foundations of military force.  
Modern concepts of polemology have been used in the belief that military 
archaeology without such concepts is but another brand of subjective ‘drum and 
bugle’ history writing.  The aim of the research has been to show the cultural 
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backdrop of common man in the political setting of IA IIa.  It soon becomes clear that 
the political world of the common man entailed incessant warfare.  The latter was the 
societal norm rather than peaceful cohabitation notwithstanding generalised 
perceptions to the contrary.  This dissertation excludes the normative domain from its 
scope and strives to work only in the empirical and analytical domains of science.    
 
The selection of time refined social science concepts that are relevant for this 
examination of man in the context of IA IIa Syro-Palestine have to be balanced 
against the challenges of ethnocentricity and anachronistic bias.  In this quest for 
accuracy and relevance it was useful to list the factors that are unaffected by time and 
culture.  It has also been useful to place the many political irruptions into types and 
categories.  Human nature motivated by caprice, pride, ignorance and bias and those 
several other inputs that provoke the decision for warfare in human society has 
likewise been unaffected by the march of time.  Sensitivity to the limitation of texts 
and primary sources all provide for a more trustworthy analysis of the IA IIa 
lifeworld. 
 
In the nature of military force it is the concept of a war potential that stands at centre 
stage.  This is the substance of military statecraft.  It gives political weight and muscle 
to other more benign forms of statecraft such as economics, cultural exchange, and 
diplomacy.  It extends to all aspects of a society and its values, including within its 
scope both practical and intangible aspects.  Phenomena such as the economy, 
technical sophistry, national ethos, geographic factors and demographics all added 
together determine a political entity’s war potential.  The military potential of a nation 
is a subset of its war potential.  A political entity’s total, general, and operational 
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strategies are circumscribed by its war potential.   Essentially, all strategy is 
methodology and it has a consistent aim: the creating of untenable situations for 
opponents.  The ‘creating’ of such circumstances is what gives warfare its art aspect.  
Strategy has a reciprocal relationship with technology.  Technological sophistication 
is critically important to fleshing out the cultural backdrop of a political entity.  This 
may be the result of cultural communication or even acculturation.  Technical 
sophistry informs the selection of strategy and the development of tactical practicum 
in polemology.  To ignore aspects of logistics is to render the accuracy of an 
examination of military force meaningless at a stroke.  The notes on logistics are 
explicitly extensive for at least three reasons.  Firstly, logistics makes up as much as 
nine tenths of the business of war (Van Creveld, 1977: 231), which is essentially the 
content of this dissertation.  Secondly, to avoid the oft made error of lip-service to 
logistics that is so common to the work of several writers on military matters.  Finally, 
the bias of New Archaeology demands that such a practical approach take its proper 
precedence over the political – historical approach which has tended to track the life 
and works of the elite with scant regard for the lot of the commoner.   
 
To this end chapter six places the artefacts associated with warfare in a holistic 
cultural context.  The preceding chapters will afford a more accurate interpretation of 
these material cultural remains.  Insights from such research will provide a valid test 
for our existing assumptions of the lifeworld of the common man in antiquity.  
Understanding the context of such material remains increases the anthropologist’s 
capacity to understand them and interpret them intelligibly.  When considered 
holistically the chapters of this dissertation have established an informed visage of the 
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political dynamics that shaped the lifeworld of the common person in the period 
catalogued by archaeologists as Iron Age IIa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8.  BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Barker, Phil.  1980.  Wargames Rules 3000 to 1485 AD.  Sussex: Flexiprint Ltd.  
Beaufre, Andre.  1965.  An Introduction to Strategy.  London: Faber and Faber. 
Bible Lands, Photographs, Maps, and Commentary.  1986. The Church of Jesus  
  Christ of Latter-day Saints. 
Bimson, J. J., Kane, J. P., Paterson, J. P. & Wiseman, D. J.  1992.  New Bible Atlas.   
Leicester:  Inter-Varsity Press. 
Blaiklock E.M. and Harrison R.K (eds.) 1983.  The New International Dictionary of 
  Biblical Archaeology.  Grand Rapids: Regency. 
Blainey, Geoffrey N.  1976.  The Causes of War.  Melbourne: Sun Books Ltd.   
 279
Burger, Marlene.  1992.  Reference Techniques.  1st edition.  Pretoria: University of  
South Africa. 
Bury, J.B. and Meiggs, R.  1991.  A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the  
Great.  4th Edition.  London: Macmillan Education Ltd. 
Cary, M and Scullard, H.H.  1991.  A History of Rome, Down to the Reign of   
Constantine.  3rd Edition.  London: Macmillan Education Ltd. 
Church Educational System.  1981.  Old Testament: Genesis – 2 Samuel (Religion  
301). Student Manual, 2nd Edition.  Salt Lake City: The Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 
Connolly, Peter, 1975. The Roman Army.  London: Macdonald & Company. 
Consolidated-Webster Encyclopaedic Dictionary.  1962.  New York: Consolidated   
Book Publishers. 
Collins English Dictionary.  2001.  Glasgow: HarperCollins. 
Coggins, Jack, 1967.  By Star and Compass.  Kingswood & London: World’s Work  
Limited. 
Cotterell, Arthur, (ed.).1980.  The Encyclopaedia of Ancient Civilisations.  London:   
Windward   
Craffert, P.F.  1998.  New Archaeology and Cultural Analysis: mediating divine  
power and healing the sick. (BAR304-D).  Goodwood: National 
Commercial Printers.   
Craffert, P.F. (ed.) 1995.  Biblical Archaeology: only study guide for Bar 100-Y.   
Pretoria: University of South Africa.   
Consolidated-Webster Encyclopaedic Dictionary.  1962.  New York: Consolidated   
  Book Publishers.. 
Davis, Adelle.  1981.  Let’s Stay Healthy: A Guide to Lifelong Nutrition.  London:  
 280
Allen and Unwin. 
Douglas, J.D. (ed.). 1974.  The New Bible Dictionary.  London: Inter-Varsity Press 
Dupuy, T.  1984.  The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare.  New York: Da Capo Press 
Faure, A.M. 1988.  Political Science: study guide 1 for PCS 201-J.  Revised edition.  
Pretoria: University of South Africa.    
Faure, A.M. 1988.  Political Science: study guide 1 for PCS 201-J.  Revised edition.  
Pretoria: University of South Africa.    
Fourie, D.F.S.  1996.  Strategic Studies: honours study guide for STUSTO-S.   
  Revised Edition.  Pretoria: University of South Africa 
Fuller, J.F.C.  1991. The Generalship of Alexander the Great.  Herts, U.K: Spa Books  
Ltd. 
Gottwald, Norman K.  1987.  The Hebrew Bible, A Socio-Literary Introduction. 
  Philadelphia:  Fortress Press   
 
Heath, E.G.  1980.  Archery, A Military History.  London: Osprey Publishing Ltd. 
Howard, Michael and Paret, Peter (editors and translators).  1976.  Carl von  
Clausewitz, On War.  Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Jones, Archer.  1987.  The Art of War in the Western World.  Oxford: The Oxford  
University Press. 
Kagen, Donald.  1995.  On the Origins of War.  London: Pimlico of Random House. 
Keegan John and Holmes Richard.  1987.  Soldiers; A History of Men in Battle.   
London: Sphere Books Ltd.  
Knapp, A. Bernard.  1988.  The History and Culture of Ancient Western Asia and  
Egypt.  Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company. 
Matthews, Victor H.  1995.  Manners and Customs in the Bible.  (Revised Edition)   
Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers. 
Mazar, Amihai.  1990.  Archaeology of the Land of the Bible, 10 000 – 586 B.C.E.   
 281
New York: Doubleday. 
Merit Student Encyclopedia.  1973.  S.v. ‘Swords and Daggers’.  New York:  
Montgomery, Bernard.  1972.  A Concise History of Warfare.  London: Collins. 
Miller, J. M. and Hayes John H.  1986.  A History of Ancient Israel and Judah.   
Philadelphia: Westminster Press. 
Negev, Avraham.  1972.  Archaeological Encyclopedia of the Holy Land.  Jerusalem:  
  Weidenheld and Nicolson 
Reader’s Digest Atlas of the Bible.  1981.  New York: Readers Digest. 
Spence, I.G.  1993.  The Cavalry of Classical Greece.  Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Van Crefeld, Martin.  1977.  Supplying War; Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton.   
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Vermaak, P. S.  1996a.  Department of Semitics.  Ancient Near East: tutorial letter for  
ANE100-A (103/1996, study unit 1).  Pretoria: University of South 
Africa. 
Vermaak, P. S.  1996b.  Department of Semitics.  Ancient Near East: tutorial letter for  
ANE100-A (104/1996, study units 2 and 3).  Pretoria: University of 
South Africa. 
Vermaak, P.S.  1996c. Department of Semitics, Ancient Near East: tutorial letter for  
ANE100- A (106/1996, study unit 5).  Pretoria:  University of South 
Africa.  
Vogel, U. and Van Oosten, H.  1983.  Ancient History: study guide 2 for AHS 100-6  
(History of the Ancient Near East).  Pretoria: University of South 
Africa.     
Warry, John.  1980.  Warfare in the Classical World.  London: Salamander Books.  
 282
 Weapons: An International Encyclopedia from 5000 B.C. to 2000 A.D.  1982.   
   Paperback edition.  London: Macmillan. 
Wilkinson, Richard H.  1994.  The language of the body: the symbolism of gesture,  
from Symbol and Magic in Egyptian Art, pp 192 – 211.  London: 
Thames and Hudson LTD. 
Windrow, Martin (ed.), 1981.  Ancient Armies of the Middle East.  London: Osprey.   
Wiseman, D.J. (ed.), 1973.  Peoples of the Old Testament.  Oxford: The Clarendon 
  Press. 
Wright, G. Earnest. 1974.  Great People of the Bible and How They Lived.  New  
  York: The Readers Digest Association, Inc. 
Yadin, Yigael, 1963.  The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands in the Light of  
Archaeological Discovery.  London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
Zertal, Adam.  1988.  The Water Factor During the Israelite Settlement Process in  
Canaan, in Society and Economy in the Eastern Mediterranean (c.  
1500 – 1000 B.C.), editors, M. Heltzer and E. Lipinski.  Leuven:  
Uitgeverij Peeters.  Pages 341 – 352.  
   
